Racial Subordination through Formal Equal Opportunity by Brooks, Roy L.
San Diego Law Review 
Volume 25 
Issue 5 Civil Rights Symposium Article 2 
9-1-1988 
Racial Subordination through Formal Equal Opportunity 
Roy L. Brooks 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Roy L. Brooks, Racial Subordination through Formal Equal Opportunity, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 879 (1988). 
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol25/iss5/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, 
please contact digital@sandiego.edu. 
Racial Subordination Through Formal
Equal Opportunity
ROY L. BROOKS*
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 881
II. FORMAL EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ........................................ 885
11. THE BLACK M IDDLE CLASS .......................................... 898
A. Defining Characteristics ......................................... 898
B. The Subordination Question ..................................... 902
1. Dominant Class Problems .................................... 902
2. Racial Subordination ........................................ 913
a. Strict Scrutiny Test .................................. 913
b. Title VII ............................................ 917
3. Sum m ary .................................................. 926
IV. THE BLACK WORKING CLASS ......................................... 928
A. Defining Characteristics ......................................... 928
B. The Subordination Question ..................................... 931
1. Dominant Class Problems .................................... 931
a. H ousing ............................................ 932
b. Education ........................................... 934
1) Primary Education ............................... 934
2) Higher Education ................................ 936
2. Racial Subordination ........................................ 937
a. H ousing ............................................ 937
1) Intent Test ...................................... 937
2) Strict Scrutiny Test .............................. 942
3) Fair Housing Act ................................ 945
4) Damages and Protracted Litigation ................. 947
b. Education ........................................... 949
1) Primary Education ............................... 949
2) Higher Education ................................ 953
3. Sum m ary .................................................. 958
V. THE BLACK UNDERCLASS ............................................ 960
A. Defining Characteristics ......................................... 960
B. The Subordination Question ..................................... 964
1. Dominant Class Problems .................................... 964
a. Three Current Theories ........................ 964
b. A Different Theory ................................... 967
2. Racial Subordination .................................... 974
a. Slavery and Jim Crow ............................... 974
b. Formal Equal Opportunity ........................... 978
3. Summary ............................................... 981
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................... 982
[VOL. 25: 879, 1988] Racial Subordination
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW





Since the death of Jim Crow, national policymakers have at-
tempted to nurture a new prescription for regulating socio-legal rela-
tions between Black and White Americans. Although far more
moral, decent, and consistent with the values of a liberal democratic
state than pervasive racial humiliation sanctioned under Jim Crow,
the new racial blueprint - what might be called "formal equal op-
portunity"' - has proven to be an imperfect formula. For the social
explorer looking for a cure for racial inequality, formal equal oppor-
tunity has too often proven to be little more than a modern-day dino-
saur born extinct. For this reason, formal equal opportunity may not
be the final expression of interracial relations in the United States.
Three decades after Brown v. Board of Education2 presaged Jim
Crow's belated demise - a time in which academic lawyers have
stimulated some of the most penetrating thinking on civil rights
laws3 - the problem of according Black Americans equal opportu-
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego. B.A. 1972, University of Connecti-
cut; J.D. 1975, Yale University.
1. See infra text accompanying note 19 for a definition of formal equal
opportunity.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Arranged alphabetically by author, the following commentaries are among
the seminal writings on civil rights law during the last 34 years: Ackerman, Integration
for Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 245 (1974); Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term - Foreward: The Civil Rights
Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985); Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term -
Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); Bittker, The Case of the
Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387
(1962); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960);
Blasi, Bakke As Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 67 CALIF. L. REV.
nity in fact as well as in name seems more puzzling than at any
other time in American history. Rather than clarification, Americans
face an enigma at every major turn: Why, after passage of hundreds
of civil rights laws at the national, state, and local levels, do Black
Americans seem worse off socially and economically than Black
Americans were under Jim Crow? Has the "American Dilemma"4
(the American race problem, or unequal socioeconomic conditions in
Black America) metamorphosized from a pre-1960s problem of race
21 (1979); Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Foreword: In Defense of the An-
tidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); Brooks, Affirmative Action In
Law Teaching, 14 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 15 (1982); Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80
HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966); Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Delgado,
Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, 17
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit
Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977); Ely, The
Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); Fiss,
The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1979); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law:
A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Graglia,
Special Admission of the "Culturally Deprived" to Law School, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 351(1970); Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preferences in Law School
Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (1975); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Hellerstein, The Benign Quota,
Equal Protection, and "The Rule in Shelley's Case'" 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 531 (1963);
Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473
(1962); Horowitz, Unseparate but Unequal-The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Is-
sue in Public School Education, 13 UCLA L. REV. 1147 (1966); Jordan, Taking Voting
Rights Seriously: Rediscovering the Fifteenth Amendment, 64 NEB. L. REV. 389 (1985);
Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of
Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966); Karst, The Supreme Court, 1977
Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1977); Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L.
REV. 955 (1974); Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988); Marshall, A Comment on the Nondis-
crimination Principle in a "Nation of Minorities," 93 YALE L.J. 1006 (1984);
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); O'Neil, Racial Pref-
erence and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. REV. 925 (1974); Pollak,
Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U.
PA. L. REV. 1 (1959); Snadalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Re-
sponsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975); St. Antoine, Color
Blindness but not Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal Protection, and "Pri-
vate" Racial Discrimination, 59 MICH. L. REV. 993 (1961); Tribe, Perspectives on
Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structural Justice?, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 864 (1979); Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitution, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 775 (1979); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14
STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961); Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An
Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581 (1977); Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); Wright, Color-Blind The-
ories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 213 (1979).
4. See G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MOD-
ERN DEMOCRACY (1944).
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into a post-1960s problem of class and power? If today's civil rights
problem translates into class warfare, is it amenable to a resolution
through the civil rights laws?
These questions will continue to frustrate analysis and action in
civil rights unless changes are made in the way legal scholars within
and outside law schools think about civil rights laws and practices
developed to promote formal equal opportunity. Modern civil rights
inquiry tends to proceed along, or at least incorporates in major
ways, two traditional lines of legal analysis taught in American law
schools.' One is formalistic, the major concern of which is the inter-
nal order of law, deductive logic, or what Roberto Unger has called
"a restrained, relatively apolitical method of analysis."' The other is
instrumental, in which there is less concern with the immanent ra-
tionality of law - with perfectly symmetrical positioning of legal
premises - than with a utilitarian rationality of law - law's social
consequences.7 My criticism of civil rights analysis has less to do
with a particular mode of inquiry' than with the failure of commen-
tators employing legal conceptual schemes to ask the right question
- the "subordination question."
The subordination question calls for more than a discussion of the
various ways in which antidiscrimination laws subordinate Black
Americans.9 It requires one to be at particular pains to pinpoint and
5. Perhaps the best introduction to legal formalism and legal instrumentalism is
still to be found in the writings of Justice Holmes. See, e.g., 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW (M. Howe ed. 1963); Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897);
Holmes, Codes and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1870), reprinted in
44 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1931). Holmes, of course was highly critical of legal formalism.
His legal perspective was largely derived from Jeremy Bentham and other early English
utilitarians. See, e.g., H. POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND UTILITA-
RIAN JURISPRUDENCE (1984). For a 'recent defense of formalism, see, Weinrib, Legal
Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988).
6. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 565
(1983).
7. Most civil rights scholars today lean toward instrumentalism. See, e.g., Bell,
supra note 3, at 80; Brooks, supra note 3, at 35; Ely, supra note 3, at 723; Karst &
Horowitz, supra note 3, at 964-66; Michelman, supra note 3, at 13; Van Alstyne, supra
note 3, at 803-10; Wasserstrom, supra note 3, at 615-22.
8. A utilitarian approach does, however, seem fundamentally sound, if not abso-
lutely necessary, in a complex, changing society. Moreover, assessing the social results of
a rule of law is the only way to determine its success or failure, or, to paraphrase
Holmes, to determine whether a rule of law can be tamed and made a useful animal.
See, Holmes The Path of Law, supra note 5, at 469.
9. This is how issues of racial subordination are normally treated, if raised at all.
See, e.g., D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 41 (2d ed. 1980); NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AND COMMUNITY COMPETENCE(0. Barbarin, P. Good, 0. Pharr, & J. Siskin eds. 1981); Bell, supra note 3; Kennedy,
then to analyze the subordinating force or mechanism in civil rights
law, which I believe to be formal equal opportunity. Taking formal
equal opportunity as the subordinating agent, my analysis of the
concept leAds me to conclude as follows: If we are to believe, as I
think we must,10 that formal equal opportunity is intended to cure
the damage caused by racism - unequal socioeconomic conditions,
or in other words, the American race problem - then formal equal
opportunity is a tailed public policy. Too often formal equal opportu-
nity subordinates each class within Black society, and this racial sub-
ordination feeds the American race problem. Whether racial subor-
dination is engineered through avowed, unconscious, or
institutionalized racism or through a nonracial balancing of con-
traposed interests is quite beside the point. The point is that Black
Americans are subordinated and suffering; their civil rights interests
receive relatively low or no deference at critical moments and the
American race problem continues unabated. This is, indeed, ironic
because civil rights is the one arena in American society in which
Black interests should receive top priority.
In short, the subordination question is primarily concerned with
formal equal opportunity's implementation,"' and envisions that an
analysis of such will proceed along a particular line of inquiry, which
has two basic features. The first feature requires that the discussion
of racial subordination be deeply anchored in the social and eco-
nomic stratification that now characterizes Black society.' 2 Civil
rights analysis resting on a clear understanding of socioeconomic
class within Black society will facilitate pointed examination of is-
sues of race and class. It can help to determine, for example,
whether systemic racial subordination ended with slavery and Jim
Crow, or whether the historical process of racial subordination con-
tinues to exist but in a different form.
The second feature of the analysis calls for a precise articulation
of the nexus between current racial subordination and the American
race problem - socioeconomic vulnerability within Black society. In
this way the disutility of civil rights laws in the lives of Black Ameri-
cans can be clearly seen. Also, the manner in which the nation's in-
terracial regulatory system interferes with a resolution of the Ameri-
can race problem can, once again, be plainly established.
In focusing on the subordination question, my treatment of racial
Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARv. L.
REv. 1327, 1342-44 (1986). For a definition of racial subordination, see infra text ac-
companying note 13.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 15-19, 57-58.
11. See infra text accompanying note 19 for a discussion of the meaning of for-
mal equal opportunity.
12. See infra Parts III A, IV A, V A. See also W. WILSON, THE DECLINING
SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 152 (1978).
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subordination in civil rights - the notion that civil rights doctrine,
practices, and policy give low priority to matters of keen interest to
Black Americans or otherwise call upon Black Americans to endure
a disproportionate share of societal hardships 13 - differs signifi-
cantly from that offered by other "revisionists" civil rights scholars,
the most prominent being Derrick Bell. 4 Rather than discuss how
the civil rights laws subordinate Black Americans, I attempt to iden-
tify the subordinating force within civil rights law and analyze its
racial subordination in a way that is more sensitive to class stratifica-
tion in today's Black society and in a way that connects racial subor-
dination to unequal socioeconomic conditions in Black society. In the
process, I attempt to restructure Black society into three distinct so-
cioeconomic classes - the Black middle class, the Black working
class, and the Black underclass - to reflect Black society's current
reality. In short, how racial subordination through formal equal op-
portunity is manifested along class lines and how it affects the
American race problem are the major elements of what I call the
subordination question.
I have attempted to pull together this genre of civil rights analysis
in the pages of this article. My basic thesis is the following: To the
extent that formal equal opportunity is intended to be a cure for the
American race problem, it is a failed public policy, because although
conceptually sound, it is operationally flawed. The endeavor to expli-




Formal equal opportunity is the nation's fundamental civil rights
public policy. Like its predecessor civil rights policy (the separate-
but-equal policy under Jim Crow 5), formal equal opportunity seeks
13. See sources cited supra note 9. For a discussion of racial subordination as a
form of racism, see, e.g., Brooks, Anti-Minority Mindset in the Law School Personnel
Process: Toward an Understanding of Racial Mindsets, 5 L. & INEQUALITY J. 101, 109
(1987).
14. See D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987). Revisionist scholarship also includes works by Chrenshaw, Delgado,
Freeman, Jordan, Kennedy, and other writings by Bell cited supra notes 3 and 9. For a
discussion of revisionist civil rights scholarship in the larger context of civil rights scho-
larhip, see infra text accompanying note 53.
15. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) established separate-but-equal as a
national civil rights policy.
to regulate in rather broad terms the treatment government, and to a
lesser extent private individuals, accord to society's racial groups in
relation to one another. Formal equal opportunity, in other words,
determines the direction and tone of interracial relations in our soci-
ety today.
Clearly, the past holds the key to understanding formal equal op-
portunity. The meaning and significance of this civil rights policy is
rooted in the community attitudes and beliefs that fueled Jim Crow's
separate-but-equal policy. For, formal equal opportunity is intended
to run in the opposite direction of Jim Crow policy and all that such
policy represents. 6
The community attitudes and beliefs of a Jim Crow nation, which,
of course, did not include Black community attitudes and beliefs,
were unmistakable. Black Americans were regarded as an alien
breed lower than the community of White Americans. Several un-
kind stereotypes of Black Americans lay at the bottom of this cruel
view of Black Americans. Blacks were thought to be beastial, un-
teachable, uncouth, odious, and inferior to Whites in every essential
respect. In 1896, the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson' deter-
mined that these community attitudes and beliefs had gelled into a
strong community expectation concerning interracial relations - the
races are to be held separate but equal, meaning, of course, unequal.
The separate-but-equal policy, supported by a prominent Black
American, Booker T. Washington, was thereby born, and a parade
of laws designed to enforce it soon followed. These laws, which man-
dated "Colored" and White public accommodations, schools, librar-
ies, restrooms, drinking fountains, and so forth, as well as condoned
ubiquitous discrimination against Black Americans, 18 endured until
formal equal opportunity reached the level of public policy in the
1950s and 1960s.
Formal equal opportunity is a first-time blend of Black (genuine
Black) and White community expectations having the force of law.
At its most basic level, formal equal opportunity can be defined as a
civil rights policy in which Black and White Americans are held to
be of equal legal status. The races are deemed to differ in no legally
material way. They are, therefore, entitled to equal legal treatment.
Racism and its humiliating effects - segregation and discrimination
- are no longer the official policies of or condoned by the
16. For an extensive discussion of the transition from a separate-but-equal public
policy to one of formal equal opportunity, see, e.g., J. WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE:
AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965 (1987); R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE
(1976); C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d. ed. 1966).
17. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
18. See, e.g., J. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 37-257; R. KLUGER, supra note 16,
at 1-256; C. WOODWARD, supra note 16, at 67-110.
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government. 19
Formal equal opportunity has not, of course, reversed all negative
attitudes White Americans held toward Black Americans in the Jim
Crow era. Racism and stereotypes of Black Americans continue to
thrive in our society. The survival of these racial attitudes does not,
however, call into question formal equal opportunity's legitimacy as
our current public policy. So many social institutions and conven-
tions have been built around formal equal opportunity that commu-
nity expectations favoring formal equal opportunity are clearly
stronger and more consistent with our liberal democratic society
than those favoring separate-but-equal treatment.
In Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, we
learn that new paradigms often have a long and uncertain gestation
period.20 The same is true with formal equal opportunity. The first
serious indication that formal equal opportunity might replace sepa-
rate-but-equal as the nation's civil rights policy came during the Sec-
ond World War. President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802
on June 25, 1941, which (in what has become standard legal jargon
for creating formal equal opportunity rules of law) "prohibited dis-
crimination on the basis of race, creed, [or] color . . ." in certain
areas of federal employment, vocational training programs adminis-
tered by federal agencies, and the national defense industry.21 Exec-
utive Order 8802 also created a federal agency, called the Fair Em-
ployment Practice Committee, which was authorized to receive and
investigate charges of employment discrimination, redress proven
grievances, and make recommendations to effectuate the Executive
Order's purposes.22
Flashes of formal equal opportunity appeared in the military itself
during the Second World War. Prior to the War, Black Americans
in the armed services were confined to segregated units and assigned
noncombat, low-status jobs, usually in labor details. Black soldiers in
the First World War, for example, were trained in the United
States, often using broom sticks as weapons, but fought gallantly in
Europe not as Americans but as part of the French armed forces.
The experiences of Black soldiers, in other words, reflected the ex-
periences of Blacks in American society as a whole under Jim Crow.
By the end of the Second World War: the army desegregated most
19. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1970).
21. Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1941).
22. Id.
of its officer candidate schools, but Army Air Corps training was still
segregated; the Navy had its first Black commissioned officer, but
Black sailors generally were permitted to serve on ships only as mess
stewards; and the Marine Corps, which had been exclusively White
since the late 18th century, enlisted Black Americans but assigned
them to segregated units.2"
Although racial progress in the military during World War II was
minor, matters were greatly improved by the time the next major
war came about. Black Americans were allowed to fight for their
country in all branches of the service in desegregated units during
the Korean War. This turn of events was the direct result of Execu-
tive Order 9981, signed by President Truman on July 26, 1948,
which required "equality of treatment and opportunity for all per-
sons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or
national origin.12 4 A companion order, Executive Order 9980, signed
on the same day, brought formal equal opportunity to most areas
within the federal government's civilian departments.2"
More than the altruism of lawmakers, the confluence of several
domestic and international conditions brought about these early
promulgations of formal equal opportunity. Demographic changes in
the industrialized North was a crucial factor. Between 1940 and
1944, 470,000 Black Americans moved from the rural regions of the
South to the urban areas of the North looking for better jobs and
better racial relations. This influx of Black Americans had to be ab-
sorbed by the cities, placed desegregative pressures on employment
markets, and, most importantly, provided a welcomed supply of male
labor for hungry civilian industries supporting the war effort.26
The war itself was an important motivation for the executive or-
ders issued by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. Fighting for de-
mocracy abroad made it increasingly difficult to defend racial op-
pression at home. Black Americans, who saw the contradiction,
applied pressure on government officials by increasing demonstration
marches and other forms of protests. Union leader A. Philip Ran-
dolph's threatened march on Washington in 1940, which helped to
persuade President Roosevelt to issue Executive Order 8808, is an
23. See, e.g., Moskos, Blacks in the Army: Success Story, CURRENT, Sept. 1986
at 10; McGuire, Desegragation of the Armed Forces: Black Leadership, Protest and
World War 11, 63 J. NEGRO HIsT. 147-58 (1983); Schafer, Freedom Was As Close As
The River: The Blacks of Northeast Florida and the Civil War, 23 ESCRIBANO 91-116
(1986); Howard-Filler, Two Different Battles, 71 MICH. HIsT. 30-33 (1987); Dowd, Dec-
larations of Dependence: War and Inequality in Revolutionary New Jersey, 1776-1815,
103 N.J. HIsT. 46-47 (1985). One of the best books on Blacks in the military is R. HOPE,
RACIAL STRIFE IN THE U.S. MILITARY (1979).
24. Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1948).
25. Exec. Order No. 9980, 3 C.F.R. 720 (1948).
26. See generally J. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY To FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NE-
GRO AMERICANS 523-545 (3d ed. 1969).
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example of the new activism that took hold of Black Americans. The
success of an activist form of Black self-help also served to convince
Booker T. Washington's followers that it was time to jettison their
support for separate-but-equal and embrace a more assertive civil
rights policy - formal equal opportunity - advocated by such
Black leaders as W.E.B. DuBois and A. Philip Randolph."
Finally, the rise of Keynesian economics and the decline of laissez-
faire economics in the United States during the 1930's made govern-
ment-intervention schemes, such as formal equal opportunity, seem
proper. Indeed, the failure of laissez-faire government to prevent or
to extricate the nation from severe economic depression made gov-
ernment regulation of institutional behavior seem not only legitimate
but also necessary.28
Formal equal opportunity during the war years was but a commu-
nity impulse struggling to become a public policy. Separate-but-
equal was still the dominant community value - it was still "law"
- although it had been significantly vitiated.
Formal equal opportunity came of age on May 17, 1954, when the
Supreme Court handed down its momentous decision in the cases
consolidated under Brown v. Board of Education.29 Against the
backdrop of all the pressures that caused Presidents Roosevelt and
Truman to establish pockets of formal equal opportunity in selected
areas of American life, and with the momentum of a line of its own
cases chipping away at separate-but-equal, ° the Supreme Court in
Brown I took a decisive turn for the better in the government's ap-
proach to race relations in the United States. Brown I was the first
act of government to make the ideal of racial equality a constitu-
tional imperative and, hence, unequivocally the official civil rights
policy of the United States. In Brown I, a unanimous Supreme Court
27. See, e.g., Dorn, Truman and the Desegregation of the Military, Focus, May
1988, at 3-4.
28. See J. FRANKLIN, supra note 26, at 546-611.
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. See, e.g., Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (14th Amendment Equal
Protection Clause prohibits state enforcement of racially-restrictive covenants in hous-
ing); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (Black law students ordered admitted to
all-white University of Texas Law School on ground that the state law school established
for Blacks failed to offer equal educational opportunity); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (State-imposed restrictions placed on
Black graduate students attending an otherwise all-White university produced such ine-
qualities as to offend the equal protection clause); Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S.
816 (1950) (Southern Railway's discriminatory dining-car regulations violate equal pro-
tection clause). For the best account of the legal history leading up to Brown I see R.
KLUGER, supra note 16.
promulgated, as the Court itself would later say, "the fundamental
[policy] that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitu-
tional," and declared that "[a]ll provisions of federal, state, or local
law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this
[policy] ."31
Even though Brown I dealt solely with the issue of public educa-
tion, the fact that for the first time the Supreme Court construed the
Constitution, the nation's legal infrastructure, to require nonracial
access to such an essential societal bounty as public education would
inevitably project a towering shadow over virtually every aspect of
interracial relations in this country. Indeed, Brown I has been
credited with engendering "a social upheaval the extent and conse-
quences of which cannot even now be measured with certainty. '32
Brown I is important because it changed the legal status of Black
Americans from mere supplicants "seeking, pleading, begging to be
treated as full-fledged members of the human race" to persons enti-
tled to equal treatment under the law.3
In the years following Brown I, courts and legislatures have identi-
fied and accentuated two major operational tenets derived from for-
mal equal opportunity. These tenets have guided the manner in
which legal institutions and the community at large have applied for-
mal equal opportunity since Brown L Today, formal equal opportu-
nity is often defined in terms of these operational tenets.
The first is racial omission, or what some might call colorblind-
ness. Racial omission may only be a restatement of formal equal op-
portunity's fundamental meaning discussed earlier in this part of the
article - equal legal status and treatment. Racial omission is the
belief that racial differences should be ignored and omitted from le-
gal consideration. Rules of law and practices regulating access to
education, employment, housing, and other societal bounties must be
formulated without regard to race or racial dynamics. Black and
White Americans are entitled to be treated the same in all essential
respects by the government. Accordingly, Black Americans may not
receive any opportunities not also available to White Americans, and
vice versa.
Racial integration is the sibling tenet of racial omission. Racial
integration is racial mixing. It is simply any governmental policy
that mandates or encourages a physical merger or juxtaposition of
Black and White Americans. If the government favors racial inte-
gration, it necessarily must disfavor racial separation. Both policies
cannot be promoted simultaneously.
31. Brown v. Board of Educ. [Brown II], 349 U.S. 294, 297 (1955).
32. Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REv. 237, 247
(1968).
33. Id.
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Racial integration should be contrasted with desegregation. Deseg-
regation is the removal of legal restraints on one's actions or designa-
tions on one's status intended to stigmatize. The removal of these
government-imposed conditions permits a group or its members to
choose to go their separate or integrated ways. Racial integration,
then, presupposes desegregation.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964,11 the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 31
and the Fair Housing Act of 196836 are the most significant federal
rules of law implementing the twin tenets of racial omission and ra-
cial integration. More sweeping than any other piece of civil rights
legislation in American history, the 1964 Civil Rights Act has eleven
titles each of which prohibits discrimination "on the basis of race or
color" in a major sector of American life: voting (Title I), public
accommodations (Title II), public education (Title IV), and employ-
ment (Title VII) to mention a few. The 1965 Voting Rights Act
vastly improves the voting protections offered by Title I of the 1964
Civil Rights Act (which mainly establishes standards applicable to
voter registration) by banning all forms of racial discrimination in
voting (from literacy tests to complex schemes of vote dilution) and
by enforcing these rights with powerful remedies. Finally, the 1968
Fair Housing Act makes it illegal for certain property owners, real
estate agencies, and lenders to discriminate "on the basis of race or
color" in the sale or rental of housing.
After all the civil rights laws and passions promoting formal equal
opportunity since Brown I, scores of Black Americans are still living
a life that in many ways is commensurate with second-class citizen-
ship, a life that in many respects is Jim Crow all but in name. For
example, Black median family income was 60 percent of White me-
dian family income in 1968, but fell to 57 percent by 1986. The
number of Black males unemployed or no longer looking for jobs
increased by an astounding 155 percent between 1970 and 1985.
While the rate of Black male and female unemployment has gener-
ally been twice the rate of White male and female unemployment
since the end of the Second World War, the Black unemployment
rate increased to 2.7 times that of Whites by March 1988. Also, the
percentage of Black families receiving aid for dependent children
34. Civil Rights Act of 1964, ch. 20, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971 to 2000h-6 (1982)).
35. Voting Rights Act of 1965, ch. 20, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971-73 (1982)).
36. Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Title VIII), ch. 45, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982)).
(AFDC) increased from 11.6 percent in 1967 to 23.6 percent in
1983 (compared to an increase from 1.5 percent to 2.7 percent for
White families during the same period). In addition, the share of
Black families headed by a female increased from twenty-four per-
cent in 1965 to forty-four percent by 1985 (compared to an increase
from nine percent to thirteen percent for White families during this
period). By the middle of the 1980s, one of every three Blacks (35.7
percent) and nearly half of all Black children (46.7 percent) were
living in poverty. With fifty-two percent of Black female-headed
families living in poverty by 1985, female-headed families have come
to constitute the largest segment of poor Blacks. 31
The post-1960s, on the other hand, has been a boon for millions of
other Black Americans. Improvements in education, occupational
status, and homeownership during this period have launched many
Blacks into the American middle class. For example, the percentage
of Black white-collar workers increased from 19.5 percent to 40.9
percent and the percentage of Black domestic workers decreased
from 12.6 percent to 2.8 percent between 1965 and 1985. Likewise,
the percentage of Black Americans who own their homes increased
from thirty-eight percent to forty-five percent between 1960 and
1983.38
As impressive as these improvements may seem, it would be a
large mistake to conclude that Black Americans on balance are
thriving. Even taking post-1960s progress into account, the average
aggregate racial differential between White and Black Americans
(or "racial gap") stands at approximately two-to-one today, which is
about where it was a generation ago. For example, the racial differ-
ential in the crucial areas of unemployment, poverty (even excluding
female-headed families), and income is about two-to-one in favor of
Whites. 9
37. See e.g., UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PUB. No. 152, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS SERIES 60; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 17, 1986, at 21. J.
SMITH & F. WELCH, CLOSING THE GAP: FORTY YEARS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS FOR
BLACKS xxiv-xxv, 81, 101-11 (Rand Corp. ed. 1986) [hereinafter RAND RPT.]; CENTER
ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, FALLING BEHIND: A REPORT ON HOW BLACKS
HAVE FARED UNDER THE REAGAN POLICIES 4 (1984).
38. See e.g., U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 17, 1986, at 21; RAND RPT.,
supra note 37, at 4-41.
39. The unemployment rates for Black men and Black women remained at about
two times the rate for White men and White women from 1960 through 1975. UNITED
STATES DEP'T OF COM., CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES P-23,
PUB. No. 80, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN HISTORICAL VIEW, 1970-1978 20 (1979) [hereinafter cited as PoPU-
LATION RPT.]. This ratio is 2-to-1 for adult males. For Black male teenagers, however,
the unemployment rate has more than doubled that of White male teenagers in the
1980s. See, e.g., RAND RP'r, supra note 37, at 108-09. In 1980, the percentages of Black
males and Black intact-families living in poverty were twice as high as the percentages
for their White counterparts. This is down from the 3-to-I ratio for both categories in
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The major argument advanced in this article is that there is a re-
lationship between formal equal opportunity and unequal socioeco-
nomic conditions within today's Black society. I attempt to argue, in
other words, that there is something dreadfully wrong about the way
our fundamental civil rights policy has been applied since Brown L
Some instrumentalists,40 particularly legal realists,41 would argue
that formalism is what is wrong with formal equal opportunity, that
formal equal opportunity has not been grounded in the social reality
it seeks to regulate. For example, the late Judge Skelly Wright, one
of the most influential modern legal realists, faulted those who would
apply our civil rights law and policy in a way that is too concerned
with abstractionism, deductive logic, and internal consistency.42
Judge Wright would advise judicial decisionmakers implementing
formal equal opportunity to proceed from the Holmesian maxim
concerning the content and growth of law - "The life of the law has
not been logic; it has been experience"4 3 - rather than from the
Langdellian syllogism 44 _
All P are M [principle of law from FEO]
No S are M [crucial facts of problem]
Ergo, No S are P [authoritative decision]
1960. Id. at 103. Black male and Black intact-family incomes were 72.2 percent and 82
percent, respectively, as high as their White counterparts in 1980, compared to 58.1 and
61.4 percent, respectively, in 1960. Id. at 104. Median income for all Black Americans
was only 55 percent of the median income for all White Americans in 1984. Id. at 84. In
1960, the figure was approximately the same, 55 percent. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1971 at 316 (92d ed.
1971); UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, PART I, G 189-256 (1975).
40. For a discussion of instrumentalism, see supra text accompanying note 7.
41. Legal realism, a form of instrumentalism, purports to be a realistic and scien-
tific view of the law, meaning that it: (a) focuses on what judges do rather than on what
judges say; (b) is cognizant of the consequences judicial decisions have on the commu-
nity; and (c) believes all legal institutions operate pursuant to a pleasure-pain calculus in
which they attempt to maximize the welfare of the greatest number of individuals within
the community. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); K. LLEWEL-
LYN, JURISPRUDENCE (1962). See also supra note 5.
42. Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court,
84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971).
43. 0. HOLMES, supra note 5, at 5. This expression appears in a somewhat differ-
ent form in an unsigned review of Langdell's Contracts book. See Book Note, 14 Am. L.
REV. 233 (1880).
44. This reference is to legal formalism promoted by the famous Harvard Law
School Dean, C.C. Langdell. See C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS (1871). Not surprisingly, this book received a negative review from Holmes,
who was an instrumentalist. See supra note 5.
While there are instances in which judicial and nonjudical deci-
sionmakers implementing formal equal opportunity have not been at-
tentive to socioeconomic reality, there are also many instances in
which decisionmakers, especially judges, do attempt to ground their
decisions in that reality. And many of these decisionmakers are gen-
erally supportive of civil rights. For example, the Supreme Court in
Bakke45 sincerely tried to devise a remedy that could deal with the
real-life admissions obstacles Black students face without at the
same time undermining the intellectual integrity of formal equal
opportunity.
The real problem with the application of formal equal opportunity
has less to do with formalism than with the degree of deference
given to a Black American view of reality. It is the quantum of pri-
ority that is sometimes given to Black civil rights interests in the
implementation of formal equal opportunity that concerns me most.
Formal equal opportunity (or more precisely its twin operational ten-
ets of racial omission and racial integration) gives low priority, low
weight to Black civil rights interests at critical times. Civil rights,
which under formal equal opportunity is intended to level the play-
ing field for Blacks lopsided by a long-term policy of separate-but-
equal, would seem to be the one arena in American society in which
Black interests should receive top priority.
With the advent of class stratification in Black society since the
1960s, Black civil rights interests occasionally conflict. This, of
course, makes it more difficult to vindicate Black civil rights inter-
ests. Yet in most instances, Black civil rights interests are not con-
traposed, and the conundrum of which Black civil rights interest gets
vindicated does not usually present itself. 46
The low deference given to Black civil rights interests under for-
mal equal opportunity is a point of view that has largely escaped the
attention of civil rights scholars who write in what Judge Wright
disparagingly called the "scholarly tradition. '47 Some of these schol-
ars are Langdellian in their excessive preoccupation with general
principles of universal application, perhaps the most well-known be-
ing Herbert Wechsler who in a highly controversial article entitled,
"Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,"48 totally ne-
glected the social reality of racism in his criticism of Brown v. Board
of Education. These scholars would be expected to miss the issue of
45. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1976).
46. The integrationist interest of middle- and working-class Blacks may, however,
conflict with the separatist interest of the Black underclass. See infra Part V B2.
47. WRIGHT, supra note 42.
48. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1959). The article was later published in H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 3 (1961).
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Black civil rights interests.
But other scholars who have missed the issue are instrumentalists
or legal realists and (like Wechsler) basically supportive of civil
rights. These scholars, as Richard Delgado aptly demonstrates in his
article entitled, "The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of
Civil Rights Literature, '4 9 are ill-attuned to or have not concen-
trated on Black civil rights interests. Scholars as prominent as Tribe
and Michelman of Harvard Law School, Ackerman and Fiss of Yale
Law School, and Ely and Brest of Stanford Law School have focused
more on issues of process and institutional legitimacy than on the
lack of vindication of Black civil rights interests by decisionmakers5 0
Ronald Dworkin's limited discussion of civil rights law and policy is
more concerned with developing a theory of law as an alternative to
natural law and to H. L. A. Hart's positivism 51 than with developing
a theory of law centered on Black civil rights interests. 2 While those
writing in the "scholarly tradition" have made important contribu-
tions to civil rights scholarhip and to the quest for racial justice in
this country, none of them have developed the point that I believe
needs to be advanced today: By giving low priority to Black equality
interests, formal equal opportunity ineluctably contributes to Black
socioeconomic inequality.
Unrestrained by the "scholarly tradition," Black and White revi-
sionist civil rights scholars (such as Bell, Delgado, Freeman, and Jor-
dan) have advanced the claim that civil rights law subordinates
Black Americans or, in other words, frequently marches to the beat
of the perpetrator's perspective (Whites) rather than the victim's
perspective (Blacks). 53 I want to go deeper and further than that
claim. I want to (a) pinpoint and explore the content of the subordi-
nating agent in our civil rights regime (formal equal opportunity);
(b) restructure Black society to reflect current socioeconomic stratifi-
49. Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984).
50. See id. at 566-573.
51. See, H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
52. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). Dworkin attacks
the positivist belief that courts in "hard cases" (i.e., cases which cannot be brought under
a clear rule of law laid down by a legal institution in advance) have "discretion" to
decide such cases either way on the basis of policy. He argues that courts in such cases
lack institutional legitimacy to decide the cases on the basis of policies; they can only
decide them on the basis of principles. Policy decisions are committed to the discretion of
the legislature. For a criticism of this thesis, see, e.g., Ursin, Judicial Creativity And
Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 229, 235 n.24 (1981).
53. See supra note 14 for sources on revisionist civil rights scholarship.
cation; (c) identify the major class problems (the dimensions of the
American race problem) relative to each segment of Black society;
(d) explain how formal equal opportunity subordinates each class;
and (e) connect such racial subordination to these dominant class
problems.
Before I leave the starting gate, two arguments warrant a response
at this time, only because my response to these arguments may help
to further clarify our understanding of formal equal opportunity.
The first argument is that formal equal opportunity only intended to
equalize the legal status and treatment of the races; it never sought
to directly affect the socioeconomic conditions of Black Americans
relative to those of White Americans. The second argument is that
even if formal equal opportunity was supposed to reach the relative
living conditions of Black and White Americans, it never sought to
assure equality of results, only equality of treatment by
government. 4
My initial response to these arguments is to recognize the conces-
sion in both arguments that formal equal opportunity has had a
greater impact on Black Americans at the normative level than at
the ground level. For part of my contention is that Blacks and
Whites are accorded equal treatment by government more in theory
than in the pleasures and burdens of daily life. Blacks have certainly
received a legalistic, formalistic type of equality; hence, the word
"formal" in the term "formal equal opportunity." But that type of
equality is a poor proxy for the real thing - an equal chance to
improve or protect one's socioeconomic condition.
This leads to a response to the second argument, which is the fa-
miliar equality of treatment versus equality of results or achievement
argument. I fault formal equal opportunity (or more precisely its
thirst for racial omission and racial integration) for its inability to
deliver equal socioeconomic opportunity, not equal socioeconomic re-
sults. Formal equal opportunity equalized the legal status and treat-
ment of Black and White Americans, but it does little more than
that to redress socioeconomic disparities caused by centuries of une-
qual legal status and treatment of the races. The government could
have redressed socioeconomic disparity directly by simply upgrading
the living conditions of Black Americans (such as, by giving them
better housing and jobs in proportion to their population percentage)
or indirectly by providing Black Americans with solid opportunities
to create socioeconomic parity or better (such as, by providing them
with the means to win the battle against employment discrimina-
54. For further discussion of this argument see e.g., Fiss, A Theory of Fair Em-
ployment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 337-40 (1971).
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tion55). The former strategy, which looks to the outcome of the race,
is unthinkable if it displaces White Americans. The latter approach,
which focuses on the starting positions in the race, is quite proper.
Yet, formal equal opportunity has provided Black Americans with
fewer opportunities to improve or to protect employment, housing,
and educational conditions than White Americans of comparable so-
cioeconomic classes have enjoyed with or without the aid of civil
rights laws and policies, including the primary policy of formal equal
opportunity.56 The fact that formal equal opportunity undoubtedly
has helped Black Americans more than it has White Americans
(mainly because Blacks have been in need of its services more than
Whites) is quite beside the point. The point is that formal equal op-
portunity was designed to level the playing field for Black and White
Americans, and this it has done more so within the rarefied pages of
the law books than within the mundane living conditions of Black
society. To claim that the playing field should be level - that Blacks
should have the same opportunities in reality as Whites to augment
or preserve their socioeconomic position - is quite different from
claiming that the results or achievement of the competition should
be equal. I make the former not the latter claim.
This is not to say that the results of the competition are entirely
irrelevant. They in fact are probative of the condition of the playing
field. For example, substantial disparity between the incomes of
comparably educated and experienced Blacks and Whites gives evi-
dence of racial discrimination.
The first argument -that formal equal opportunity is not sup-
posed to do anything about Black America's socioeconomic condition
flies in the face of fact and logic. Formal equal opportunity, as
discussed earlier,57 came into existence as a response to Jim Crow's
separate-but-equal policy. Living under the latter civil rights policy,
Blacks were certainly separate from Whites and clearly not equal to
Whites both in law and in socioeconomic reality. Formal equal op-
portunity seeks to reverse every aspect of its predecessor policy; it
does not seek a partial reversal. Furthermore, it is nonsense to think
that formal equal opportunity would attempt to equalize the legal
status and treatment of Blacks without some expectation and hope
that tangible benefits would accrue to Blacks. This was certainly the
thinking of the Black lawyers who argued the school desegregation
55. See infra Part III B2.
56. See infra Parts III B2, IV B2, and V B2.
57. See supra text accompanying note 15-19.
cases,58 and, indeed, of anyone who seeks a redress of legal rights in
court. It was also the thinking of the dedicated social engineers and
legal institutions that helped to nurture formal equal opportunity. If
it was not, why would they have bothered to promote such a policy?
I shall present the details of my argument against formal equal





Although rarely defined, the term "middle class" is widely used in
American society. It is a term that purports to measure socioeco-
nomic success in America. Since Americans like to view themselves
as a successful people, there is little wonder that most Americans
consider themselves to be members of the middle class. Yet, as one
commentator has indicated, this "all-inclusive category . [is] so
broad that it not only blurs real distinctions in income, lifestyle, and
well-being but often clouds public discussion as well." 59 Quite sim-
ply, the term "middle class" needs to be carefully (and perhaps nar-
rowly) defined before it can be gainfully employed in public
discourse.
Yet, it may be impossible to arrive at a definition acceptable to
everyone. The debate among Black scholars illustrates this point.
Sociologist Bart Landry defines middle-class status in terms of oc-
cupation. In his book, The New Black Middle Class, he equates
middle-class status with white-collar occupations. By white-collar oc-
cupations, Landry means sales and clerical workers as well as profes-
sionals and business managers."0
While I might disagree with some of the occupations he classifies
as middle class - for example, I would view sales and clerical posi-
tions as working-class occupations - I believe Professor Landry's
occupational approach is useful. An individual's occupation reveals
something about his or her socioeconomic status. Primarily, it indi-
cates the stability of one's income stream. For example, an automo-
bile worker, who endures periodic layoffs and contract negotiations,
has a less stable earnings stream than a computer analyst, who en-
joys a high degree of job security and mobility, even though both
workers might earn about the same amount. Occupational status
58. See, e.g., R. KLUGER, supra note 16; ARGUMENT. THE COMPLETE ORAL AR-
GUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA,
1952-55 (L. Friedman, ed. 1969).
59. S. RosE, THE AMERICAN PROFILE POSTER (1986).
60. B. LANDRY, THE NEW BLACK MIDDLE CLASS (1987).
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also tells us something about educational background. A doctor's
level of education is vastly different from that of a professional wres-
tler, even though both may earn $200,000 annually.
An occupational approach, however, has its limitations. Occupa-
tional status can be a misleading indicator of income level. For ex-
ample, a Legal Aid attorney may earn only $18,000 a year; a dentist
$25,000. These salaries ordinarily cannot provide or "buy into" a
middle-class lifestyle: comfort, security, a nice home, a late model
car, an exciting annual vacation, and, in general, a stable, even thriv-
ing existence. Yet, a plumber earning $60,000 a year could easily
afford such a lifstyle.
Because income level dictates the type of lifestyle an individual or
family can afford, many scholars believe that individual or family
income is the most important determinant of socioeconomic status.
These scholars use income as the primary measuring stick for mid-
dle-class, working-class, and underclass position. Sociologist Robert
Hill and economist Andrew Brimmer are among leading Black
scholars who take an income approach in defining the Black middle
class. For Hill, the Black middle class consists of individuals with
annual incomes between $20,000 and $50,000. For Brimmer, it con-
sists of families with annual incomes between $25,000 and
$50,000.61
Besides the fact that Hill's and Brimmer's income ranges may be
too low if taken as national averages, an income approach is itself
problematic. Fundamentally, it provides little information about oc-
cupational status, earnings stability or potential, and educational
background. For example, a young business lawyer who earns
$50,000 a year, a janitor who moonlights as a taxicab driver and has
a combined annual income of $50,000, a high school teacher who
earns $50,000 a year after 20 years on the job, and a family in
which the husband factory worker and wife office cleaner have a
combined annual income of $50,000 all have the same middle-class
income but vastly different occupations, job security and mobility,
future earnings potential, and educational background.
Yet each of these individuals and families has the ability to live
the American Dream of a stable, comfortable lifestyle. Income is es-
sential to having this ability. The fact that individuals and families
from different occupations and educational backgrounds can buy
into middle-class status simply means that there are many ways in
61. See The New Black Middle Class, EBONY, Aug. 1987, at 32.
which one can reach Nirvana in this country. Even an actor can be-
come President of the United States.
This article, then, takes an income approach in defining socioeco-
nomic classes in Black society. But I am less concerned with the
numbers themselves than with what the numbers mean. When I use
the terms "Black middle class," "Black working class," and "Black
underclass," I am referring mainly to a set of socioeconomic charac-
teristics a Black household (individual or family) normally possesses
at a particular income range. I shall specify exactly what those char-
acteristics are, including occupational status, as I move from class to
class beginning here with the Black middle class.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, most American
households with an annual household income of about $45,000 -
$85,000 live a stable, comfortable lifestyle - that is, a middle-class
lifestyle. A household within this income range usually is able to own
a home, drive a late model automobile, have a complete line of
household appliances - microwave oven, VCR, and so on - and
have savings or investments. Typically, at least one parent is a pro-
fessional or business manager, and both parents work. 2
Black households within this income range have the following spe-
cific characteristics.
43 percent of the households consists of intact families, of
which an equal percentage of the husbands ('1) are employed
either as semi-skilled or unskilled blue-collar or service work-
ers, professionals, or managers; and an equal percentage of
the wives ('/3) either keep house, are employed in clerical posi-
tions, or are professionals;6"
14 percent of the households are female-headed, and the
household head is likely to be employed as a semi-skilled or
unskilled blue-collar or service worker; 4 and
the remaining characteristics (which accounts for 43 per-
cent of the households) are either not available or are scat-
tered throughout other categories (male-headed families, sin-
gle women, and single men) in percentages too small to
report.65
Based on a $45,000 - $85,000 income range, eight percent of
Black Americans are middle class, compared to twenty-one percent
of White Americans. Part IV of this article demonstrates that the
62. Much of the raw data that forms the basis of my statistical assertions on class
characteristics comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and have been assembled in
Rose's book, AMERICAN PROFILE, supra note 59. Rose discusses the "shrinking middle
class" at id. 9-13. See also id. at 8, 22.
63. See id. at 22.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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Black middle class is the largest segment of Black society, and that
the White working class is the largest segment of White society. Part
V shows that the Black underclass is the second largest stratum of
Black society, and that the White underclass is the smallest compo-
nent of White society. The size of classes in Black and White society
breakdown as follows:
Class Black White
Underclass 37 percent 16 percent
Working Class 55 percent 63 percent
Middle Class 8 percent 21 percent
Total 100 percent 100 percent
Unfortunately, these statistics only add to the inconsistencies in
published reports on the size of Black classes. Professor Landry, for
example, asserts that forty-four percent of all Black workers are in
the middle class. That such inconsistencies exist should not be sur-
prising when one is mindful of the various factors that can go into
each statistical conclusion. It makes a difference that Professor Lan-
dry focuses on occupational status and that I concentrate on income;
that many of his occupational categories (such as, sales and clerical
workers) are excluded by my income range; and that he limits his
study to Black workers whereas I look more broadly at Black house-
holds. Likewise, it is a matter of consequence that sociologist Hill
and economist Brimmer use lower income ranges than do I, even
though each of us takes an income approach.
The critical point to observe, however, is the extent to which the
studies are internally consistent in the factors used to compare socio-
economic classes cross-racially. One finds consistency here and, more
tellingly, a oneness in the conclusions reached about the lot of mid-
dle-class Blacks in juxtaposition with that of middle-class Whites.
Each study concludes that since the 1960s, the Black middle class
has made plenty of progress but continues to lag behind the White
middle class. Color remains a significant barrier in a middle-class
Black's chances for sustained happiness and worldly success. 6
Nowhere is this assessment more evident than in the employment
arena. Here, middle-class Blacks face a congeries of employment
66. In addition to The New Black Middle Class, see supra note 60, and the spe-
cial issue of Ebony on the Black Middle Class see supra note 61, other studies include:
The Black Middle Class, Bus. WK., Mar. 14, 1988, at 62; The New Black Middle Class
(Part I), Focus, Sept. 1987 at 5; The New Black Middle Class (Part II), Focus, Oct.
1987, at 6. Professor Landry's research forms the basis for many of these studies.
problems that threaten to pull them down, returning some to the
working class and perhaps others even lower. And here, middle-class
Blacks face racial subordination through the dictates of formal equal
opportunity.
B. The Subordination Question
The subordination question is in reality a two-fold question: does
formal equal opportunity (racial omission or racial integration) en-
gender incidents of racial subordination (situations in which low or
no priority is given to Black civil rights interests) and, if so, has such
racial subordination contributed to the American race problem (so-
cioeconomic vulnerability within Black society) since the 1960s?
Before responding to this question class by class, it may be useful to
clarify the dominant socioeconomic problems facing each segment of
Black society. Several specific problems plague the Black middle
class.
1. Dominant Class Problems
So much is made about affirmative action these days, that little
attention is given to what happens to a Black (whether or not a ben-
eficiary of affirmative action) after he or she is hired. Scratch the
surface of this peachy world of employment and one finds no dearth
of racial problems hounding the Black corporate manager or profes-
sional. Loneliness, disaffection, stress and hypertension (or "John
Henryism"), "complex racial discrimination" (sophisticated or un-
conscious racial discrimination frequently accompanied by nonracial
factors), and de facto segregation in high-level jobs are the principal
problems. Of these, employment discrimination and segregation are
the most serious class problems.
As a society of one or a few, any person is almost by definition
lonely. Feelings of loneliness are often heightened by a multitude of
maladroit professional and semi-social interactions with well-mean-
ing White colleagues. An awkward remark ("Blacks seem to have a
natural ability for basketball" or the traditional "Some of my best
friends are Black") or a racist joke can be very poignant. To survive
in an environment that neither understands nor fully supports them,
some Blacks have adopted a policy of what the French call soyez
mbfiant ("be mistrustful"). This survival policy - a manifestation of
racial sensibility within the Black middle class6 7 - inevitably inten-
sifies loneliness. Leon Lewis reflects on soyez m~fiant in the follow-
ing passage:
67. For a discussion of racial sensibility, see infra text accompanying notes 377-
78, 391-96, 424-29.
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Everything is different when you're [B]lack. It's amazing how the quality of
one's life can be changed by what might happen, by what you think might
happen and by what other people think might happen.
Often I've been invited to cocktail parties, openings and other gatherings of
a business or civic nature, and many times I've been the only [B]lack per-
son in attendance. I can become very uncomfortable in that setting. My
subconscious might start sending up smoke signals, and I think, say, 'What
if that lady standing near me should suddenly scream?' Every eye would be
on me, and I could be in a world of trouble. Why should a thought like that
enter my mind? The lady doesn't look as if she is about to scream, but it
has happened and who is to say it will never happen again? 8
Disaffection is another class problem. Like V. S. Naipaul living in
the garden of the oppressor,6 9 the Black corporate manager or pro-
fessional, working in the same garden, can feel "unanchored and
strange." A feeling of alienation can intensify in the face of racial
hypocrisy within the work environment. Disgust and disillusionment
can take hold when, in spite of the institution's professed concern for
fair employment and meritocracy, qualified Blacks are overlooked
("they can't be found"), less-demanding standards are applied to
White "favored sons," Black employees are paid less than compara-
bly educated Whites, and Black employees must cope in a work envi-
ronment in which policymaking and attitudes are controlled by
Whites who are at best indifferent and at worst antagonistic to their
needs. Expectations of racial congruity with which the Black em-
ployee might have entered the institution quickly wither away under
the harsh light of life's realities.
Some Black corporate managers and professionals also suffer from
hypertension caused by stressful attempts to adapt to a White-domi-
nated work environment. Recent studies have validated this slice of
the Black experience, long known to Blacks, and have also concluded
that Black Americans generally suffer more hypertension than
White Americans. High blood pressure strikes nearly twice as many
Blacks as Whites, and with more devastating consequences. "Black
hypertension victims suffer heart failure at twice the rate of [W]hite
victims and have 12 to 18 times the kidney-failure rates. Hyperten-
sion also gives American Blacks the world's second highest death
rate from strokes, after the Japanese.'70
"John Henryism," a term taken from the fictional Black
68. Lewis, In On The Game, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1985, at 70.
69. V. NAIPAUL, THE ENIGMA OF ARRIVAL (A. Knopf ed. 1987).
70. Williams, Stress of Adapting to White Society Cited As Major Cause of
Hypertension in Blacks, Wall St. J., May 28, 1986, at 35, col. 4. For more information
on Black health, see, e.g., UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 72, table 112 (106th ed. 1986).
strongman who died by pitting his sledge hammer against a steam
drill, is frequently used to describe the syndrome of stress and hyper-
tension within the Black middle class. "John Henryism is a manifes-
tation of 'the struggle to get into the mainstream' and is character-
ized by a belief that one can triumph despite the odds."71 Unlike the
aggressive "Type-A" personality, the John Henry personality "shows
extreme patience and tends to suppress anger in order to deflect
White hostility. '7 2 Roger Wilkens, a Black lawyer and social com-
mentator, reflects on his personal struggle with John Henryism:
I had always to be careful never to break the unstated rules that minimized
my difference, the unspoken inferiority that I hoped my [White] friends
would ignore. So I was quiet for the most part, waiting for situations to
develop before I reacted, always careful, always polite and considerate. 3
One study traced John Henryism in a group of Black graduates of
the Meharry Medical School in Nashville, Tennessee. This study
covered a twenty-five-year period, and found that forty-four percent
of the subjects developed hypertension. The fact that Black physi-
cians normally practice under more stressful conditions than their
White counterparts is, according to one observer, a major reason for
the study's results. Black physicians have "traditionally practiced
alone with limited finances and in situations where they were forced
to struggle for patients and acceptance from peers."74
Complex racial discrimination, certainly a contributor to John
Henryism, is one of the greatest obstacles facing the Black corporate
manager or professional.75 Employment discrimination that is subtle,
sophisticated, or unintentional is difficult enough to uncover, al-
though its sting is as great as the old-fashion, overt brand of discrim-
ination. Such employment discrimination is doubly difficult to
unearth when it is accompanied by a nonracial factor. 6 A neutral
factor provides a handy pretext for racial discrimination and can
even blind the Black applicant or employee as to the true reasons
behind the personnel action. Also, some courts have taken the posi-
71. Williams, supra note 70.
72. Id.
73. R. WILKENS, A MAN'S LIFE 54-55 (1982).
74. See Williams, supra note 70, at 35, col. 5.
75. See, e.g., J. FERNANDEZ, RACISM AND SEXISM IN CORPORATE LIFE: CHANG-
ING VALUES IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1981); Reibstein, Many Hurdles, Old and New,
Keep Black Aanagers Out of Top Jobs, Wall St. J., July 10, 1986, at 25, col 4;
Hymowitz, Many Blacks Jump Off The Corporate Ladder To Be Entrepreneurs, Wall
St. J., Aug. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 1; Hines, When the Boss Calls You A... : Coping with
the Intricacies of Corporate Racism, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Mar. 1982, at 69; Rivlin,
Climbing the Legal Ladder: Some Kinds of Discrimination Die Hard, A.B.A. UPDATE 28
(Fall 1981). See also F. DICKENS & J. DICKENS, THE BLACK MANAGER: MAKING IT IN
THE CORPORATE WORLD (1987).
76. Accompanying nonracial factors may include the fact that the Black appli-
cant has less traditional qualifications than White applicants or the fact that a dis-
charged Black employee violated an inconsequential company policy.
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tion that a nonracial factor contributing to the Black applicant's or
employee's disparate treatment shields the employer from liability."
The presence of complex racial discrimination within America's
top jobs is manifested in several ways. Racial wage gaps and the
collective experiences of middle-class Blacks are among the most
compelling indicators of complex racial discrimination. Taken to-
gether, these indicators strongly suggest that complex racial discrim-
ination is more than an intermittent phenomenon. They offer at least
prima facie proof that complex racial discrimination is regular and
systemic in places of middle-class employment - corporations, 78 law
firms, 9 law faculties,80 newsrooms,8' the TV industry,82 and so on.
In spite of dramatic improvements in Black occupational status
since the 1960s - mainly the result of improvements in education
and affirmative action83 - wage gaps between comparably educated
Black and White males still exist. According to a Rand Corporation
study, "While these racial wage differences narrowed substantially
over time [down from 50 to 55 percent in 1940] they remained at
levels of 70 to 80 percent in 1980. These within-education wage dif-
ferentials should be contrasted to the aggregate ratios of 43 percent
in 1940 and 73 percent in 1980. . . .That contrast informs us that
education will play a significant role in explaining the racial wage
gap. However, it also warns us that simply equalizing the number
of years of schooling alone would leave a sizeable racial wage
gap."84
Along with racial wage gaps, the observations of Blacks and
77. See infra text accompanying notes 168-88 for a discussion of causation in
Title VII litigation.
78. See, e.g., BLACK ENTERPRISE, Apr. 1987, at 39; Bus. WK., Feb. 20, 1984, at
104. See also Dingle, Will Black Managers Survive Corporate Downsizing?, BLACK EN-
TERPRISE, Mar. 1987, at 49.
79. See, e.g., Burke, 3,700 Partners. 12 Are Black., NAT'L L.J., July 2, 1979, at
1; Smith, The Invisible Lawyer, BARRISTER, Fall 1981, at 42.
80. See, e.g., Brooks, Anti-Minority Mindset in the Law School Personnel Pro-
cess: Toward an Understanding of Racial Mindsets, 5 L. & INEQUALITY J. 101, 105-06
(1987); Bell, The Price and Pain of A Racial Perspective, STAN. L. Sci. J. 5 (1986);
Brooks, supra note 3, at 33.
81. See, e.g., TIME, Nov. 29, 1982, at 90. Levine, The Plight of Black Reporters:
Why 'Unconscious Racism' Persists, TV GUIDE, July 25, 1981, at 22.
82. See, e.g., Hays, Capturing the Black Experience, TV GUIDE, Nov. 29, 1986,
at 10.
83. See, e.g., RAND RPT., supra note 37, at xx-xxi, 85-91; Bergmann, An Affirm-
ative Look at Hiring Quotas, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1982, § 8 (Bus.), at 3, col. 1. See
also N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1983, § 1 (Main), at 12, col. 1; Id., Dec. 13, 1981, § 4 (Wk.
in Rev.), at 2, col. 2.
84. RAND RPT., supra note 37, at 23 (emphasis added).
Whites in the trenches portray a clear picture of complex racial dis-
crimination. The numbers and narratives reinforce each other. The
numbers support a suspicion of racial discrimination Blacks have
held for a long time.85 Collectively, the personal perceptions enhance
the view that complex racial discrimination may offer the best expla-
nation for racial wage gaps and the paucity of Blacks in middle-class
jobs.
Glegg Watson and George Davis, co-authors of Black Life in Cor-
porate America: Swimming in the Mainstream and former co-
teachers of a course on multicultural. management at the Yale
School of Management, believe that complex racial discrimination is
prevalent in corporate America and has had a considerable effect on
Blacks. Watson asserts that "Black advancement to the top of the
corporate pyramid has moved beyond the preparation-and-qualifica-
tion question and on to a team-acceptance question. 8a7 Davis is more
explicit: "Race is not mentioned much in corporate America, yet it
has a big effect on people's careers because management is team-
work - and in teamwork you've got to have a high comfort level
among the team members." 88 Other Blacks share these views. "By
and large, it's a matter of chemistry," says a Black partner at
Heidrick & Struggles,89 the nation's largest executive search firm.
"Most companies want a guy who is 6-foot-2, blue-eyed, and blonde
- what we call the guy who steps out of the IBM catalog. Blacks
generally just don't fit that description." 90 Another Black, who is
chairman of a Black management firm, notes that "Headquarters
people, who have seen the [B]lack manager over time and know that
he is competent and articulate, would have no problem, but what
they're afraid of is how the guys in Kansas will take this [B]lack
executive when he comes to town." 91 Some Blacks believe even
White executives who feel comfortable with Black managers are re-
luctant to place Blacks in line positions that expose them to racist
White managers who may jeopardize the Black manager's success.92
A 1984 survey of corporate personnel executives by Business
Week magazine confirms these observations. Even in companies with
a strong commitment to affirmative action, Black managers were
85. As one Black lawyer has stated in reference to the low percentage of Black
partners in large law firms, "We have long felt that the large, established firms discrimi-
nate against minority attorneys, but we haven't had the statistics until now." Burke,
supra note 79, at 1.
86. G. WATSON & G. DAVIS, BLACK LIFE IN CORPORATE AMERICA: SWIMMING IN
THE MAINSTREAM (1982).





92. Id. See also sources cited supra note 75.
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perceived as "different." "This 'difference,'" the study concluded,
"raises questions about the unacknowledged cultural and racial bar-
riers to the realm of senior management, which is largely
[WIhite."93
Much is the same in the nation's newsrooms. Max Robinson, a
former co-anchor of ABC News and the first Black anchor of a na-
tional news program, recalls that on the day
Ronald Reagan was crowned and our hostages came home, I watched from
the sidelines, because ABC chose not to include me in the coverage of either
event, even though I [was] the national-desk anchor .... [I] looked around
and found that . . . suddenly [B]lack people disappeared. In an orgy of
[W]hite patriotism, [B]lack people would interfere with the process and
point out the reality Americans didn't want to face.
94
Other Blacks in network news concur in Mr. Robinson's general
charge of racial discrimination. Some also charge that not only their
careers, but also balanced network coverage of Black society suffers
because Blacks are kept out of decisionmaking positions. As Richard
Levine reports in his article, The Plight of Black Reporters: Why
'Unconscious Racism' Persists:
Although the overt- racism that simply excluded minorities from network
news jobs has long since ended, many [B]lacks feel that an 'unconscious
racism'. . . on the part of their [W]hite superiors handicaps both the cov-
erage of the [B]lack community and their own careers. . . . No matter
how many [B]lack reporters appear on-camera, [W]hite producers and ex-
ecutives are running the show. .... 1
The first major poll of minority journalists conducted by a news
organization is also replete with findings of complex racial discrimi-
nation. Of those surveyed, 75 percent felt that they did not have "the
same chances for promotion as [W]hite colleagues"; 51 percent said
that their editors "believe that minority journalists, as a group, are
less skilled" than Whites; and 10 percent said that they were "told
openly that race was the reason they were refused certain assign-
ments, notably on sensitive subjects including school desegregation."
One respondent said: "I believe [White editors] expect less from mi-
nority staffers, and only if we do more will we be seen as equal."96
93. Bus. WK., supra note 81, at 105.
94. Levine, supra note 81, at 22.
95. Id.
96. TINtE, Nov. 29, 1982, at 90. In EEOC v. New York News, Inc., 81 Civ. 337
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), a jury in the Southern District of New York returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs who charged that between 1979 and 1982 the New York Daily
News denied promotion and desirable assignments to four Black journalists. Testimony
described a newsroom where editors tossed around such epithets as "nigger" and "spic."
Although these acts of racism seem undisputable, the jury found discrimination in only
If the 1980s is the "Cosby Decade," it is also the decade of com-
plex racial discrimination in the TV and motion picture industry.
There has always been employment discrimination in Hollywood.
"Only this new strain is more subtle and discreet. ' 97 Some Black
actors believe that this new strain of employment discrimination is
more "dangerous" than the overt form Blacks have experienced
under Jim Crow, because "those who are guilty of [subtle] discrimi-
nation don't even realize it." Even some of the performers in the
hugely-successful 1977 TV miniseries Roots have encountered racial
barriers. Ben Vereen, for example, has experienced racial discrimi-
nation under the guise of artistic expression: "I'll want to read for a
role I like, but they'll say, 'You can't play that, you have to play the
janitor. We want a [W]hite actor for that part." '98 Another Roots'
star adds: "If you had been a [W]hite actor, and you were in the
most popular show in television history, you would have had - at
the very least - a job."99
It is difficult to find work environments in which complex racial
discrimination is more pronounced than in American law firms and
law schools. A 1987 survey by the Minority Employment Committee
of the Los Angeles County Bar Association provides insights into the
plight of Black lawyers in Los Angeles and other cities. The survey
concludes that "[a] capable minority attorney might not be hired by
some Los Angeles law firms, if the firms' partners believe their cli-
ents would not work with a non-[W]hite lawyer - or that a minor-
ity attorney would not fit in at the firm. . ."100 A named partner of
one firm stated that "[t]he client is not always as interested in qual-
ity as with someone who fits the mode that they [sic] feel comforta-
ble with. Rather than to have someone who might be sharp and a
[B]lack, they would rather have someone who fits the profile."''
A similar situation exists in law schools. Some White law profes-
sors exhibit a predisposition to assess Black performance in a nega-
tive or hypercritical fashion; an intolerance for even small mistakes
12 of the 23 incidents on which testimony was taken, again demonstrating how difficult it
is to prove intentional discrimination today. See N.Y. Times, April 19, 1987, § 4 (Wk. in
Rev.), at 7, col. 1.
97. Hays, supra note 82, at 11.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Becnel, Minority Lawyers" Some Firms Fear Client Objections, L.A. Daily
J., May 11, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
101. Id. Of the 400 questionnaires that were mailed out, there were only 35 re-
sponses. One bar committee member said there was no way to determine whether the
small number of responses accurately reflected the prevailing attitudes of law partners in
Los Angeles, because, as far as he knew, this was the first survey of its kind undertaken
by the bar. Id. For an excellent discussion of racism in the legal profession, see Diamond,
A Trace Element in the Law, A.B.A. J., May 15, 1987, at 47-48. See also Weisenhaus,
White Males Dominate Firms: Still a Long Way to go For Women Minorities, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 1.
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committed by Blacks; a proclivity toward denying Blacks the defer-
ence or presumption of competence normally accorded to White
male law professors. Like other White professionals, some White law
professors, in short, possess a set of negative biases against Blacks
either consciously or unconsciously. 02
The existence of such an anti-Black mindset is suggested by sev-
eral facts. Two are statistical - the low percentage of'03 and high
turnover rate for minority law teachers.104 There are also the obser-
vations of minority and female law teachers. Based upon years of
experience, some minority law professors have concluded that their
White male colleagues seem to believe that only a "superstar" mi-
nority should be hired, promoted, or tenured. 0 5 Female law profes-
sors, not being entirely immune from negative prejudging, have simi-
larly noted that law faculties are "only looking for the [female]
superstars."' 106
Despite racial wage gaps, other statistics, and scores of personal
observations, some might demand more "specific" evidence of em-
ployment discrimination. Some may even be inclined to dismiss any
claim of racial discrimination, no matter how complex such discrimi-
nation is claimed to be, as "wild speculation" while others might call
it "over-reaction." In fact, it may never be possible to pinpoint the
existence of racial discrimination in places of high employment in a
manner that is sufficiently "objective" or "conclusive" for some
Americans.
Still others may demur. They may insist that society has come too
far in race relations for Blacks, especially middle-class Blacks, to
"quibble" about racial discrimination in the nation's top jobs. Why
not, they might ask, concentrate on society's real social problems -
such as the problems of poor Blacks - rather than on the psuedo
social problems of affluent Blacks?
These criticisms miss the main point: racial discrimination, besides
being unlawful, is harmful. Whether complex or Jim-Crow style, ra-
cial discrimination harms society by diminishing society's humanity;
102. See generally Brooks, supra note 80, at 107-08. Symposium, The 1985 Mi-
nority Law Teachers' Conference, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 383, 576 (1986).
103. For example, of the 6,660 full-time law professors in the 1985-86 academic
year, only 6.5 percent were minorities. Brooks, supra note 80, at 105.
104. Of the 351 full-time minority law professors teaching during the 1979-80 aca-
demic year, only 201 remained in the profession during the 1985-86 academic year. Id.
105. Goldfard, Education Without Representation, 9 STUDENT LAW. 11 (May
1981).
106. Rivlin, supra note 75, at 49.
and it harms Blacks by diminishing their human dignity. Professor
Derrick Bell's reflection on an incident of racism at Stanford Law
School in which he was involved is most instructive on the latter
point. '0
The fact of my exclusion from the dialogues that must have taken place
before so radical a remedy for student upset was adopted was a denial of
my status as a faculty member and my worth as a person every bit as
demeaning and stigmatizing to me as the Jim Crow signs I helped remove
from public facilities across the South two decades ago. 0 8
If complex racial discrimination is one of the most serious
problems facing the Black middle class, the problem of racially seg-
regated top-level jobs commands equal attention. Racially segre-
gated, or underrepresented, workforces give evidence of complex ra-
cial discrimination. Such workforces also invoke strong images of
yesteryear's racial hierarchy, which, like racial discrimination, is
harmful to all Americans.
Images of a racial caste system derived from racially imbalanced
workforces harm White and Black Americans in several ways. These
images can ignite latent racism in some Whites, particularly the
young or uninitiated. For example, the paucity of Black faculty and
the abundancy of Black unskilled workers at major White colleges
and universities may have contributed to the upsurge of campus ra-
cism during the 1980s. Jim Crow images may also leave indelible
doubts in the minds of other Whites about the caliber of work Blacks
are capable of performing. Most importantly, these images create
psychological barriers for Blacks. Places in which no or few Blacks
work convey negative messages to Blacks, especially the young:
Blacks are unwelcomed; Blacks can't perform at this level. 10  As
Time essayist Lance Morrow has put it:
People become only what they can imagine themselves to be. If they can
only imagine themselves working as menials, then they will probably sub-
side into that fate, following that peasant logic by which son follows father
into a genetic destiny. If they see other [BIlacks become mayors of the
largest cities, become astronauts, become presidential candidates, become
Miss Americas and, more to the point, become doctors and scientists and
lawyers and pilots and corporate presidents - become successes - then
young [B]lacks will begin to comprehend their own possibilities and honor
them with work." 0
107. See Bell, supra note 80.
108. Id. at 5.
109. The psychological effects of segregative occurrences on Blacks are well docu-
mented and have played an essential role in the development of race law. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 n.11 (1954). See also Local 28, Sheet
Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 450 (1986) ("Affirmative action 'promptly oper-
ates to change the outward and visible signs of yesterday's racial distinctions and, thus,
to provide an impetus to the process of dismantling the barriers, psychological or other-
wise, erected by past practices.'" quoting NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir.
1974)).
110. Morrow, The Powers of Racial Examples, TIME, Apr. 16, 1984, at 84.
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Finally, Blacks isolated in predominantly White environments may
experience feelings of loneliness, disaffection, and John Henryism,
which can adversely affect their performance.
Notwithstanding these deleterious social consequences, images of
Jim Crow abound in places of high-level employment. While the
number of Black corporate managers and professionals has increased
with the general rise in Black occupational status since the 1960s,
Blacks are still underrepresented in these vital occupations well into
the 1980s. According to the federal government's Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Blacks comprised 4.7 per-
cent of all corporate managers and 4.5 percent of all professionals in
1985.111 In individual professions, Blacks held less than 1 percent of
the partnerships at the nation's largest law firms in 1987,112 3.9 per-
cent of the fulltime teaching positions in the nation's law schools in
the 1985-86 academic year,'13 6.3 percent of the nation's investment
banking jobs in 1985, two years prior to the Wall Street purge of
Black investment bankers," 4 and something less than 5.5 percent of
newspaper editorial posts in 1982." 5
Are racial wage gaps and the low percentages of Black corporate
managers and professionals mainly products of nonracial factors?
The "experience factor" - the relatively brief time "qualified"
Blacks have been on the job - can affect racial wage gaps. And
layoffs stemming from the October 1987 stock market crash, merg-
ers and acquisitions, and general corporate cost-cutting seem to be
the most visible reasons for declines in the number of Black corpo-
rate managers during the 1980s."16 But these factors do not lessen
the explanatory power of race.
111. Dingle, supra note 78, at 51.
112. Weisenhaus, supra note 101. See also Diamond, supra note 101, at 46. Ac-
cording to Roderick McLeod, chairman of the A.B.A.'s Minorities in the Profession
Committee, "By and large, minorities are very under-represented in all segments of the
[legal] profession-in all size firms, corporate legal departments and government." Id. at
47. See also Marcotte, The Changing of the Guard, A.B.A. J., May 15, 1987, at 60.
113. See Association of American Law Schools Executive Director to Deans of
Member Schools, Memorandum No. 86-57 (Sept. 5, 1986).
114. Blacks and the Wall St. Purge, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 1988, at 38. Although
investment banking firms refuse to comment on how many Blacks were laid off after the
October 1987 stock market crash, it is estimated that as many as a third to a half of the
Blacks were laid off. One insider at Solomon Brothers says that roughly two-thirds of the
firm's Black bankers were fired after the crash. Id.
115. TIME, Nov. 29, 1982, at 90. 5.5 percent of newspaper editors are minority.
Blacks, therefore, are less than 5.5 percent of newspaper editors.
116. See, e.g., Dingle, supra note 78; Deutsch, The Ax Falls on Equal Opportu-
nity, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1987, § 3 (Bus.), at 1, col. 2; Wall St. J., July 7, 1986, at 25,
col. 4; Blacks and the Wall St. Purge, supra note 114, at p. 38.
When one pierces the surface of employment dynamics, it is hard
not to find racial factors at work. For example, Black corporate man-
agers hired during the 1960s and 1970s were herded into personnel,
public or governmental relations, municipal finance, affirmative ac-
tion compliance, and similar soft positions. While this type of hiring
helped the corporation's affirmative-action profile, it did not place
Blacks on the fast track to the company's highest-paying and most
secure jobs. Rather, it left Blacks at risk during times of financial
crisis. 1117 In addition to this form of tokenism, Blacks are typically
left out of corporate social inner-circles and, consequently, denied
the benefits of the old-boy network.1"' Also, half of all managerial
and professional jobs Blacks obtained between 1960 and 1976 were
with local, state, and federal governments. 1 " Even in the 1980s,
Black college graduates are 1.5 times more likely to secure public
sector employment than private sector employment.120 Further, these
public sector positions are themselves likely to be soft. Usually they
involve some aspect of social program management. Quite naturally,
cutbacks in these programs will have a disparate impact not only on
Black recipients (normally underclass or working-class Blacks) but
also on Black managers (the Black middle class). It is not surprising
then that although Blacks comprise about twenty percent of all pub-
lic employees, they suffer some forty percent of public-employee
layoffs. 2'
Ultimately, it might not be important whether racial wage gaps or
the low percentages of Black corporate managers and professionals
are caused by racial or nonracial factors. The fact is they exist, and
something must be done to prevent the creation of Jim Crow images.
The American Bar Association saw the situation this way in 1986
when, without finding an explicit racial or nonracial antecedent, it
stated that "the lack of opportunity for minorities in the legal profes-
sion persists," and then proceeded to adopt a specific plan for resolv-
ing this problem. 122
Complex racial discrimination and racially segregated top obs are
the dominant problems facing the Black middle class. They are par-
ents to loneliness, disaffection, and John Henryism. Complex racial
discrimination and racially segregated top jobs do not exist in a vac-
uum. They are linked to the current regime of interracial relations
and, more particularly, to that regime's subordinating features.
117. Bus. WK., Feb. 20, 1984, at 104.
118. TIME, Dec. 6, 1983, at 53.
119. Yagoda, Movin' on Up, PHILA. MAG., Nov. 1983, at 176, 180.
120. Bus. WK., Feb. 20, 1984, at 104.
121. Yagoda, supra note 119, at 180.
122. A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1986, at 18.
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2. Racial Subordination
Through its tenet of racial omission,123 formal equal opportunity
subordinates the Black middle class. Racial subordination of the
most stable segment of Black society arises mainly within the em-
ployment context. The strict scrutiny test and judicial treatment of
statutory antidiscrimination law give low priority to the employment
interests of middle-class Blacks and, relative to their White counter-
parts, force them to endure a disproportionate amount of employ-
ment discrimination, segregation, and other employment hardships.
a. Strict Scrutiny Test
The strict scrutiny test is nowhere to be found in the Constitution
or in its legislative history. It is a legal doctrine made up entirely by
judges. The strict scrutiny test comes into play when federal courts
are called upon to review government-sponsored decisions challenged
as violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment or the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's
due process clause. The former constitutional provision protects
against state actions124 and the latter against federal actions. 25
Now a fixture in constitutional law, the strict scrutiny test is the
legal system's primary means of implementing formal equal opportu-
nity's racial omission tenet. It commands the omission of race in the
government's formulation of laws and public policies. More impor-
tantly, it operates to strike down, as a denial of equal protection of
the laws, any governmental activity or legislation that is either predi-
cated upon an explicit racial or other "suspect classification"' 26 or
violative of a "fundamental personal interest."' 27 The act under
scrutiny is saved from judicial strangulation only if the government
can meet a two-fold burden. First, the classification must be justified
123. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34 for an explanation of the concept of
racial omission.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987)(cases cited
therein). See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
125. See, e.g., Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 479-80
(1986)(cases cited therein). See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
126. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Elec. Comm'rs., 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
See generally P. PoLYvIou, THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW (1980); Note, Devel-
opments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
127. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). Fundamental per-
sonal interest include the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942),
the right to vote, Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533, and the right to interstate travel, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
by a "compelling governmental interest." Second, the means chosen
to achieve that purpose must be the least restrictive, narrowly-tai-
lored means available. 12 8
As applied by the Supreme Court, the strict scrutiny test sets up a
standard of judicial review so rigorous as to be fatal to most applica-
ble legislative acts. The first burden is particularly difficult to meet.
Protecting national security'29 and remedying past institutional or
individual discrimination'"0 are among the few (if not the only)
times the government has been able to demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest to the Supreme Court's satisfaction.
The Court, however, has attempted to balance the interventionist
proclivity of the strict scrutiny test with a more deferential form of
judicial review. Legislative acts not predicated on a suspect classifi-
cation or violative of a fundamental personal interest - which is
where the great majority of legislative acts fall - do not offend con-
stitutional equal protection if they can be rationally related to a le-
gitimate governmental purpose. The so-called "rational basis test"
provides the widest degree of judicial comity to even speculative leg-
islative judgments.' 31
Both the strict scrutiny test and the rational basis test are so pre-
dictable that the judicial outcome is virtually determined by the type
of legislation under review. Legislation involving a suspect classifica-
tion or a fundamental personal interest most likely will not survive
constitutional scrutiny; whereas legislation not involving either of
these categories probably will be sustained. The Supreme Court's
analysis for equal protection claims is in this sense outcome-
determinative. l3 2
Middle-class Blacks find the strict scrutiny test to be problematic
because it quashes voluntary attempts to promote real equal employ-
ment opportunity in places of high employment. The test, in a word,
128. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986)(Pow-
ell, J., concurring); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967). See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 397 U.S. 184 (1964); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Some Supreme Court Justices have proposed alternative
levels of judicial scrutiny. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
129. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
130. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) (cases cited therein).
131. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Elec. Comm'rs., 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969)
("Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally. "). Note, supra note
126.
132. Explicit gender-based classifications are not suspect classifications and, hence,
are not subject to strict scrutiny. Neither are they reviewed under the rational basis test.
Rather, the Supreme Court employs a "middle-tier" or an "intermediate level" of scru-
tiny. Under this standard, the classification in question must serve important governmen-
tal objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 191 (1976). See also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
642-64 (11 th ed. 1985); C. DUCAT & H. CHASE, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 692,
861-71 (3d ed. 1983).
[VOL 25: 879. 1988] Racial Subordination
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
commands the omission of race at the wrong time. Except in a very
limited situation, it enjoins the public sector's use of race-conscious
employment policies or practices that engender racial inclusion. In so
doing, it treats employment policies and practices resulting in racial
exclusion pari passu with socially-beneficial ones.
The limited circumstance under which the strict scrutiny test per-
mits governmental bodies to use an explicit racial classification is
clear beyond peradventure. Race can only be used if it achieves a
compelling governmental purpose. So far, a racial classification
designed to remedy a public employer's prior racial discrimination is
the only purpose the Supreme Court finds compelling in the employ-
ment context. As the Court itself has stated: "It is now well estab-
lished that government bodies, including courts, may constitutionally
employ racial classifications essential to remedy unlawful treatment
of racial or ethnic groups subject to discrimination."13
Establishing an employer's prior racial discrimination is no easy
task. Absent the unlikely event that an employer (even in connection
with the voluntary use of a racial classification13 ') either admits to
its own racial discrimination or leaves behind smoking-gun evidence,
the victim's only chance of proving prior racial discrimination is by
proving that the employer violated constitutional or statutory antidis-
crimination law. If the asserted violation involves the equal protec-
tion clause, the victim will probably be defeated by the intent test.'35
If the asserted violation involves a federal statute rather than the
Constitution, the victim will have to surmount enormous barriers
133. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 166. While agreeing that "some elevated level of [judi-
cial] scrutiny is required when a racial or ethnic distinction is made for remedial pur-
poses," id., some members of the Court have proposed alternative levels of judicial scru-
tiny. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, for example, would allow racial
classifications that serve "important governmental objectives" and are "substantially re-
lated to the achievement of those objectives." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 301 (quoting Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978)). Justice Stevens would permit
the use of race if the public interest vindicated by such use and the means employed to
implement that interest justify the resulting adverse effects on the disadvantaged group.
Id. at 313-14. None of these alternative levels of judicial scrutiny have replaced the strict
scrutiny test as the dominant mode of constitutional analysis for racial classification. The
use of race to remedy the defendant's prior discrimination is permissible under any of the
alternative modes of constitutional analysis. See generally Paradise, 480 U.S. 166, n.17.
134. When an employer voluntarily sets up race-conscious employment practices or
policies, it is usually willing to admit to conspicuous racial or sexual imbalance in its
workforce but quite unwilling to admit to its own discrimination, because that, in effect,
would be admitting to a violation of the law. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 619-26 (1987); United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979).
135. See infra text accompanying notes 236-51 for a discussion of the intent test.
created by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, to which I shall
turn in due course.
In short, the strict scrutiny test - specifically, the Supreme
Court's color-blind perspective and narrow interpretation of compel-
ling governmental purpose - subordinates the Black middle class in
the employment context. It gives low priority to the Black middle
class' interest in equal employment opportunity. And, it does so by
making it extremely difficult for a public employer to voluntarily use
racial classifications for the purposes of assisting qualified Blacks in
catching up with their White counterparts, in dismantling psycholog-
ical and institutional barriers erected by past employment practices,
or otherwise in overcoming the present-day effects of prior subordi-
nating systems.
Such racial subordination contributes to complex racial discrimi-
nation and segregation in high employment by prolonging these con-
ditions. Making it extremely difficult for employers or Blacks to use
a device that can purge complex racial discrimination and segrega-
tion from the workplace perpetuates rather than diminishes these so-
cioeconomic problems. Given the difficulties of proving a violation of
constitutional or statutory antidiscrimination law, voluntary racial
preferences may be the only way to effectively counteract complex
racial discrimination and segregation in employment. Even the Su-
preme Court recognizes that "affirmative race-conscious relief may
be the only means available 'to assure [true] equality of opportuni-
ties and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices
which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disad-
vantage of minority citizens.' ",136 Reports issued since the 1960s by
the Department of Labor, 13 7 the United States Commission on Civil
Rights,'38 the Rand Corporation,"3 9 and others 40 support this con-
clusion, and go on to assert that racial preferences have launched
many qualified Blacks on successful careers they otherwise would not
have obtained or dared to pursue. Placing barriers in the path of
voluntary efforts to promote racial inclusion necessarily accommo-
dates, extends, and perhaps even intensifies racial exclusion - the
very condition these voluntary efforts are so capable of reversing.
136. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 450 (1986) (quoting
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). See also Thompson v.
Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv.,
665 F.2d 482, 499 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625
F.2d 918, 943-45 (10th Cir. 1979); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n. Streamfitters Local 938,
501 F.2d 622, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1974); Edwards & Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies for
Employment Discrimination, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9 (1976).
137. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1983, § 1 (Main), at 12, col. 1.
138. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1981, § 4 (Wk. in Rev.), at 2, col. 2.
139. See RAND RPT, supra note 37, at 85-91.
140. See, e.g., Bergmann, An Affirmative Look at Hiring Quotas, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 10, 1982, § 3 (Bus.), at 3, col. 1.
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b. Title VII
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,14 1 is the nation's major
antidiscrimination law in the employment context. Its key antidis-
crimination section, Section 703(a), provide classic illustration of the
manner in which Congress has decided to implement the racial omis-
sion tenet in federal civil rights laws:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin .... I'l
Although Congress made employment discrimination on the basis
143 144 145 * 146 14of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin 7 illegal
under Title VII, it did not define the word "discrimination." This
omission may have been deliberate. Congress may have felt that the
task of defining such a complex term is better left to the courts.
Responding to this challenge, the Supreme Court devised two dis-
tinctly different definitions of employment discrimination: disparate
treatment (requiring proof of racial motivation) 48 and disparate im-
pact (requiring no such proof) . 4  Both concepts were defined suc-
cinctly by the Supreme Court in Teamsters v. United States:50
A 'Disparate treatment' such as is alleged in the present case is the most
141. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 to 2000e-17 (1982).
142. § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
143. See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 885 (S.D. Cal.
1973), affld as modified, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975).
144. Although an impermissible basis listed in § 703(a), color is generally treated
as indistinguishable from race. See EEOC Dec. No. 72-0454 (Sept. 15, 1971) (unre-
ported EEOC finding of reasonable cause where light-skinned "White-looking" Black
was selected over dark-skinned, Negroid-featured Black).
145. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Bundy v. Jackson, 641
F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir.
1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
146. In addition to prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religious observances,
practices, and beliefs, Title VII requires employers to accommodate work requirements
to religious practices. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977).
147. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
148. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
149. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
150. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can
in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treat-
ment. . . . Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil
Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII. See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec.
13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("What the bill does. . .is sim-
ply to make it an illegal practice to use race as a factor in denying employ-
ment. It provides that men and women shall be employed on the basis of
their qualifications, not as Catholic citizens, not as Protestant citizens, not
as Jewish citizens, not as colored citizens, but as citizens of the United
States").
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that
stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall
more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required
under a disparate-impact theory. Either theory may, of course, be applied
to a particular set of facts.
It is difficult to prosecute a disparate impact claim of racial dis-
crimination in places of high employment. In order to state a claim
of such employment discrimination under Title VII, one must rely
upon sufficient statistical evidence. 152 Ordinarily, there are too few
Black applicants who have applied for a specific position with a par-
ticular employer within a given time frame to create an applicant
pool large enough to be statistically significant. 15 3 The even smaller
number of Black employees engenders a greater statistical problem
in promotion cases.5 Hence, as a practical matter, a Black person
denied a position or promotion within high employment will probably
have to-seek legal redress under a disparate treatment theory of em-
ployment discrimination.
Proceeding under a disparate treatment theory of employment dis-
crimination, however, will be almost as difficult as suing under a dis-
parate impact theory. This has less to do with the fact that Title VII
151. Id. at 335 n.15.
152. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433
U.S. 299 (1977).
153. While the Supreme Court has not stated how large a sample must be in order
to be statistically significant, it is clear that a Title VII plaintiff must prove that an
employer's selection criteria for hiring or promotion creates a "significant" racial dispar-
ity. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
154. Adequate numbers are more often available in lower level jobs. See, e.g.
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)(state troopers); Johnson v. Transporta-
tion Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616 (1987)(sex discrimination involv-
ing road dispatcher position); Local 28, the Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421 (1986)(sheet metal workers); Local No. 93, International Association of Firefighters
v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986)(firefighters); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267 (1986)(school teachers); Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561
( 1984)(firefighters). For a detailed discussion of the use of statistics to prove disparate
impact, see, e.g., B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 80-161
(2d ed. 1983); Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates In Employment Testing: Statistical
Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REv. 793 (1978).
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was born at a time when most forms of racism were overt155 or with
the transaction costs attentive upon complex litigation generally 156
than with federal case law. Federal courts have made it extremely
difficult for Title VII plaintiffs to win individual disparate treatment
cases. Proving racial motivation, establishing causation in mixed-mo-
tive cases, and judicial hostility toward even applying Title VII to
high-level jobs are among the most serious obstacles to successfully
litigating individual disparate treatment cases.
The Supreme Court has developed a system of proof for individ-
ual, nonclass disparate treatment cases of employment discrimina-
tion. 57 Plaintiff is given the initial burden of proving a prima facie
case of disparate treatment. The central issue here goes to defend-
ant's motivation: was defendant motivated by a discriminatory ani-
mus? Plaintiff can prove the requisite state of mind by using direct,
smoking gun evidence,1 58 which is rarely available today,1 59 or infer-
entially using circumstantial evidence.160 If plaintiff succeeds, de-
155. For an excellent discussion of Title VII legislative history see Vaas, Title VI
Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 431 (1966).
156. E.g., payment of attorneys' fees up front, delay in litigation, and protracted
litigation. See, e.g., Levi, The Business of the Courts: A Summary and a Sense of Per-
spective, 70 F.R.D. 212 (1976); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
157. In a disparate treatment class action, plaintiff must establish that defendant
regularly and purposefully treated his or her protected class less favorably than the domi-
nant group, or, in other words, that disparate treatment was not an isolated act but a
systemic practice. Such disparate treatment is normally proven by statistical evidence,
see Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), but can also be proven by testimony from numerous indi-
viduals, see Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324, or by the adoption of broad employment practices
or policies based on explicit impermissible criteria, see Dothard v. Rawlinson 433 U.S.
321 (1977).
158. See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 885 (S.D. Cal.
1973), affld as modified, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975).
159. See, e.g., Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp 397, 399 (D. Ore.
1970), affd 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974).
160. Although statistics can be used under certain circumstances in individual dis-
parate treatment cases, see Bompey & Saltman, The Role of Statistics in Employment
Discrimination Litigation - A University Perspective, 9 J. C. & U. L., 263, 271 (1982),
most of these cases are established without the use of statistics. In McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court set forth the primary non-statistical method of estab-
lishing a prima facie case based on circumstantial evidence. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). It
must be proven:
(i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainants qualifications.
Id. at 802.
fendant is given an opportunity to rebut plaintiff's prima facie case.
Defendant does so by showing a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son" for plaintiff's treatment.16' If defendant meets its burden of
proof, praintiff is then given an opportunity to show that defendant's
stated reason is nothing more than a pretext for intentional
discrimination. 62
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,6 3 the
Supreme Court let stand a devastating problem of proof for Title
VII plaintiffs. The Court reaffirmed earlier Supreme Court rulings
that defendant's burden of proving a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for plaintiff's treatment is only a burden of production, not
one of persuasion.164 In the absence of smoking-gun evidence or an
unsophisticated defendant, the Court's holding makes it easy for a
defendant to win on the merits of a disparate treatment case. De-
fendant can rebut the prima facie case on the basis of admissible but
untrue evidence as to its true motivation. Plaintiff, not being privy to
defendant's thinking, is left with the near impossible task of persuad-
ing the trier of fact that defendant's stated motivation was untrue.165
Given the fact that defendant is -in the best possible position to know
the true reasons for the action taken against plaintiff, plus the fact
that courts normally allow the use of subjective reasons in articulat-
ing a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason,"'' 6 placing the burden
of persuasion on the plaintiff is not only exceedingly unfair to the
plaintiff but a sure way to smother the truth. 67 It is unrealistic to
161. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
162. Id. at 804-05.
163. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
164. "The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by
the proferred reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of
fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff." 450 U.S. at 254-55. See also
Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (employer's burden to dispel the ad-
verse inference created by plaintiff's prima facie case is merely to "articulate" some le-
gitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action, and not to prove the absence of dis-
criminatory motive); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)
(employer's burden in rebutting prima facie case is to show that he based his decision on
a legitimate consideration, and not on an illegitimate one such as race). Thus, the ulti-
mate burden of persuasion as to the issue of discrimination always remains with the
plaintiff. See generally Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII
Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1129 (1980).
165. See, e.g., Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 528 F. 2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1976)
(plaintiff fails to prove pretext).
166. See, e.g., Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College, 648 F.2d 61, 66
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981) (subjective reasons for tenure denial);
Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 150, 156 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978)
(reasons given for inadequate teaching ability were arguably subjective).
167. Referring to the use of fairness as a principle on which to allocate the burden
of proof, Professor Cleary has stated, "The nature of a particular element may indicate
that evidence relating to it lies more within the control of one party, which suggest the
fairness of allocating that element to him." Cleary, Presuming and Pleading. An Essay
on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1959). Thus, placing the burden of persua-
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expect many Black applicants or employees to be able to prove dis-
criminatory intent under these circumstances.
Even if discriminatory intent can be proven, plaintiff will also have
to face the problem of proving causation. Because a clever employer
will have little trouble meeting its Burdine burden, the causation
question will probably arise in the murky context of mixed-motive
cases. 
1 8
A mixed-motive case is one in which both permissible and imper-
missible factors play a role in the employer's conduct.'69 A typical
example of a mixed-motive case is where a Black candidate is denied
a job or promotion both because he or she is less qualified than a
White candidate and the employer is racist. Title VII prohibits dis-
crimination "because of" race or color, but does mixed-motive dis-
crimination constitute discrimination "because of" the candidate's
race or color?
Unfortunately, the law provides no clear answer. Title VII does
not define the causal connector "because of." The Supreme Court
has not explicitly decided the causation issue. Lower federal courts
have decided it but have gone in different directions.
Although Title VII does not define the causal connector "because
of," Title VII does suggest two approaches to mixed-motive cases.
The first is presented in Section 703(a)(2), quoted above, °70 which
prohibits acts that "tend to deprive" individuals of employment op-
portunities. Section 703(a)(2) seems to suggest that an impermissi-
ble factor (such as, racial prejudice) cannot be among the factors
motivating an employer's actions. This approach to mixed-motive
cases is called the "taint standard." If an employer's action is tainted
by an impermissible factor (specifically, "race, color, sex, religion, or
national origin"' 71), then it is unlawful employment discrimination
under Title VII. The taint standard, also called the "discernible fac-
tor" standard (the personnel decision is unlawful if race, for exam-
ple, was a discernible factor in the decision 7 2), would seem to be
sion on the plaintiff regarding defendant's "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" is
hardly compelling from a fairness perspective.
168. For a detailed discussion of the mixed-motive cases, see Brodin, The Stan-
dard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982).
169. Thus, the mixed-motive issue in individual disparate treatment cases will nor-
mally arise at the pretext stage.
170. See supra text accompanying note 142.
171. This language is taken from section 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
172. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Block, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 713 (8th Cir.
1984).
consistent with the broad congressional design of Title VII -
namely, "to eliminate . . discrimination in employment based on
race, color, [sex,] religion, or national origin.'
Another section of Title VII, however, suggests a different ap-
proach to causation in mixed-motive cases. Section 706(g),174 pat-
terned after the National Labor Relations Act's17 5 remedial provi-
sions,176 sets forth the type of relief a prevailing plaintiff may receive
under Title VII. The last sentence reads:
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an
individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promo-
tion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back
pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or
was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged
for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin or in violation of section 704(a). 7 7
Although this sentence would seem to address only the question of
remedy, as does all of Section 706(g), the entire section resulted
from the adoption of an amendment to Title VII. The amendment's
purpose was to specify to a federal district court that a Title VII
violation could be found only when race, color, sex, religion, or na-
tional origin was the sole motivation behind the employer's action. 78
This is sometimes called the "sole factor" standard: causation is es-
tablished in a Title VII case only when the employment decision is
based solely on one of the impermissible criteria. Under the "sole
factor" standard plaintiff can never prevail in a mixed-motive case,
because, by definition, an impermissible criterion was not the sole
factor behind the employer's action.
Federal courts have not been any more decisive than Congress in
resolving the causation problem in mixed-motive cases. 9 In McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green,8 0 the Supreme Court seemed to adopt
173. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2401. See also United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1982 & Supp. 1 1983)
175. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
176. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 n.l 1 (1975).
177. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
178. Congressman Emmanual Celler, who introduced the amendment, stated:
Mr. Chairman, the purpose of the amendment is to specify cause. Here the
court, for example, cannot find any violation of the act which is based on facts
other - and I emphasize "other" - than discrimination on the grounds of
race, color, religion, or national origin. The discharge might be based, for ex-
ample, on incompetence or a morals charge or theft, but the court can only
consider charges based on race, color, religion, or national origin. That is the
purpose of this amendment.
I 10 CONG. REC. 2567 (1964).
179. For a discussion of causation in systemic disparate treatment cases, see, e.g.,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); East
Texas Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
180. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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the taint standard suggested in section 703(a)(2). The Court stated
that, "In the implementation of. . .[personnel] decisions, it is abun-
dantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle
or otherwise."18 1 In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation
Co.,182 the Supreme Court suggested that the proper causation stan-
dard may be somewhere between the liberal taint standard and the
stricter sole factor standard. Responding to plaintiff's claim that the
employer's "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" offered for their
discharge was mere pretext, the Court said:
The use of the term 'pretext' in this context does not mean, of course, that
the Title VII plaintiff must show that he would have in any event been
rejected or discharged solely on the basis of his race, without regard to the
alleged deficiencies ... [N]o more is required to be shown than that race
was a 'but for' cause.1 8
3
McDonald, thus, adopts a "but-for" causation standard. Title VII
is violated when plaintiff shows that but for the use of an impermis-
sible criterion (race, color, sex, and so on), the adverse personnel
decision would not have been made. The but-for standard is some-
times called either the "dominant taint," "dominant factor," or "de-
termining factor" standard184 (the personnel decision is unlawful if
race, for example, was the dominant or determining factor in the
decision), or the "same decision" standard185 ("which would uphold
personnel action based in part on race if merit principles alone would
have led to the same result").'
Like the Supreme Court and Congress, the lower federal courts
have not agreed on a causation standard. They seem to be split be-
tween the taint and but-for standards. 8 7 One scholar, however, has
concluded that the lower federal courts are moving toward stricter
standards of causation. 88
In short, assuming the employer is able to meet its burden of pro-
duction under Burdine, the success of the plaintiff's disparate treat-
ment case may depend on which causation standard the court ap-
plies. A plaintiff will have an easier time establishing a Title VII
181. Id. at 801.
182. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
183. Id. at 282 n.10.
184. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Block, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 713 (8th Cir.
1984).
185. Id.
186. Brodin, supra note 168, at 296.
187. See id. at 308-10 (cases collected). See also Bibbs, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 713.
188. See Brodin, supra note 168.
violation in jurisdictions employing the taint standard than in juris-
dictions employing the stricter but-for or sole factor standards.
None of this, however, matters much in some federal courts. Some
federal judges have relaxed Title VII's protections in high-level jobs,
and others have taken a "hands-off" attitude.189 As the Second Cir-
cuit has observed, these courts have rendered high-level employers
"virtually immune to charges of employment bias, at least when the
bias is not expressed overtly."'190
These judge-made obstacles to successful litigation of individual
disparate treatment cases - burden of proof, standard of causation
in mixed-motive cases, and poor judicial attitude - may be in place
in spite of, rather than because of, the Black civil rights interest at
stake. There may even be "compelling" countervailing interests un-
derpinning these laws and policies. But it cannot be gainsaid that
these laws and policies give low or no priority to the Black middle
class' civil rights interest - namely, equal employment opportunity.
The fact that academic institutions won all but one of the twenty-
three race discrimination cases brought in federal court against them
between 1971 and 1984,'1' is indicative of the deference Title VII
gives to middle-class Blacks.
By subordinating the civil rights interest of the Black middle class
in employment, Title VII contributes to the problem of complex ra-
cial discrimination. Allocation of the burden of proof, the but-for or
sole factor causation standards, and judicial defiance in applying Ti-
tle VII at high levels of employment provide little protection against
complex racial discrimination and may even encourage would-be dis-
criminators. Having only the burden of producing evidence probative
of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for disparate treatment,
and having the protection of the but-for or sole factor test in mixed-
motive cases, an employer has great opportunities to discriminate
and get away with lying about it. 92 Judicial disdain for Title VII
provides both an opportunity and a motivation to discriminate, with-
out having to lie about it.
Title VII's racially subordinating features also contribute to the
problem of conspicuous racial stratification in high-level jobs. The
burden of proof and the causation standards are so onerous for plain-
tiffs, and the judicial attitude so obvious that not only is the
probability of winning a Title VII lawsuit remote, but also many
189. See, e.g., Brooks, Civil Rights Scholarship: A Proposed Agenda for the
Twenty-First Century, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 397, 410 (1986); Bartholet, Application of Ti-
tle VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REv. 947, 959-78 (1982).
190. Bartholet, supra note 189, at 961 (quoting Powell v. Syracuse Univ. 580 F.2d
1150, 1153 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978)).
191. Shipp, The Litigiousness of Academe, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1987, § 12, at 63.
192. Of course, the motivation to discriminate is racism or some perceived eco-
nomic benefit to the employer.
[VOL. 25: 879. 1988] Racial Subordination
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Blacks are discouraged from even filing a Title VII complaint in fed-
eral court. If Blacks do not win Title VII cases or file Title VII law-
suits, Title VII is less effective in doing what Congress intended it to
do - create employment opportunites for Blacks in occupations that
have been traditionally closed to them. As the Supreme Court has
stated:
[I]t was clear to Congress that '[t]he crux of the problem [was] to open
employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been tra-
ditionally closed to them,' . . . and it was to this problem that Title VII's
prohibition against racial discrimination in employment was primarily
addressed. 193
It is worth noting briefly that Title VII also subordinates working-
class Blacks and may, to some extent, subordinate underclass
Blacks. 9 But because of different socioeconomic conditions, racial
subordination in these instances differ in substance from what the
Black middle class experiences. For poorer Blacks, Title VII suf-
fers from many of the same defects as Title VIII, the Fair Housing
Act, which is discussed later in Part IV. Both antidiscrimination
laws provide only theoretical protection for these segments of Black
society, because poorer Blacks lack either the time, flexibility, or re-
sources to pursue complex litigation. True attorneys fees can be
awarded to a successful Title VII litigant. 196 Most lawyers, however,
require three to five thousand dollars up front to cover filing fees, the
193. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448-49 (1986). The
Court is quoting from United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203
(1979) (quoting I10 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)). The Court
also stated that "Title VII was designed 'to achieve equality of employment opportunities
and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of
[W]hite employees over other employees.'" 478 U.S. at 448 (quoting Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)). See also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 364-65 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976); Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
194. Title VII can subordinate underclass Blacks who are in a position to call upon
its use. For these underclass Blacks, the substance of racial subordination under Title VII
parallels that of working-class Blacks. Such racial subordination can make employment
discrimination as dominant a class problem for these underclass Blacks as social dysfunc-
tion and cultural self-destruction is for all underclass Blacks. The inability to acquire or
to recapture a job lost through employment discrimination (past or present) can prevent
a poor Black from climbing out of the underclass as much as it can propel a wealthier
Black into the underclass.
195. Blacks interested in low-level jobs, however, are ordinarily in a position to
take advantage of disparate impact discrimination, whereas Blacks interested in better-
status jobs usually are not. Because there are more Black workers and applicants at low-
level jobs than at high level positions, statistical analysis is more likely to be available in
low-skill than in high-skill jobs.
196. § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
cost of discovery, and other start-up expenses.
Knowing that access to Title VII is remote for poorer Blacks, es-
pecially if they are unemployed, or that Title VII litigation is an up-
hill endeavor even for richer Blacks, some employers find little deter-
ence in Title VII. Frequently, they will refuse the government's ef-
forts to reconcile the dispute, and gamble that neither the govern-
ment nor the Black complainant will pursue the matter to federal
court. Employment discrimination and segregation are reinforced
each time this strategy pays off.197
Other civil rights laws and policies weigh heavier on working-class
and underclass Blacks than Title VII. These features of formal equal
opportunity are given extensive treatment in subsequent parts of this
article.
3. Summary
By far the smallest segment of Black society, the Black middle
class is also the most assimilated segment of Black Americans. A
typical Black middle class household consists of a nuclear family in
which both parents work, at least one as a business manager or pro-
fessional. The household, in addition, possesses a late model automo-
bile, a complete line of household appliances, and investments or sav-
ings. Annual household income ranges between $45,000 and
$85,000. Like their White counterparts, the average Black middle
class household is stable and comfortable.
Unlike the White middle class, however, race burdens and in some
instances threatens the material success of the Black middle class.
Long after the death of Jim Crow, color still remains a significant
factor in a skilled and talented Black person's chances for sustained
happiness and worldly success. This is particularly so in high-level
employment. Loneliness, disaffection, stress and hypertension (or
John Henryism), complex racial discrimination, and conspicuous ra-
cial stratification in high-level employment are the dominant class
problems facing the Black middle class. Complex racial discrimina-
tion and racially segregated top jobs are the most serious class
problems; they fuel the other class problems and have deleterious
social consequences. Racial wage gaps, the collective experiences of
middle-class Blacks, and the existence of racial stratification in high-
paying jobs give evidence of complex racial discrimination in places
of high employment. Likewise, complex racial discrimination and
hard statistical evidence establish the existence of Black under-
representation in high-status jobs.
197. For a detailed discussion of Title VII's administrative process, see M. ZIM-
MER, C. SULLIVAN & R. RICHARDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION 363-460 (1982).
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Complex racial discrimination and racially segregated jobs are
linked to formal equal opportunity by racial subordination. Civil
rights laws and policies or practices fully sanctioned by the federal
government and designed to vindicate the racial omission tenet -
the strict scrutiny test in racial preference law and the burden of
proof, standard of causation, and poor judicial attitude in antidis-
crimination law - give low or no priority to the Black middle class'
civil rights interest in equal employment opportunity. These judge-
made features of formal equal opportunity subordinate this impor-
tant civil rights interest by, in the case of the strict scrutiny test,
intercepting, enjoining, or discouraging public sector employers from
using the only proven means of engendering racial inclusion, and, in
the case of the other features, by decreasing the odds of winning
individual disparate treatment cases under Title VII. As a conse-
quence of these incidents of racial subordination, there are fewer
good opportunities in law to redress complex racial discrimination
and segregation in employment. Racial subordination depletes the
arsenal of weapons that can be used to combat complex racial dis-
crimination and segregation; it vitiates the Black middle class' de-
fenses against racial exclusion. In a word, the strict scrutiny test's
rejection of racial inclusion and Title VII's inability to unearth com-
plex racial discrimination on an individual basis, show little comity
for the equal-employment-opportunity interest of middle-class Blacks
and, as a consequence, leave these Black Americans more, not less,
vulnerable to employment discrimination, underrepresentation, and
other employment hardships such as tokenism, loneliness, disaffec-
tion, and John Henryism.
Racial subordination in this area of the law may contribute to the
socioeconomic problems of the Black middle class in a more active
way. It may actually encourage employment discrimination or segre-
gation. For, when the courts give low respect to the Black middle
class employment interests, that not only provides a would-be dis-
criminator with the opportunity to discriminate and get away with
lying about it, but it also sends encouraging signals to those individu-
als. Some employers may read the courts' construction of Title VII,
particularly the courts' reluctance to apply Title VII to top jobs, as a
green light to engage in subtle forms of employment discrimination;
it is permissible to discriminate, so long as you do so discretely or
cleverly.
Title VII also subordinates the employment interests of the Black
working class and underclass. Poorer Blacks, especially if unem-
ployed, lack either the time, resources, or flexibility to pursue costly
and protracted litigation. These Black Americans, however, have
other problems of a more immediate nature peculiar to their class




The Bureau of Labor Statistics offers two benchmark income
levels that help to establish the upper income level for the Black
working class. One level - called "low budget" - is set at approxi-
mately $18,000 for the middle to late 1980s. The other level -
called "medium budget" - is set at approximately $31,250 for the
same period.1" 8 As with all Bureau of Labor Statistics income levels
published since at least 1981, these levels are based on the cost of
maintaining a family of four in an urban setting and adjusted annu-
ally for inflation.
A low-budget family normally rents rather than owns its home. It
most likely lives without air-conditioning and cannot afford to hire a
handyman to do home maintenance and repairs. Relative to higher-
budget families, this family "eats less meat and more potatoes,
drinks less wine and liquor but more beer." The low-budget category
"is not designed as a subsistence budget; the family in this category
should be able to function with "a sense of self-respect and social
participation."' 99
In contrast, a medium-budget family enjoys a higher standard of
living. Ordinarily, it owns its home and has about fifteen years re-
maining on its mortgage. According to a study by the United Auto
Workers, this budget category provides one new suit every three to
four years for the father, three street dresses every two years for the
mother, a new television set every ten years, a new refigerator every
seventeen years, a new toaster every thirty-three years, a used car
every four years, nine movies for adults and none for children each
year, and no savings.200
Notwithstanding these differences, low- and medium-budget fami-
lies are remarkably alike in essential ways. They share many cul-
tural characteristics - such as, occupational status and family
structure - and are less stable than "high-budget" families
($46,800 in annual income), the Bureau of Labor Statistics' next in-
come level.201 Consequently, it is not unreasonable to combine low-




[VOL. 25: 879. 1988] Racial Subordination
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
and medium-budget families into one class - the Black working
class - and to allow the high-budget floor to indicate the class' in-
come ceiling. For purposes of discussion (and with the understanding
that setting the line of demarcation between socioeconomic classes is
not an inexact science), I shall take $45,000 (the income floor I use
for the Black middle class) as the upper income limit for the Black
working class. Accordingly, the family income range for this seg-
ment of Black society is $18,000 to $45,000.
Using this income range, approximately 55 percent of Black
Americans belong to the working class, compared to approximately
63 percent of White Americans. With approximately 37 percent of
Black Americans belonging to the underclass, compared to approxi-
mately 16 percent of White Americans, the Black working class is
the largest segment of Black society.202
The following is a more detailed profile of Black working class
households.
32 percent of Black working class households consists of family
units headed by both husband and wife. As to the husbands: 6
percent are either unemployed, "farmers" (meaning farm la-
borers or farm owners), or "professionals" (meaning such sala-
ried workers as teachers, engineers, technicians, police officers,
firemen, small-business owners, and sales representatives); 50
percent are semi-skilled or unskilled blue-collar or service
workers; and an equal percentage (13 percent) are either em-
ployed in a "clerical" position (meaning postal workers, secre-
taries, sales clerks, telephone operators, and so on) or retired.
As to the wives: an equal percentage (25 percent) are either
keeping house or employed as semi-skilled or unskilled blue-
collar or service workers; 19 percent are clerical workers; 13
percent are professionals; and an equal percentage (6 percent)
are either employed as "managers and owners" (meaning sala-
ried managers of businesses or such self-employed professionals
as doctors and lawyers) or retired.20 3
0 2 percent of Black working class households are male-headed
families, in which the household head is most likely a
professional.20 4
202. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
203. See S. Rose, supra note 59, at 12-13, 21-22.
204. Id. at 21-22.
* 16 percent of Black working class households are female-
headed families, of which an equal percentage of the household
heads (13 percent) are either not in the labor force, unem-
ployed, professionals, or retired; and an equal percentage of the
household heads (25 percent) are either semi-skilled or un-
skilled blue-collar or service workers or retired.2"5
* 10 percent of Black working class households consist of single
men, of which an equal percentage (20 percent) are not in the
labor force or are clerical workers or managers; and 40 percent
are semi-skilled or unskilled blue-collar or service workers.200
* 8 percent of Black working class households consist of single
women, of which an equal percentage (25 percent) are likely to
be semi-skilled workers, professionals, or retired.207
Some working-class Blacks live in constant fear of slipping into
the underclass. Many who have crossed the poverty line are still very
close to the world of hunger and hovels. Others who have never ex-
perienced poverty live but a misstep away from its open doors - a
divorce, the untimely death of a spouse, the unemployment of a
working spouse, a catastrophic illness in the family, old age, or re-
tirement. Indeed, between 1978 and 1986, 5.2 percent of the nation's
working class fell below the poverty line or into the low end of the
working class. And during this same period, a dramatic seven million
Americans were added to the ranks of the poor. 08
Several factors seem to explain such instability within the Ameri-
can working class, Black or White. Irrational economic behavior 0 9
and expediency or a lack of long-term planning210 seem to be among





208. TIME, Jan. 5, 1987, at 49.
209. Irrational economic habits basically entail living beyond one's financial means
and misallocating household funds. These class traits are often manifested in several
ways: piling up consumer debt; forgoing savings and investments in order to purchase
state-of-the-art consumer goods; and purchasing late model cars that not only require
higher monthly payments, but also higher insurance, property taxes, and maintenance
costs. One of the most irrational habits is the tendency to have too many children. These
lovely objects of one's affection are expensive to raise, especially on a meager income.
210. Living life for the moment-from pay check to pay check or weekend to
weekend-and without direction or without the constraints of a life-plan can often result
in a financially depleting life-style. Although some of this behavior may be implusive,
much of it is probably the consequence of a lack of knowledge or exposure to rational
living in a complex society.
211. Crime, drug abuse, and alcoholism can also threaten to destabilize some
working-class Blacks. Any family can become distracted, emotionally enervated, and
even torn apart by a teenager's criminal acts, a mother's drug addiction, or a father's
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Even though the Black working class is no more or no less suscep-
tible to these menacing effects than their White counterparts, the
Black working class, unlike the White working class, must contend
with certain racial factors that can be more destabilizing and demor-
alizing to Blacks than any of the racially-neutral factors. These ra-
cial barriers to a better life constitute the Black working class' spe-
cial class problems.
B. The Subordination Question
1. Dominant Class Problems
Working-class Blacks are particularly vulnerable in two of the
most consequential areas of American life: housing and education.
Housing discrimination and segregration, often accompanied by vio-
lence, are the main problems in the housing area. Two sets of socio-
economic problems are dominant in education: the lack of "quality
education" in primary schools; and the low enrollment of Black stu-
dents in undergraduate and graduate schools.
The Black underclass also faces serious housing and educational
problems - problems similar to those encountered by the Black
working class. These problems, however, are not as destabilizing as
the internal problems underclass Blacks face. Dysfunctional and self-
destructive behaviors, values, and attitudes within the Black under-
class necessarily preclude personal or group advancement to the
working class. 12 In contrast, the housing and educational problems
discussed here do not necessarily block entry into the Black working
class; they present major barriers for advancing to the Black middle
class. It is only after one has been extricated from self-annihilation
can one begin to deal with the enemy from without. Housing and
educational problems, in short, are the major problems with which
Blacks who have reached working-class status must deal. They are
problems of the Black working class that, more than most other
problems, hinder advancement to a more stable life in the Black
middle class.
alcoholism.
212. See infra Part V.B.1. for a discussion of the problems facing the Black
underclass.
a. Housing
After enduring months of racial taunts and acts of vandalism, a
Black family moved out of its home in a working-class neighborhood
on Cleveland's West Side.2"' A year later, an interracial couple and
their two children were subjected to numerous threats, racial slurs,
and acts of vandalism by angry White neighbors demanding that
they and another Black family leave a working-class Italian enclave
in Southwest Philadelphia.214 Earlier that same year, a Black woman
living by herself in a Chicago apartment complex, and the only
Black living in that complex, walked out of her apartment to find her
car resting on slashed tires. The act was repeated later on, and this
time her headlights were also smashed. On other occasions, she re-
turned home to find her telephone line snipped, her apartment ran-
sacked, and an unsigned letter containing racial slurs and the follow-
ing threat: "Last Chance, Get Out." The letter was the final blow;
she moved out of her apartment.2 15
These stories underscore an ugly truth about life in America to-
day: some two decades after Congress passed the Fair Housing
Act,2 16 housing discrimination and segregation, sometimes buttressed
by acts of violence, "remains the pattern in neighborhoods from New
York to California." This pattern is especially prevalent in working-
class neighborhoods, which consist of low- and moderate-priced
housing.2 17
Housing discrimination today is more subtle than these stories
might otherwise suggest. In fact, housing discrimination, like most
racial discrimination in the post-1960s,21 a mainly takes the form of
213. L.A. Times, June 12, 1986, pt. I, at 20, col. 4 (San Diego ed.).
214. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1985, § 1, at 38, col. 1.
215. Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 1, col. I.
216. Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Title VIII), Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1982)).
217. TIME, June 30, 1986, at 40. See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1985, § 4 (Wk. in
Rev.), at 3, col. 1, at 8, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1985, § 4 (Wk. in Rev.), at 8, col.
1; Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
218. It is unusual to find overt acts of racism today. Although well-publicized,
Howard Beach, Queens - where in December of 1986 three Black teenagers who
walked into a diner to use a telephone were chased and beatened by a gang of White
youths, resulting in the death of one of the Black teenagers who was forced into an on-
coming car by the mob - and Cummings County, Georgia - where in January of 1987
the Ku Klux Klan stoned a group of Blacks who were marching to commemorate Dr.
Martin Luther King's birthday - involved rare incidents of overt racism. See TIME, Jan.
5, 1987, at 48; N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1986, § 4 (Wk. in Rev.), at 10, col. 1. See also
Leavy, What's Behind the Resurgence of Racism in America?, EBONY, Apr., 1987, at
132; Freedman, Racial Tension in New York is on Increase Despite Gains, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 29, 1987, § I (Main), at 1, col. 4; Simpson, Black College Students are Viewed as
Victims of a Subtle Racism, Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1987, at I, col. 1; TIME, Apr. 6, 1987,
at 57; Davidson, Private Schools for Black Pupils are Flourishing, Wall St. J., Apr. 15,
1987, at 33, col. 3. See generally H. ASHMORE, HEARTS AND MINDS: THE ANATOMY OF
RACISM FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 138 (1982).
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complex racial discrimination - racial discrimination that is subtle
in the sense that it is sophisticated, unconscious, or institutionalized
and frequently accompanied by nonracial factors. In contrast to the
"Al Campanis syndrome, '219 practitioners of complex racial discrim-
ination are usually clever enough to hide their anti-Black feelings.2
"Smiling discrimination" is a prime example of complex racial
discrimination.
Housing officials have noted that Blacks "often encounter discrim-
ination with a smile." As one housing official has stated: "Many
times people are denied [housing] and know they've been denied, but
don't know it's discrimination . . . The person may be very nice
and may never directly say anything that leads [prospective tenants
or homeowners] to know it's something about them . . . but is told
that a unit is not available." 221
According to the Kentucky Human Rights Commission, another
common example of smiling discrimination in the housing area
works as follows. A rental agent will tell a Black family, "I'm very
sorry, but we don't have a vacancy today." Later, the same agent
will tell a White family the same thing, but add, "I expect we'll have
one tomorrow. ' 222 Numerous examples of smiling discrimination in
other areas of interracial relations appear daily in the news media.22 '
Smiling discrimination is not the only form of complex racial dis-
crimination in housing today. To quote one observer: "The ploys are
endless." In Atlanta, for example, "one ruse is to demand earnest
219. Al Campanis, a former major league baseball player, was fired from his posi-
tion as the Los Angeles Dodgers, Vice-President for player personnel, the third-highest
position in the organization, for the bush-league bigotry he displayed in a TV interview
on ABC's Nightline April 6, 1987. Asked by anchor Ted Koppel why there are no Black
managers, coaches, or owners in baseball, Campanis said Blacks may lack "some of the
necessities" to hold managerial positions. After a "flabbergasted" Koppel gave him a
chance to remove his foot from his mouth, Campanis stuck it in deeper by re-
marking-from out of left field-that Blacks are "not good swimmers because they don't
have the buoyancy." TV GUIDE, Apr. 18-24, 1987, at A-2, (San Diego ed.). See L.A.
Times, Apr. 9, 1987, pt. III, at 1, col. I (San Diego ed.).
220. For an exploration of these feelings, see, e.g., Brooks, Anti-Minority Mindset
in the Law School Personnel Process: Toward an Understanding of Racial Mindsets, 5
L. & INEQUALITY J. 101-04, 107 (1987).
221. TiMe, June 30, 1986, at 40.
222. Id.
223. For example, there is the suburban shopping mall sales girl who waits on a
White customer before waiting on a Black customer who was there first. There is also the
night club owner who imposes a certain dress code designed to keep Blacks out or who
plays a certain type of music (e.g. country and western) when "too many" Blacks are on
the dance floor. See, e.g., TIME, Mar. 10, 1986, at 46; San Diego Reader, July 26, 1984,
at 1, col. I; East County Today, Nov. 30, 1983, at 2B, col 1; San Diego Union, Dec. 31,
1983, at B3, col. 6.
money in cash from a [B]lack prospect. When the would-be buyer
returns from the bank, he is told, 'Sorry, the property has been
taken.'" Another maneuver is for rental and sales agents to tip off
one another "by writing the names of [W]hite applicants in
script. '224 "Steering" - where real estate agents deliberately direct
Black prospects to Black or mixed neighborhoods and Whites to
neighborhoods with few Blacks - is yet another example of complex
racial discrimination in housing. According to University of Chicago
urbanologist Gary Orfield, steering is "[o]ne of the driving engines
of resegregation . . . . If you can stop that, you've solved a big part
of the problem. 225
b. Education
1) Primary Education
Contrary to popular belief, the desire for quality education is very
strong among Black Americans. As Professor Derrick Bell of
Harvard Law School has concluded from his research: "American
[B]lacks have sought effective public schooling for their children for
two centuries." 26 Of all the problems Black Americans have en-
countered and still face in their quest for quality education, or effec-
tive public schooling, the one internal problem that most Blacks to-
day seem to have resolved is the problem of defining "quality
education," or "effective public schooling."
Perhaps it can be said that most Black Americans desire an edu-
cational program that combines three ingredients: the "three Rs,"
Black pride, and cultural diversity. Like all children, Black children
need good basic schooling. They need to learn how to read, write,
and do arithmetic. But because of the lingering effects of prior racial
subordination, Black children also need special instruction in Black
pride. Such instruction mainly entails the creation of educational
programs that can help Black children to become aware of and to
deal with low self-esteem, racial sensibility, and other negative as-
pects of being Black in a racist society. Futhermore, Black children,
like all American children, should be educated within a culturally
diverse setting. This will not only enable American children to learn
how to function more effectively in a culturally diverse society, but
will also help America's culturally diverse society function more ef-
fectively. The importance of cultural diversity in education was rec-
ognized almost a century ago by a Kansas court:
At the common schools, where both sexes and all kinds of children mingle
224. TIME, June 30, 1986, at 40.
225. Id.
226. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 364-68 (2d. ed. 1982).
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together, we have the great world in miniature; there they may learn
human nature in all its phases, with all its emotions, passions and feelings,
loves and hates, its hopes and fears, its impulses and sensibilities; there they
may learn the secret springs of human actions, and the attractions and re-
pulsions, which lend with irresistible force to particular lines of conduct.
But on the other hand, persons by isolation may become strangers even in
their own country; and by being strangers, will be of but little benefit either
to themselves or to society. As a rule, people cannot afford to be ignorant of
their society which surrounds them; and as all kinds of people must live
together in the same society, it would seem to be better that all should be
taught in the same schools."'
Notwithstanding Black America's quest for quality education,
more than a generation after Brown v. Board of Education,228 scores
of underclass and working-class Black children receive no semblance
of quality education in their schools. These children attend public
schools that provide inferior basic schooling, few or no programs for
Black awareness, or little cultural diversity. Frequently, all of these
poor qualities combine in one school.
A 1985 report prepared for the Joint Center on Political Studies
by Professor Jennifer Hochschild of Princeton University indicates
the extent to which cultural diversity is lacking in American public
schools. Professor Hochschild states that one-third of all Black chil-
dren were attending "one-race" schools - schools ninety percent or
more Black - in 1980. Although this is less than the two-thirds
percentage of Black children attending one-race schools in 1968, the
"pace of desegregation has slowed dramatically" since 1980. In fact,
there has been "little desegregation since 1976," and, not surpris-
ingly, racial isolation is accelerating as we move toward the end of
the 1980s. 22'
Meaningful desegregation has even eluded the Topeka, Kansas
public school system, the named defendant in Brown v. Board of
Education. In 1985, the son of the lawyer who represented Linda
Brown Smith, the named plaintiff in the case who in 1954 was a
pupil in the Topeka school system, petitioned the district court on
behalf of Ms. Smith's daughter to re-open Brown. The petition was
based on the ground that, some thirty years after the Supreme
Court's 1954 desegregation decree, the school board still had not de-
227. Ottawa v. Tinnon, 26 Kan. 1, 19 (1881).
228. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
229. Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1985, at 22, col. 1. The study was published by the Joint
Center for Political Studies in 1985 under the title, THIRTY YEARS AFTER BROWN.
Founded in 1970, the Joint Center is a nonprofit research institute located in Washing-
ton, D.C. It publishes a monthly magazine entitled Focus, which is cited throughout this
article.
segregated its public schools.2"'
2) Higher Education
If college and post-graduate education are the keys to Black
worldly success,231 then the future for Black Americans grows
bleaker each year. After an enrollment explosion during a brief pe-
riod in the 1970s, Black enrollment in four-year colleges began to
fall during the 1980s. Various studies underscore this point.
One study, conducted by the American Association of State Col-
leges and Universities, shows that while the number of Black high-
school graduates grew substantially between 1975 and 1982, the per-
centage of these students enrolling in college declined from 31.5 per-
cent to 28 percent during this period. In contrast, the percentage of
White high-school graduates going to college held steady and even
slightly increased from 32.4 percent to 32.5 percent during the same
period. The study also reveals that the decline in Black enrollment at
some schools far exceeds the national average. For example, Black
enrollment at Oberlin college in Ohio fell thirty-nine percent in the
twelve-year period ending in 1985.232
Another study indicates that by 1985 Black enrollment in colleges
decreased further and began to stagnate at about twenty-four per-
cent of Black high school graduates while White enrollment climbed
to almost forty-three percent of White high school graduates. Even if
Black enrollment has reached its nadir, the picture remains rather
bleak. The fact remains that Blacks "have a smaller presence on
American campuses than they did six years ago, both in absolute
terms and as a percentage of all undergraduates. 2 3
What accounts for the low enrollment of Blacks in colleges and
universities? Cutbacks in federal financial aid during the 1980s is
certainly partially responsible.23 4 But there is another less obvious
agent to which little attention has been given: racial subordination.
230. Wall St. J., Sept. 3, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
231. See RAND RPT., supra note 37, at 21-41.
232. Wall St. J., May 29, 1985, at I col. 1; TIME, Nov. 11, 1985, at 84.
233. Fiske, Enrollment of Minorities in Colleges Stagnating, N.Y. Times, Apr.
19, 1987, § I (Main), at 1, col. 1. See Washington Post, Apr. 13, 1987, at 29, col. 1.
Figures from the Census Bureau also show a decline in Black college enrollment between
1980 and 1985. They also indicate that Black women have enrolled in college in much
larger numbers than Black men during this period. BLACK ENTERPRISE, April, 1987, at
39.
234. For a discussion, see Fiske, supra note 239, at 18, cols. 2-3. See also infra
text accompanying notes 320-23.
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2. Racial Subordination
Through its tenet of racial omission,235 formal equal opportunity
subordinates working-class Blacks. Such racial subordination, in
turn, contributes to the dominant, or special, class problems encoun-
tered by this segment of Black society. Specifically, it directly
causes, accommodates, or even encourages complex racial discrimi-
nation and de jure or de facto segregation in housing as well as a
lack of quality education in public schools and low Black enrollment
in higher education.
a. Housing
"My right to live where I choose was violated."2 36 This is the cry
of a young Black woman who was vicitimized by housing discrimina-
tion and by acts of violence to her home. And it is the civil rights
interest at stake for the Black working class in housing. Working-
class Blacks have a strong civil rights interest in equal housing op-
portunity. They demand the right to seek housing wherever it is
available; the right to live wherever one chooses. As will be seen in
the discussion of racial occupancy controls later on, it may be neces-
sary to temporarily frustrate the open housing interest of a few
working-class Blacks in order to vindicate the long-term open hous-
ing interest of many more working-class Blacks.
Several features of the legal apparatus designed to implement the
racial omission tenet give low priority to the fair housing interest of
working-class Blacks and, hence, contribute to housing discrimina-
tion and segregation within this segment of Black society. The intpnt
test, the strict scrutiny test, the paper-tiger statutory scheme of the
Fair Housing Act of 1968, low damage awards, and protracted liti-
gation are the major subordinating features of civil rights law since
the 1960s. By giving low priority to the Black working class' housing
interest, each of these acts of governance contributes to housing dis-
crimination and segregation.
1) Intent Test
The intent test comes into play when a federal constitutional chal-
lenge is made - usually under the equal protection clause of the
235. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34 for an explanation of the concept of
racial omission.
236. Celis, Closed Doors: Justice, HUD Oppose Housing Segregation, But En-
forcement Lags, Wall St. J, Oct 28, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
Fourteenth Amendment a7 - against a state, city, or municipal land
use law, policy, or practice having an exclusionary effect on working-
class Blacks. Limited only by human imagination, land use devices
that preclude Blacks from obtaining affordable housing in desirable
areas come in a variety of configurations: a new state constitutional
provision requiring prior voter approval in the form of a local refer-
endum before any municipality can develop a federally funded low-
rent housing project; a suburban township's charter provision requir-
ing prior voter approval of all zoning changes within the township by
a fifty-five percent referendum vote; a city's decision to rezone prop-
erty a private group targeted for a low-and-moderate-income hous-
ing project; or a city's denial of a religious order's request to rezone
a segment of its own land from single-family to multiple-family
housing, the effect of which is to prevent the owner from construct-
ing low-and-moderate-income housing on its land.
The United States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts
have given constitutional clearance to these and other land use ma-
nipulations in spite of their obvious exclusionary effect on the lower
Black classes. According to the federal courts, these tactics are per-
fectly permissible under the Constitution's equal protection clause
because they are "facially-neutral" as to race - they do not contain
an explicit racial classification, such as the type so prevalent in the
days of Jim Crow; no "Whites Only" or "niggers stay out" language
on the face of these laws. They are not, therefore, racially
discriminatory.238
The fact that these laws do have a visible effect on most Black
Americans may, the Supreme Court concedes, indicate the existence
of racial discrimination. But the Court has placed a burden on Black
plaintiffs more difficult to scale than the property barriers them-
selves. A plaintiff must prove that the legislative body enacting the
land use barrier intended to exclude Blacks. No matter how outra-
geous the exclusion, the intent test remains the standard of liability
for a civil rights claim brought under the Constitution.
237. The equal protection clause protects individuals against legislative action or
private action conducted "under the color of state law." The fifth amendment, which
protects individuals against federal action, has an equal protection component in its due
process clause that is co-extensive with that of the fourteenth amendment. U.S. CoNsT.
amends. V, XIV. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 n.16 (1987).
238. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977); City of Eastland v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976);
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Land use barriers may, of course, discriminate
on the basis of economic status. But such discrimination apparently does not merit con-
stitutional protection. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970). Accord
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 547 (1972). See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971) where the claims of indigents who were unable to pay divorce filing fees
were treated as due process rather than as equal protection claims.
Ivol.. 25: 879. 1988] Racial Subordination
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Washington v. Davis23 9 is the seminal case on the intent standard
of liability. This 1976 Supreme Court case came to the Court from
Washington, D.C. Black applicants, whose rate of failure on a writ-
ten police examination was significantly higher than that for White
applicants, filed a lawsuit claiming that the exam was racially dis-
criminatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal pro-
tection clause. Disagreeing with lower federal courts, which at that
time had held that disproportionate effects standing alone will suffice
to prove racial discrimination, the Supreme Court said that ". . . to
the extent that those cases rested on or expressed the view that proof
of discriminatory racial purpose is unnecessary in making out an
equal protection violation, we are in disagreement."24 The intent
standard has been upheld in subsequent Supreme Court decisions.24'
Effects are not, however, entirely irrelevant to an equal protection
claim. They can be used as a basis for proving discriminatory pur-
pose. They are among a panoply of factors probative of a discrimina-
tory state of mind. As the Court stated in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,242 proof of a
discriminatory intent requires "a sensitive inquiry into circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent.' 243 In a more recent case, Rogers v.
Lodge,244 which dealt with voting rights under the equal protection
clause, the Supreme Court was even more direct: "[discriminatory
motive] may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts,
including the fact, if true, that the law bears more heavily on one
race than another." 245
Although systemic disparate effects constitute a relevant area of
inquiry - if only as a means of probing discriminatory intent - the
Supreme Court has not really lightened a plaintiff's arduous burden
of reading a defendant's state of mind. Considering the fact that the
defendant in land use and other equal protection cases is normally
239. 426 U.S. 229 (1979).
240. Id. at 244-45.
241. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55 (1980); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977).
242. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
243. Id. at 266.
244. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
245. Id. at 618. "Relevant facts" include the magnitude of the disparity, foresee-
ability of the consequences of the government's actions, legislative history, patterns of
conduct and the government's knowledge of the disparate impact. Dowdell v. City of
Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1186 (11 th Cir. 1983). See also Zimmer v. McKeithan, 485
F.2d 1297, 1305-07 (5th Cir. 1973), a.f'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. East
Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
an institution of government, the plaintiff's burden can at times be
nearly impossible to satisfy. The Supreme Court itself in Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney246 has indicated, albeit inadvertently, just
how difficult the plaintiff's burden can be.
In Feeney, the Massachusetts legislature passed a law granting
military veterans absolute preference for state jobs. Because ninety-
eight percent of the veterans were males, the veteran's preference
law had the forseeable and natural effect of excluding females from
state jobs. The law was challenged on equal protection grounds. Re-
versing the lower court, which found the law's adverse impact on
women too inevitable to have been "unintended," the Supreme Court
ruled that discriminatory purpose "implies more than intent as voli-
tion or intent as awareness of consequences . . . . It implies that the
decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed
a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely
'in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. 'z47 How
can a plaintiff realistically meet this incredible burden of proof?
How useful are such "relevant facts" as forseeability and magnitude
of disparate impact in probing discriminatory intent? When can it
objectively be said that these inferences of intentional discrimination
have ripened into proof?
Some of these concerns have even been raised by justices of the
Supreme Court. No justice has been a more thoughtful critic of the
Court's approach to the equal protection clause than Justice Stevens.
Not only does he criticize the intent test on the ground that it lacks
a "judicially manageable standard for adjudicating cases of this
kind," he also observes that:
[I]n the long run constitutional adjudication that is premised on a case-by-
case appraisal of the subjective intent of local decisionmakers cannot possi-
bly satisfy the requirement of impartial administration of the law that is
embodied in the Equal Protection Clause. . . . The costs and the doubts
associated with litigating questions of motive, which are often significant in
routine trials, will be especially so in cases involving the 'motives' of legisla-
tive bodies.2
48
With his usual perspicuity, Justice Stevens points out the utter non-
sense of the intent test: "[I]t is incongruous that subjective intent is
identified as the constitutional standard and yet the persons who al-
legedly harbored an improper intent are never identified or
mentioned. 2 49
The intent test, in short, places the task of winning an equal pro-
tection case against a legislative body somewhere between extremely
difficult and impossible. By holding on to the intent test - which is
246. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
247. Id. at 279.
248. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 643, 645 (1982).
249. Id. at 647.
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nowhere mentioned in the equal protection clause - the Supreme
Court is giving low priority to the equal housing opportunity interest
of working-class Blacks. The justices are telling these Black Ameri-
cans that "in spite of" the latter's legitimate interest in breaking
through land use barriers that limit the places in which they can
seek affordable housing - and "in spite of" the absolute illogic of
the intent test - the Supreme Court shall not abandon or modify
the current standard of liability under the equal protection clause. 5
True, all who claim under the equal protection clause are subject
to the limitations of its standard of liability. But this is too simplis-
tic. The promise and agony of equal protection litigation are not
evenly distributed between Black and White Americans. The Four-
teenth Amendment was "passed in large part to protect" Black
Americans.25 Since Brown v. Board of Education, fourteenth
amendment equal protection has been a critical tool in the struggle
for racial equality in this country. The equal protection clause has
special meaning and consequence to a vulnerable people.
Some of that consequence is apparent in the housing area. By sub-
ordinating the open housing interest of working-class Blacks, the in-
tent test necessarily contributes to their special housing problems.
The intent test accommodates, and may even encourage, complex ra-
cial discrimination and segregation in housing. For the standard of
liability is so difficult to meet that a good portion of housing discrim-
ination and segregation simply cannot be redressed. Municipalities
bent on maintaining a racially exclusionary way of life are virtually
assured of prevailing in a private lawsuit, so long as they are smart
enough to keep their true motives hidden. Quite naturally, this dis-
courages victims of housing discrimination and segregation from
even attempting to bring a lawsuit under the equal protection clause.
The high probability of an unsuccessful lawsuit also provides little
incentive for municipalities to change exclusionary land use laws,
policies, or practices. What is worse, the intent test is so predictably
onerous that would-be discriminators or segregationists may read it
as a signal from the federal government that in the final analysis
housing discrimination and segregation are quite permissible so long
as true motives are kept private and everything is done with a smile.
250. For futher discussion of the intent test in a legislative context, see, e.g., Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205
(1970); Symposium, Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925 (1978).
251. M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN & R. RICHARDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION XXXiV (1982).
2) Strict Scrutiny Test
One of the most effective ways - some might say the only effec-
tive way - to counteract complex housing discrimination - partic-
ularly smiling discrimination and steering - and segregation is
through the remedial use of racial preferences. Voluntary rather
than court-imposed or other involuntary use of racial preferences 25 2
play a crucial role in resolving issues of racial discrimination and
segregation.253 In housing, racial occupancy controls, or "benign
quotas," are the most common form of voluntary racial
preferences.254
Racial occupancy controls are housing policies or practices that
manage desegregation through the use of racial quotas. Mainly used
in public housing,2 55 racial occupancy controls seek to create stable,
desegregated communities by regulating residency on the basis of
race. Thus, depending on the racial composition of a particular
neighborhood or housing development, a housing authority may give
preference to a Black or White family so that the percentage of both
racial groups will remain roughly constant.
The necessity for such racial management is predicated on social
science data showing that as predominantly White communities be-
come poor and predominantly Black, White abandonment gradually
occurs. The loss of White residents resulting in the transition of a
community to a predominantly Black population is commonly re-
ferred to as "tipping." Architect and city planner Oscar Newman
has testified that the "tipping point is a quantity that is difficult to
predict with precision. It has been variously estimated, in different
factual contexts, as ranging from a low of 1 % [B]lack to a high of
60% [B]lack. Most social scientists and housing experts agree that
under normal circumstances tipping begins to occur at between 10%
and 20% [B]lack occupancy. ' 2 58 Economist Anthony Downs states
the case for racial occupancy controls by observing that "almost all
racially integrated neighborhoods and housing developments that
have remained integrated for very long have used deliberate manage-
252. For a discussion of the distinction between voluntary and involuntary racial
preferences, see, e.g., Brooks, Affirmative Action In Law Teaching, COLUm. Hum. RTs. L.
REV. 15, 25-27 (1982).
253. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480
U.S. 616, 630 n.8 (1987)(cases cited); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 204 (1979).
254. See, e.g., D. BELL, supra note 226, at 535-41.
255. See, e.g., Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of
Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. L. REV. 245, 251-53 (1974); Wall St. J., Aug. 28,
1986, at 50, col. 1.
256. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., Starrett City, Inc., and Delmar Man-
agement Co., 660 F. Supp. 668 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 376 (1988).
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ment to achieve certain numerical targets as to the proportion of mi-
nority-group occupants. 257
Although some lower federal courts have upheld the use of racial
occupancy controls, 25s others have not.259 In addition, the Reagan
Justice Department has won an important case against racial occu-
pancy controls.2 60 The reason is clear: racial occupancy controls - a
most intense and blatant form of race-conscious social engineering
- strike at the very heart of the racial omission tenet. In so doing,
they violate the strict scrutiny test.261
Racial occupancy controls cannot survive faithful application of
the strict scrutiny test's two-tier analysis. Heavily predicated upon a
racial (and, hence, suspect) classification, racial occupancy controls
invoke strict judicial review. Given no evidence (such as an admis-
sion) of prior racial discrimination perpetrated by the housing au-
thority or municipality imposing the controls, a governmental pur-
pose compelling enough to justify use of the controls seems lacking.
Other governmental interests - such as the prevention of resegre-
gated communities and the nurturing of positive interracial relations
- should be but are not compelling enough to trigger a favorable
ruling under the strict scrutiny test.
The strict scrutiny test's treatment of racial occupancy controls
highlights its fundamental defect - the inability to distinquish be-
tween race-conscious policies that engender racial exclusion and
those that promote racial inclusion. Applied to the former, such as
Jim Crow laws, the strict scrutiny test is commendable; it promotes
racial progress. But applied to the latter, such as racial occupancy
controls and other forms of affirmative action, the test is reprehensi-
257. A. DowNs, OPENING Up THE SUBURBS 99 (1973). For a discussion of more
social science data see D. BELL, supra note 226, at 531-32, 535-37.
258. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Boston Hous. Auth., 505 F. Supp. 988 (D.C. Mass.
1981); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
259. See, e.g., Williamsburg Fair Hous. Comm. v. New York City Hous. Auth.,
493 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See generally Smolla, Integration Maintenance:
The Unconstitutionality of Benign Programs That Discourage Black Entry To Prevent
White Flight, 981 DUKE L.J. 891 (1981).
260. Starrett City Assocs., 660 F. Supp. 668. Starrett City Assocs. was decided on
statutory grounds, namely the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 677. The district court distin-
guished Otero on the ground that it was decided on a constitutional standard. Id. at 677-
78. This distinction is somewhat odd, because the Constitution is generally more restric-
tive in the use of racial classifications than the Congress. See, e.g., Johnson, 480 U.S.
616, at 627-28 n.6. Starrett City Assocs. is the major case in the Reagan Administra-
tion's long assault on racial occupancy quotas. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1986, at
50, col. 1.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 124-35 for a full discussion of the strict
scrutiny test.
ble; it enjoins racial progress."'
This paradox is inevitable. The fundamental purpose of the strict
scrutiny test is to effectuate the tenet of racial omission, to prohibit
governmental use of race as a factor in the formulation of laws and
public policies. Dogged adherence to this racial perspective is bound
to have a chilling effect on those who continue to suffer from the
government's conscious use of race in the past. Sometimes, the con-
scious use of race in the reverse direction is needed. Sometimes fire
must be fought with fire.
True, some working-class Blacks may be denied housing due to
the racial quota. But it is clear beyond peradventure that this form
of racial discrimination is vastly different from traditional racial dis-
crimination against Blacks for several reasons. First, racial occu-
pancy controls seek to engender racial inclusion; traditional racial
discrimination attempts to stigmatize and exclude Blacks. Second,
racial occupancy controls are more limited in scope and duration
than traditional racial discrimination. Third, most working-class
Blacks denied housing probably would be willing to move on to de-
segregate or integrate another community or would consider their
temporary denial of housing a small price to pay for racial progress.
These Blacks, on the other hand, probably would not tolerate the old
George Wallace brand of racial discrimination.
The strict scrutiny test, in short, not only fails to take race into
account, but - except under a most compelling circumstance
(namely, as a remedy for prior racial discrimination by the housing
authority or municipality) - it commands the omission of race in
the government's formulation of laws and public policies regulating
access to housing. Given the difficulty of proving prior racial discrim-
ination under the intent test, it is clear that unless there is an admis-
sion of prior racial discrimination, the compelling circumstance that
allows the government to use racial occupancy controls may never
materialize. This application of the strict scrutiny test gives little re-
spect to the equal housing opportunity interest of working-class
Blacks, because it realistically denies them the use of a proven
means of counteracting wide-spread, institutionalized racial discrimi-
nation and segregation in housing.
Such racial subordination can only contribute to the housing dis-
crimination and segregation problems (socioeconomic vulnerability)
within the Black working class. It can only prolong the struggle
against complex racial discrimination and de jure or de facto segre-
gation. Lest one forget the pernicious effects of housing segregation
regardless of cause, I hasten to add that as housing segregation con-
262. 1 believe that the major challenge confronting those who oppose legitimate
forms of racial preference is to devise an alternative means of fostering racial progress.
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tinues to expand, it etches an indelible suggestion in the nation's
mind that yesteryear's racial hierarchy has returned or has never
left.263
3) Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act of 1968, also known as Title VIII of the
1968 Civil Rights Act,2 64 provides an alternative to a constitutional
challenge against housing discrimination and segregation. Unlike
equal protection law, the Fair Housing Act is free of constraints im-
posed by the intent test and the strict scrutiny test. It is also un-
curbed by the Constitution's governmental-action requirement,6 5
which means that the Act applies to private parties - home owners,
realtors, lending agencies, and others.2 6  In spite of these benefits,
the Act is virtually a deadletter in the fight against housing discrimi-
nation and de facto segregation. The Act's effectiveness was stran-
gled in its infancy by a myopic Congress. And other branches of
government have inhibited all attempts to revive the patient.
No other conclusion seems fair or accurate: the Fair Housing Act
is poorly structured and administered. The Act prohibits discrimina-
tion on grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin in the sale
or rental of housing.2 67 Redlining is expressly proscribed.2 68 These
prohibitions are designed to promote "the policy of the United States
to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States."26 9 This policy, however, is a toned-
down restatement of the 1949 Housing Act's policy that "every
American family" should be provided "a decent home and suitable
living environment . . . as soon as feasible. ' 270
The watered-down policy statement presages other anemic fea-
tures of the Act. For example, the Act's antidiscrimination provision
is vitiated by several statutory exemptions. One is the single-family-
housing exemption, which exempts a single family house sold or
263. Negative images of Blacks can ignite latent racism in some Whites and can
also be depressing for Blacks, especially the young.
264. Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Title VIII) Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. 3601-19 (1982)).
265. For a discussion of the governmental-action requirement, see supra note 237.
266. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06.
267. Id. § 3604.
268. Id. § 3605.
269. Id. § 3601.
270. Spencer, Enforcement of Federal Fair Housing Law, 9 URB. LAW. 514
(1977).
rented by a person who owns three or fewer single family houses.2
Another is the so-called "Mrs. Murphy's Boarding House Exemp-
tion." This provision exempts any owner-occupied building "contain-
ing ...no more than four families living independently of each
other. .. 272
Such government-sanctioned housing discrimination is not benign.
These statutory exemptions promote racial exclusion rather than ra-
cial inclusion, perpetuate rather than liberate Black Americans from
a history of racial oppression. More than that, they encourage hous-
ing discrimination and segregation, especially in the heavily segre-
gated single-family housing market. For this reason, these exemp-
tions are arguably unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's
holding in Reitman v. Mulkey.273 In this case, the Court held that
California's famous Proposition 14, which amended the state's con-
stitution to give all persons the "absolute discretion" to sell or rent
their property as they saw fit, violated the United States Constitu-
tion because it had the effect of nullifying fundamental state policies
against racial discrimination and, hence, of "encouraging" private
housing discrimination. 274
The Fair Housing Act's sanctions are also defective. To be sure,
they are so impotent as to be an embarrassment to anyone genuinely
concerned about housing discrimination and segregation. Actual
damages are often meager - such as, $500, $1500, or $3500275 _
and punitive damages - which are designed to be a deterrent to
prospective wrongdoers - are limited to $1,000.276 Clearly, these
paper-tiger sanctions neither compensate victims nor discourage
wrongdoers.
Governmental administration of the Fair Housing Act is also
flawed. Although the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) is largely responsible for the Act's administration, it
lacks a crucial administrative tool: enforcement powers. Only the
Juftice Department or injured private citizens can initiate a civil
complaint. 7 Frequently, prosecutors are overburdened. During the
Reagan Administration, they have also become ideologically resis-
tant to prosecution.178 Typically, an injured party is in a poor posi-
tion to initiate litigation. He or she will usually lack the time or re-
sources to commence a lawsuit.
271. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1).
272. Id. § 3603(b)(2).
273. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
274. Id.
275. See infra note 287 and accompanying text.
276. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c). The next section of this article discusses damages in
greater detail.
277. Id. §§ 3610, 3612.
278. See, e.g., TIME, June 30, 1986, at 40; Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
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Poorly structured and administrated, the Fair Housing Act subor-
dinates the Black working class. The Act's exemptions, sanctions,
and enforcement provisions place this segment of Black society in
racial jeopardy. It allows them to endure any form of housing dis-
crimination - old or new - a discriminator can envision. And it
nurtures the expanding concentration of Blacks in densely populated,
geographically isolated areas.
Worst, the Fair Housing Act encourages would-be housing dis-
criminators and segregationists. Even apart from its exemptions, the
Act, rather than being a deterrent, all but gives a license to those
with a bent toward housing discrimination or segregation. It tells
them in words and by deeds that the federal government is not terri-
bly interested in combatting housing discrimination or segregation.
There can be little wonder why complex racial discrimination and de
facto segregation continue to plague the Black working class. 279
4) Damages and Protracted Litigation
Monetary relief awarded in housing litigation plus the time and
effort required to successfully prosecute a lawsuit also frustrate the
equal housing opportunity interest of working-class Blacks. Such
subordination is not limited to constitutional and Title VIII litiga-
tion. It arises as well in the context of what is called "Section 1982"
litigation.
Section 1982 is derivative of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.211 Its
name is taken from its present codification in the United States
Code.281 Section 1982 is a short provision. It reads in full: "All citi-
zens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by [W]hite citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. 28 2
The provision saw little action until 1968. In that year, it exper-
ienced a kind of judicial resurrection in the landmark case of Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer.8 3 The Supreme Court held in this case that
279. It has been estimated that 75.9 percent of the Black population "lives inside
urbanized areas, of which 75.4 [percent] live in central cities, in contrast to only 42.1
[percent] of [W]hites." Starrett City Assocs., 660 F. Supp. at 673.
280. See Brooks, Use of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 to Redress Em-
ployment Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 258, 261-62 (1977) (sources cited
therein).
281. 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
282. Id.
283. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See also Note, Civil Rights-Racial Discrimination
and Property Rights-The Scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 203 (1982).
Section 1982 "bars all racial discrimination, private as well as pub-
lic, in the sale or rental of property, and that the statute, thus con-
strued, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the
thirteenth amendment. 284 Significantly, the link to the Thirteenth
Amendment is based on the Court's realization that "... when ra-
cial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to
buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of
slavery. 2815
Section 1982's usefulness in fighting housing discrimination and
the herding of men and women into ghettos is severely limited by the
amount of monetary relief traditionally awarded in housing litiga-
tion. Punitive damages are frequently limited to the $1000 ceiling
prescribed in the Fair Housing Act.286 And rather than the five- to
seven-figure awards plaintiffs routinely receive in some tort cases -
such as, emotional distress - prevailing plaintiffs in housing cases
frequently receive meager compensatory damages - perhaps as low
as $500, $1500, and $3500.2817 As the California Attorney General
has stated, these awards "barely cover the costs of difficult, time-
consuming civil rights litigation. ' 88 Professor Derrick Bell offers the
following explanation for this extraordinary situation:
[T]here is seldom a major out-of-pocket loss in a housing discrimination
case. Usually the real injury suffered by the plaintiffs is the deep humilia-
tion of racial rejection that is no less painful because it is deemed to be an
intangible harm. Some courts have recognized this form of injury as a com-
pensable type of damage through awards for emotional distress or embar-
rassment . . . .It is possible that the generally low level of these damages
is in part due to the fact finder's lack of personal experience with this type
of injury. It may also be due to an effort to find middle ground between the
progressive legislation which is in some ways in advance of social realities,
and the residual racism which makes it difficult to enforce such legislation
fully.289
All civil rights litigation is protracted. It takes years to go from
284. 392 U.S. at 412-13 (emphasis in original).
285. 392 U.S. at 441-42. Although Justice White believes that intent test applies
to Section 1982 actions, City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 101, 129 (1981), the
Court itself has not so ruled. The Court has, however, ruled that section 1982's sister
provision, Section 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires proof of intent to discriminate. Gen-
eral Building Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982). See Comment,
Dead-end Street: Discrimination, the Thirteenth Amendment, and Section 1982, City of
Memphis v. Greene, 58 CH.[-]KENT L. REv. 873 (1982).
286. See, e.g., Marable v. Walker, 704 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1983) (trial court
limited damages to $1,000). But see Philips v. Hunter Trails Community Assoc. 685
F.2d 184, 191 (7th Cir. 1982) ($100,000 punitive damages awarded under Section
1982).
287. See J. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING: DISCRIMINATION IN REAL ESTATE, COMMU-
NITY DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION 478 (1983); D. BELL, supra note 226, at 516-
520. See also Philips, 685 F.2d at 190.
288. Office of the Attorney General-John K. Van de Kamp, News Release, at I
(July 10, 1986).
289. D. BELL, supra note 226, at 516-18.
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the filing of a complaint to the rendering of a judgment by a
court.290 Working-class Blacks simply lack the time, resources, and
flexibility to commit themselves to such an ordeal. Even if damages
could cover the cost of litigation, it would still be difficult for many
working-class Blacks to take extensive or even any time out from
work and family to participate fully in comlex litigation. The wait
itself may be enough to discourage the most ardent civil rights
plaintiff.
Meager damages and protracted litigation place the Black work-
ing class in a poor position to defend itself from housing discrimina-
tion and segregation. Regardless of how complex or simple the dis-
crimination, litigation would not be cost efficient. Even if cost
efficient, litigation may be an impossible alternative in light of its
time-consuming nature. Knowing this, prospective discriminators or
segregationists may not be deterred. Possibly, they may also feel the
law, being so accommodating, provides them tacit permission to dis-
criminate against Blacks. Housing discrimination and de facto segre-
gation can only flourish under these circumstances.
b. Education
1) Primary Education
Like a child with a thousand parents, ineffective public schooling
the absence of the "three Rs," Black pride, and cultural diver-
sity291 - has many precipitators. Paltry teacher salaries, low profes-
sional esteem, and housing segregation - which concentrates Blacks
into poor, racially isolated school districts - are among the primary
causes of ineffective public schooling.292 Formal equal opportunity is
also a major contributing factor. Racial subordination created by im-
plementation of the racial omission tenet reinforces poor public
schooling. More specifically, the intent test - which seeks to effec-
tuate the racial omission tenet in the area of primary education - is
a major obstacle in the Black working class' quest for quality
education.
Federal courts have remedial power to issue desegregation orders.
290. Civil rights litigation in which the trial court retains subject matter jurisdic-
tion-such as school desegregation-seems never-ending. See, e.g., Chayes, The Role of
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
291. See supra text accompanying notes 226-29.
292. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1985, at 22, col. 1. According to Professor
Gary Orfield of the University of Chicago, housing segregation and resegregation are the
primary reasons for segregated and resegregated public schools. Id.
Invoking this great power is not, however, easy. Plaintiffs must first
prove that the defendant school board or state government intention-
ally established or maintained a dual school system - one White,
the other Black. Proof of segregative intent is required because, as in
the case of exclusionary land use laws,293 the equal protection clause
is the relevant source of judicial authority. But, once again, the in-
tent standard of liability is nowhere to be found in the fourteenth
amendment or its legislative history. It is simply judge-made.19 4
Once segregative intent is established, a court has broad "inherent
equitable" discretion to approve a wide variety of desegregative mea-
sures tailored to the constitutional violation. Racial balancing is one
such measure. Mandatory or voluntary busing, magnet schools, pupil
or faculty quotas, and school district rezoning are typical examples
of racial balancing. In the parlance of civil rights lawyers, this clus-
ter of racial balancing measures is often referred to as "Swann reme-
dies" because the Supreme Court approved their use in the famous
case of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.2 5 Ju-
dicial authority to order Swann remedies was confirmed in a com-
panion case, Davis v. Board of School Commissioners,296 in which
the Supreme Court ruled: "Having once found a violation, the dis-
trict court or school authorities should make every effort to achieve
the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation . . . [and con-
sider the use of] all available techniques. 2 97 Significantly, the Court
also stated that "[tihe measure of any desegregation plan is its
effectiveness. '298
Racial balancing fosters two ingredients necessary for quality edu-
cation. The first is cultural diversity. There simply is no other sure
way to provide cultural diversity within racially isolated school dis-
tricts than to use some form of racial balancing. The second is the
three Rs. Although it would be terribly wrong to think that predomi-
nately Black schools necessarily provide poor schooling in the three
Rs, it cannot be gainsaid that at least some of these schools lack
sufficient educational resources to accommodate good, basic school-
ing. To the extent that a suburban or other predominantly White
school district provides better basic schooling than a predominantly
Black one, racial mixing between the two gives Black children better
exposure to the three Rs.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 237-38.
294. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Austin
Indep. School v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (remanded for reconsideration in
light of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
295. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
296. 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
297. Id. at 37.
298. Id. (emphasis added).
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The phenomenon of "White flight" has defeated many attempts to
achieve racial balancing within single school districts. A serious
problem in school desegregation, this phenomenon adversely affects
one side of the equation for successful racial mixing: White pupils. It
depletes the number of White pupils available for racial mixing
within a particular school district. White flight is effectuated when
White parents either send their children to private, religious, or
other nonpublic schools or, as in most cases, move to the suburbs
where exclusionary zoning ordinances erect economic and racial bar-
riers for low-and-moderate-income Blacks.299
Current school desgegregation law has created its own barriers for
Blacks attempting to deal with the problem of White flight. In what
is now known as Milliken 1,300 the Supreme Court ruled that the
intent test applies to every independent school district included in a
desegregation plan. Segregative intent, therefore, must be estab-
lished as to every autonomous suburban school district before such a
school district can be forced to participate in a school desegregation
plan.30 1
Although the most widely attempted desegregative measure, racial
balancing is not the only response to school segregation. In some
cases (such as those involving White flight), racial balancing may
not even be a feasible remedy. Provided that segregative intent is
established, a school desegregation plan can contain educational en-
richment elements. These elements emphasize good basic schooling
more directly and intentionally than racial balancing. Some elements
also involve instructional programs in Black pride, Black history,
Black culture, and other subjects dealing with the special educa-
tional needs of Black children. None of these remedial programs,
however, attempts to tackle the problem of racial isolation; for, none
can create cultural diversity.302
Milliken IP03 is the seminal case on educational enrichment pro-
grams. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a district court
may order state officials to share in the future cost of educational
enrichment programs. The Court reasoned that these programs re-
spond to a constitutional violation and are designed to restore injured
299. See supra text accompanying notes 256-57.
300. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
301. Id. at 743-44.
302. See, e.g., Kelly v. Metropolitan Co. Bd. of Educ., 687 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983); Clark v. Board of Educ., 705 F.2d 265 (8th
Cir. 1983).
303. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
parties to a position they would have occupied had there been no
constitutional violation.3"4
Educational enrichment components can stand on independent le-
gal grounds. Lower federal courts have approved educational enrich-
ment programs even though the desegregation plans in which they
appear contain no racial balancing measure. Some lower federal
courts have even approved such programs over the objection of
school authorities.305 Desegregation plans composed only of educa-
tional enrichment components may be the only feasible form of
school "desegregation" for one-race school districts. 30 8
Educational enrichment programs and racial balancing may be
wonderful remedies, but they are hard to come by. The intent test is
no less an obstacle to Blacks in school cases than in housing cases. 307
Proving a legislative body's state of mind is extremely difficult;
clever school officials can easily hide their true motivations from
public scrutiny. Discriminatory motivations may even be more easy
to conceal in the North than in the South because the former's his-
tory of de jure segregation is not as extensive as the latter's.
The intent test, in short, is no friend of the Black working class.
By making the task of proving segregative intent in school cases very
difficult, the intent test subordinates the Black working class's inter-
est in equal educational opportunity. And by giving low priority to
the equal educational opportunity interest of working-class Blacks,
the intent test impedes efforts to achieve quality education. If the
Supreme Court provided the Black working class with more effective
equipment to deal with an educational problem that is in large part
the legacy of prior racial subordination, much of that problem would
come to an end - an end that is long overdue.308
304. Id. at 281.
305. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 302.
306. The prototype desegregation plan for all-Black schools is what has come to be
known as the "Atlanta Compromise." Implemented in 1973 in Atlanta, Georgia, the
Compromise gave Blacks the right to obtain control of the predominantly Black Atlanta
school district and to select a Black educator as superintendent. Blacks were also given
financial backing to implement an ambitious educational enrichment program that gave
special emphasis to mathematics and reading by a most unusual feature: the school
board was given power to set its own tax rate without having to resort to a public refer-
endum to raise money. The assessed valuation on Atlanta's commercial and residential
property nearly doubled from $2.7 billion in 1973 to $5 billion in 1986. The only major
problem with the Compromise, from my point of view, is the lack of cultural diversity.
Atlanta's demographics - there are simply not enough Whites in the school district to
make racial balancing meaningful - and the Supreme Court's restrictions on interdis-
trict remedies, Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), make cultural diversity in Atlanta pub-
lic schools not even a remote possibility. For more on the Atlanta Compromise, see, e.g.,
Clendinen, Urban Education that Really Works, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1986, § 12 (Educ.
Life, Special sec.), at 68-70. See also D. BELL, supra note 226, at 415-17.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 237-51.
308. In spite of the undeniable importance of cultural diversity as an element of
quality education, my inclination is to see cultural diversity as an ideal. On the other
952
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2) Higher Education
Like the problem of quality education, the problem of low Black
enrollment in undergraduate and graduate schools is caused by sev-
eral factors. One important factor is the upsurge of racism on college
campuses during the 1980s. 30 9 Such racism, as Joseph Duffey, chan-
cellor of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, has recog-
nized, creates "a perception that [B]lacks and other minorities are
no longer welcome on college campuses." 10 Most unsettling, campus
racism may adversely affect the academic progress on Blacks already
enrolled in college. Not only can color affect the character or candor
of advice from White professors and academic advisors, but
"[s]ubtle racism may be creating a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy,
denying to many [B]lack and other minority-group students, no mat-
ter how bright and well-prepared they are, full participation in
higher education at its best."' 31 ' Such slights and insensitivities as
being the last person picked as a lab partner, 12 the recipient of re-
quests to feel your hair or the extra muscles the coaches claim you
have in your legs, 313 or within hearing distance of the White student
who proclaims in the dormitory that "he didn't want niggers living
on the floor,"'314 cut deeper than wounded pride and hurt feelings.
Many educators believe that "the way minority students are per-
hand, I view good, basic schooling and Black pride, the other components of quality
education, as educational necessities. For these reasons, I find the Atlanta Compromise,
see supra note 306, acceptable, although less than the ideal educational program. I sup-
port the 250 independent Black schools that are now flourishing as alternatives to public
education. See Daniels, Private Schools For Black Pupils Are Flourishing, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 15, 1987, at 33, col. 3.
309. See, e.g., Staples, The Dwindling Black Presence on Campus, N.Y. TIMEs
MAG., Apr. 27, 1986, at 52; Watkins, Minorities' Enrollment In College Retreats After
Its Surge in 70s, Wall St. J., May 29, 1985, at 1, col. 1; TIME, Nov. 11, 1985, at 84;
Simpson, Black College Students Are Viewed as Victims of a Subtle Racism, Wall St.
J., Apr. 3, 1987, at I; TIME, Apr. 6, 1987, at 57. There has also been an increase in
racial tension throughout America, see, e.g., Leavy, What's Behind The Resurgence of
Racism in America, EBONY, Apr. 1987, at 132; Freedman, Racial Tension in New York
Is On Increase Despite Gains, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1987, § 1 (Main), at 1, col. 4; San
Diego Union, Dec. 31, 1983, at B-3, col. 6, and in Europe, see, e.g., TIME, Feb. 6, 1984 at
40-45.
310. Fiske, Enrollment of Minorities In Colleges Stagnating, N.Y. Times, Apr.
19, 1987, § I (Main), at 1, col. 2.
311. Simpson, Black College Students Are Viewed as Victims of a Subtle Racism,
Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
312. Id.
313. Staples, The Dwindling Black Presence on Campus, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr.
27, 1986, at 52.
314. Watkins, Minorities' Enrollment In College Retreats After Its Surge in 70s,
Wall St. J., May 29, 1985, at 22, col. 3.
ceived and treated at a school has a direct bearing on their ability to
perform well academically. 'Success and the feeling of belonging are
intimately connected.' "315 The academic consequences of campus
racism can only weigh against a Black high school student's decision
to go to college.
The dearth of Black faculty on campus may also discourage Black
high school students from going to college. 310 Black faculty not only
serve as important role models for Black students but can also help
them deal with racism and its pernicious effects - such as racial
sensibility. 317 The absence of this essential resource from campus
may be seen as a strong indication of the college's true feelings to-
ward Blacks - that they are unwelcome. 318
The fact that so many college educated Blacks must still contend
with employment discrimination 1 9 may also be very discouraging for
high school students contemplating college. Vulnerability to employ-
ment discrimination dramatically discounts the market value of a
Black person's college degree. Along with campus racism and the
paucity of Black college professors, the existence of racism in the
nation's top jobs and the susceptibility of Black college graduates to
such racism may explain why Black high school students have not
responded well to expanded recruitment programs instituted by
many colleges and universities in response to the college enrollment
problem.320
Cutbacks in federal financial aid is another major factor contrib-
uting to the low number of Blacks enrolled in college. According to a
report issued by the United Negro College Fund and the National
Institute of Independent Colleges and Universities, the shift in fed-
eral financial aid from direct grants to loans since 1980 has hit
Blacks especially hard. The reasons are clear:
Some 42 percent of UNCF students come from families whose income is at
the poverty level or below, 'and 30 percent are from families earning less
than $6,000 a year .... [T]hese same students have fewer alternative re-
sources to fall back on. Their families are poorer, they earn less at their
summer jobs, they are more likely to live in states that offer relatively small
amounts of grant assistance and they receive little institutional
315. Simpson, supra note 317, at 1, col. 1.
316. See, e.g., Staples, supra note 313, at 46. Kolbert, Minority Faculty: Bleak
Future, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1985, § 12 (special section on Education), at 42, col. I;
San Diego Union, Feb. 9, 1986, at A-30, col. 1; Johnson, Ivy League Blacks Find Life in
Microcosm on the Campus, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1979, § I (Main), at 47, col. 1.
317. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 377, 391-97, 425-29.
318. The shortage of Black faculty tends to feed on itself. "If a [B]lack child never
encounters a [B]lack professional, that suggests a lot to him about his own potential."
San Diego Union, Feb. 9, 1986, at A-30, col. 1. (Interview with H. Dean Propst, Chan-
cellor of the University of Georgia).
319. See supra Part III BI.
320. See Watkins, supra note 314, at 22, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1981, § I
(Main), at 17, col. I.
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assistance.3
21
Samuel DuBois Cook, president of Dillard University, a Black
university in New Orleans, offers the following insights about the
effects of declining federal grants on Black college enrollment:
What we are seeing is the undercutting of hope, the erosion of ambition and
expectation. The availability of loans doesn't necessarily solve the problem.
In a lot of cases, you're talking about loans that amount to an entire family
income. A lot of young people are simply afraid to undertake that kind of
obligation, even for the worthy cause of education.
3 22
Reductions in federally- and privately-funded recruitment pro-
grams for gifted Black high-school students also contribute to the
college-enrollment problem. Reductions in these special recruitment
programs have been significant. For example, Upward Bound, which
is run through federal grants to colleges, served some 33,000 stu-
dents in 1985 compared to a peak of 51,000 students in 1973. On the
whole, Upward Bound and three major private programs "served
about 85,000 fewer students [in 1986] than five years [earlier]. 3 23
The racial omission tenet is certainly among the most important
reasons fewer Blacks are attending college today compared to ten
years ago. Enforcement of this tenet by colleges and universities, as
well as by federal officials, has had a direct impact on the number of
Blacks attending college. Since 1978, colleges and universities have
placed less emphasis on race in the admissions process. This shift in
emphasis did not come out of the blue; it came as a response to
Bakke,324 a Supreme Court decision that at least in part embraces
the racial omission tenet.
In Bakke, a divided Supreme Court ruled five to four that state
educational institutions could not set aside a specific number of slots
for which only racial minorities could compete. Of the majority, only
Justice Powell rested his decision on the Constitution, the equal pro-
tection clause.3 25 Justice Stevens and the other three justices who
joined in his opinion (Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist) felt that
there was no need to reach the constitutional issue because the quota
could be invalidated on statutory grounds. They specifically held that
the quota violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,3 26 which
prohibits federal funds from going to programs that discriminate on
321. Washington Post, Apr. 13, 1987, at 29, col. 1.
322. Id. See TIME, Nov. 11, 1985, at 84.
323. See, e.g., Staples, supra note 313, at 51-52.
324. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1976).
325. Id. at 320.
326. Id. at 414.
the basis of race, color, or national origin.32
Going the other way, the Court ruled five to four that the equal
protection clause does allow state educational institutions to use race
in "a properly devised admissions program.""" For Justice Powell,
race could be used as only one factor in the admissions process and
only if it was used to achieve a diverse student body.32 9 But for Jus-
tices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, race could be used
to counteract the lingering affects of prior racial subordination (in-
cluding societal discrimination) as well as present-day racial subordi-
nation.3 ° Unlike Justice Powell, the other four justices would not
apply the strict scrutiny test to race-conscious remedies designed to
assist minorities. Rather, they would apply an intermediate level of
scrutiny - somewhere between the strict scrutiny test and the ra-
tional basis test 33' - mainly to assure that the remedy in question
neither stigmatizes, stereotypes, nor specially burdens any other mi-
norities. 332 Finally, Justice Brennan's group would also uphold the
use of the quota under Title VI, on the ground that,
Title VI prohibits only those uses of racial criteria that would violate the
fourteenth amendment if employed by a State or its agencies; it does not
bar the preferential treatment of racial minorities as a means of remedying
past societal discrimination to the extent that such action is consistent with
the fourteenth amendment.333
Bakke is a poor case from which to draw conclusions about the
affect of the equal protection clause in general and the strict scrutiny
test in particular on college admissions. Only Justice Powell invali-
dated the quota on equal protection grounds. He was also the only
justice to use the strict scrutiny test. True, Justice White joined in
that part of Justice Powell's opinion relying on the strict scrutiny
test.334 But Justice White also joined Justice Brennan's opinion in
full,3 35 which caused Justice Powell to view Justice White as an ad-
vocate of intermediate scrutiny. 36 Significantly, the four justices
who would not scrutinize benign quotas strictly - Brennan, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and (possibly) White - have not won the day in
subsequent benign quota cases. Since Bakke, a majority of Supreme
Court justices, including Justice White, have taken the position that
all explicit racial classifications - whether racially exclusive or in-
clusive - are subject to strict scrutiny; and that only national secur-
327. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4.
328. 438 U.S. at 320.
329. Id. at 314-16.
330. Id. at 370-78.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 125-33.
332. 438 U.S. at 358-62.
333. Id. at 327.
334. Id. at 387.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 294-95.
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ity or the defendant's past or current intentional discrimination -
not societal discrimination - will justify the use of such a
classification. 3 7
To the extent that the strict scrutiny test, on its face or as applied,
effectively prohibits the use of explicit, racially inclusive classifica-
tions in college admissions - and assuming that more effective ad-
missions alternatives are not available - it could be argued that the
strict scrutiny test subordinates the Black working class in higher
education. 338 But it can also be agrued that Bakke itself, even
viewed without reference to the strict scrutiny test, gives low priority
to the interest of the Black working class in higher education. Bakke
set in motion a tone of inflexibility and even racial insensitivity in
the admissions process that has had a direct impact on Black college
enrollment in the last decade. Post-Bakke admissions at the Univer-
sity of California at Davis Medical School, the defendant in Bakke,
illustrates this point.
In 1978, Davis' medical school, like other state educational institu-
tions throughout the country, restructured its admissions process to
comply with Bakke. The redrawn affirmative action plan did not,
however, yield more or even the same number of new Black students
as the pre-Bakke plan. In fact, it produced far fewer. Davis' medical
school has experienced a "sharp decline in [B]lack enrollment since
1978." 339 Davis hired an affirmative-action specialist, Ms. Margie
Beltran-Atencio, to deal with its enrollment problem. Ms. Beltran-
Atencio had experience in medical school affirmative action pro-
grams at other schools. Her assessment of Davis' post-Bakke affirm-
ative action plan is instructive. She asserts that the plan "unfortu-
nately didn't do as much as it could have . . . . It lacked a certain
human touch, . . too much reliance was placed on evaluation of a
student's application, rather than of 'a human person.' "7340
Bakke, in short, subordinates the Black working class in at least
two ways. First, it invalidates the use of benign quotas, except under
extremely limited circumstances. Whether on constitutional, statu-
tory, or any other ground, invalidating the use of admissions quotas
to rectify past societal discrimination or to otherwise promote racial
inclusion gives low priority to the equal educational opportunity in-
337. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
338. The argument here parallels the argument concerning racial occupancy con-
trols discussed supra text accompanying notes 252-63.
339. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1981, § I (Main), at 17, col. 1.
340. Id. at 1, col. 6.
terest of the Black working class in higher education. Second,
Bakke's rejection of such racial preferences has been read incor-
rectly by colleges and universities as providing a mandate to assume
an inflexible or insensitive attitude toward Black applicants. Bakke
allows for the subtle use of race in the admissions process, which, of
course, is not as effective as a more aggressive race-conscious admis-
sion program. But, unfortunately, admissions programs developed in
response to Bakke do not take full advantage of even this small
bone. Too often they focus too much on traditional academic indica-
tors and too little on underlying racial dynamics or on the "whole
person. '"341 This approach disproportionately denies admissions to the
few promising Blacks who dare to apply to college.
Bakke's racial subordination can only contribute to the college en-
rollment problem. Without the use of quotas and relying mainly on
traditional admissions criteria, fewer promising Blacks will be admit-
ted to college or graduate school. Bakke and its resultant admissions
processes clearly do not counteract the enrollment problem; they
simply allow it to exist. As a wiser Supreme Court has stated on
another occasion and in a slightly different context, sometimes "af-
firmative race-conscious relief may be the only means available 'to
assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those
discriminatory practices and devices which have [worked] . . . to the
disadvantage of minority citizens.' "342
3. Summary
The Black working class is the largest segment of Black society. A
typical working-class Black is married, a semi-skilled or unskilled
blue-collar or service worker or perhaps a clerical worker, has a
working spouse with a similar occupational status, and has an annual
family income between $11,000 and $45,000. A family with these
characteristics, inter alia, uses free recreational facilities, either
rents or owns its own home, can afford a new TV set every ten years,
341. On another occasion, I explained the "whole person" concept as follows:
Affirmative action, in its most fundamental form, simply instructs the employer
to look beyond traditional qualifications and to look at the "whole person."
This means that the employer should be conscious of the applicant's race or
gender as well as such neutral qualities as motivation, how far the person has
traveled to get to where he or she is today, and whether the person satisfies a
legitimate institutional interest (e.g., educational diversity or maximization of
the institution's total utility) or social responsibility (e.g., maximization of anti-
discrimination values or acting as responsible neighbors in the community).
Given the legacy of slavery and legalized segregation, this is the only manner
in which most minorities can realistically compete with whites on an equal
footing today.
Brooks, Civil Rights Scholarship: A Proposed Agenda for the Twenty-first Century, 20
U.S.F. L. REV. 397, 403 (1986)(citations omitted).
342. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 450 (1986).
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a new refrigerator every seventeen years, and a used car every four
years, and has no savings.
Working-class Blacks are subject to socioeconomic vulnerability
mainly in two areas of life: housing and education. In the housing
area, smiling discrimination, steering, and other forms of complex
racial discrimination - racial discrimination that is subtle and com-
plex, at times sophisticated and at times unconscious or institutional-
ized, and often accompanied by nonracial factors - plus de facto
segregation - are the dominant socioeconomic problems facing the
Black working class. Two sets of socioeconomic problems face the
Black working class in education. In primary education, the problem
consists of poor or ineffective public schooling - the lack of "quality
education" - by which I mean inferior instruction in the three
"Rs," little or no programs dealing with Black pride or awareness,
and essentially no cultural diversity. In higher education, low Black
enrollment is the major problem. These problems set the Black work-
ing class apart from the White working class.
Socioeconomic vulnerability within the Black working class is
linked to a system of racial subordination. Legal doctrines, proce-
dures, and processes designed to implement or to vindicate the racial
omission tenet subordinate the Black working class. They give low
priority to the housing and educational interests of working-class
Blacks or create situations in which these Blacks are called upon to
shoulder a disproportionate amount of housing discrimination and
segregation, ineffective public education, and the denial of a college
education.
Racial subordination in housing can emerge in several specific
ways. The intent test places the task of proving housing discrimina-
tion under the equal protection clause somewhere between extremely
difficult and impossible. Literally applied, another judicial doctrine,
the strict scrutiny test, denies Blacks the use of racial occupancy
controls - one of the few means of effectively counteracting com-
plex racial discrimination and a powerful desegregation tool. Poorly
structured and adminstered, the Fair Housing Act sanctions certain
types of housing discrimination and segregation, makes private en-
forcement unrealistic, provides for weak public enforcement, and of-
fers little deterrence against simple or complex racial discrimination
and segregation.
Specific patterns of racial subordination can likewise be identified
in education. In primary education, the intent test places a near-
impossible burden on Blacks attempting to prove segregative intent
on the part of school officials. At the higher educational levels, un-
dergraduate and graduate schools attempting to comply with the
Bakke decision, either in fulfillment of a perceived legal obligation
or as a matter of institutional policy, have abandoned use of the
Black admissions quota or have placed too much weight on tradi-
tional academic indicators.
These racially subordinating features of the legal system accom-
modate or cause the housing and educational problems of the Black
working class. Complex racial discrimination and de facto segrega-
tion are prolonged and possibly encouraged by antidiscrimination
laws that leave working-class Blacks unequipped to fight housing dis-
crimination and segregation. Poor public schooling is allowed to fes-
ter long after Brown I in part because proof of segregative intent,
which is the key to unlocking educational remedies, is an extremely
heavy burden to meet today. Finally, Black college enrollment is
sure to continue to stagnate at post-Bakke low levels when colleges
and universities jettison what has always been the most effective
means of admitting promising Black students - racial quotas - or
when the admissions process otherwise fails to take the full measure
of the person applying. Given the difficulty of proving discriminatory
intent and, most importantly, the great unlikelihood that a rejected
Black high school student could afford to or would even consider su-
ing a college for discrimination, the Black admissions quota may be
the only effective way to counteract residual discrimination and ra-
cism in the admissions process. Individual high school or college
graduates are simply not in a position to fend for themselves as re-




The term "underclass" was not part of the civil rights discourse
during the 1960s. Journalist Ken Auletta popularized the term in a
1982 book, entitled The Underclass.3 4 Auletta wrote about the
hard-core unemployed, concentrating on what he perceived to be val-
ues and behavior quite different from that of mainstream society.
Bill Moyers' CBS documentary, "The Vanishing Black Family -
Crisis in Black America, ' 3 44 is perhaps most responsible for making
the term "underclass" a household word. Moyers' 1986 documentary
dramatized for the entire nation the attitudes, values, and behavioral
pattern of Black teen-aged males and females from broken families.
343. K. AULETTA, THE UNDERCLASS (1982).
344. CBS Reports: The Vanishing Black Family - Crisis in Black America (Bill
Moyers, reporter, January 1986) [hereinafter The Vanishing Family].
960
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Although now a familiar term in public discourse, the term "un-
derclass" is defined in different ways by scholars. Many of these defi-
nitions were discussed at a conference convened by the Joint Center
for Political Studies on March 5, 1987 in Washington D.C.345 Pro-
fessor William J. Wilson of the University of Chicago, Robert
Aponte, Project Director of the Underclass Project at the University
of Chicago, and Dr. Peter Gottschalk of the Institute of Poverty Re-
search and Boston College, argued in favor of an income definition
of underclass. "Individuals who comprise the underclass lack oppor-
tunities and live in neighborhoods with high concentrations of unem-
ployment, crime, and deviant behavior - but the underlying prob-
lem is poverty." 346
Other scholars disagreed with the suggestion that underclass and
poverty are synonymous. Instead, they would define underclass as
pathological behavior, a definition that could exclude as much as
seventy-two percent of poor people. Professor Christopher Jencks of
Northwestern University was one of the principal proponents of this
definition of underclass:
If you don't believe pathological behavior is really a problem worth worry-
ing about, the correct position to take is to stop worrying about the under-
class and go back to talking about poverty, which is a perfectly feasible
position to take. But it's a tactical error to import poverty back in under the
rubric of the underclass."'
Still other conference participants settled upon a definition that
would include only certain classes of the poor: the homeless; long-
term welfare recipients; long-term jobless or underemployed persons,
especially young high school dropouts; and participants in the illegal
economy (such as, pimps, prostitutes, and drug dealers). 48
Each approach is problematic. The income approach may be too
inclusive. It may, for example, capture individuals or families who
are poor for a short period of time. On the other hand, the behav-
ioral approach may be too exclusive. It could exclude, for example,
the working poor, whether short or long-term.
Each approach has a common problem, especially when focused
on the Black underclass. To the extent that the definitions rely on
government-conducted surveys, they can provide only rough approxi-
mations at best of the size of the Black underclass. Government pop-
ulation counters are reluctant to enter non-White neighborhoods,
345. The conference proceedings are reported at Focus, June 1987, at 8.
346. Id. at 9.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 10-11.
and non-Whites are reluctant to talk with government officials who
ask personal questions. "The result is a substantial (twenty percent,
perhaps) undercounting of the non-White population. ' 49
Given these problems, I find the income definition to be the most
"accurate." Its over-inclusiveness tends to offset to some extent un-
dercounting of poor Blacks. The income approach is also most ap-
pealing for an important policy reason. The policy question one must
answer in defining the Black underclass is, who among Black Ameri-
cans is in most need of help? In my view, poor Blacks are in most
need of help. As a group, they are unstable socially and economi-
cally; they are caught in a cycle of poverty and despair. I fear that if
we begin to make distinctions among poor Blacks, sufficient attention
may not be given to the needs of those who are deemed not to be
among the favored classes.
Thus, in this article, the term "Black underclass" refers to Black
Americans who either have no income, rely in whole or in part on
meager amounts of public assistance, or earn wages at or below the
poverty line - approximately $11,000 annually for a family of four
during the late 1980s.350 Using income as the measuring rod for
class size, approximately one-third of all Black Americans have be-
longed to the underclass in the 1980s.3 51 I hasten to add, however,
that as with the Black middle and working classes, I am less con-
cerned with a particular income level itself than with the socioeco-
nomic characteristics, conditions, and problems a Black household
normally buys into at a particular income level. Hence, the following
statistical profile of underclass Blacks is just as important, if not
more important, than class income:
14 percent of Black underclass households consist of family
units headed by a husband and wife, of which: (a) an equal
percentage (3 percent) of the husbands are either "not in the
labor force" (meaning, not working and not actively looking for
work352 "unemployed" (meaning, those who are without a job
but are actively looking for work), semiskilled or unskilled
blue-collar or service workers (which includes assembly-line
workers, laborers, food handlers, and domestic workers), or re-
tired; (b) an equal percentage (3 percent) of the wives are ei-
ther keeping house, unemployed, semiskilled or unskilled blue-
349. S. Rose, supra note 59, at 35.
350. Id. at 7.
351. See, e.g., id. at 21; CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, FALLING
BEHIND: A REPORT ON How BLACKS HAVE FARED UNDER REAGAN POLICIES 4 (1984).
A statistical breakdown of Black and White classes appears supra in Part III A.
352. This group includes persons who are disabled, on public assistance, or be-
tween jobs. A similar group, called "discouraged workers," consists of persons who want
to work but have stopped looking. See, e.g., S. Rose, supra note 59, at 12.
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collar or service workers, or retired. 353
41 percent of Black underclass households consist of female-
headed families. Among the household heads, 58 percent are
not in the labor force, 8 percent are unemployed, 25 percent
are semiskilled or unskilled blue-collar or service workers, and
8 percent are clerical and sales workers (secretaries, sales
clerks, telephone operators, postal workers, and so on).3"4
a 3 percent of Black underclass households consist of male-
headed families in which none of the household heads are in
the labor force.355
0 21 percent of Black underclass households consist of "single"
women (meaning unmarried with no dependents) of which 33
percent are not in the labor force, 17 percent are unemployed,
17 percent are semiskilled or unskilled blue-collar or service
workers, and 33 percent are retired. 356
* 21 percent of Black underclass households consist of single
men, of which 33 percent are not in the labor force, 17 percent
are unemployed, 33 percent are semiskilled or unskilled blue-
collar or service workers, and seventeen percent are retired.357
These statistics indicate that the Black underclass lives life at the
low end of the American Dream. Most underclass Blacks live a life
of poverty and despair, a life that is poor in income, education, hous-
ing, health, and municipal services, but rich in crime, drugs, teenage
pregnancy, high school drop-outs, broken families, welfare depen-
dency, and unemployment.358 This is life far removed from main-
stream society, and a life caught between the cross-currents of race
and class.





358. See. e.g., Wilson, The Urban Underclass, in MINORITY REPORT 75 (L. Dun-
bar ed. 1984); Frontline: Growing Up Poor (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 2, 1986)
(transcript No. 403, at 24-29; on file at Kratter Law Library, University of San Diego);
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 17, 1986, at 18-25; TIME, Sept. 16, 1985, at 32-36;
TIME, July 8, 1985, at 54-56.
B. The Subordination Question
1. Dominant Class Problems
As the statistical profile of the Black underclass clearly reveals,
not all underclass Blacks are unemployed, on welfare, or live in bro-
ken families. Yet, some theorists would isolate one or another of
these socioeconomic conditions as the sine qua non of the Black un-
derclass' problem. I believe, however, that these socioeconomic con-
ditions describe only symptoms of the real problem underclass
Blacks face, not the problem itself. A socioeconomic phenomenon
more fundamental, ubiquitous, and sustaining than welfare, crime,
teenage pregnancy, and so on provides a better understanding of the
Black underclass' condition. In analyzing this phenomenon, it may
be helpful to first consider three widely-accepted theories concerning
the Black underclass's dominant class problem.
a. Three Current Theories
The first theory, advanced by the conservative Charles Murray in
his book, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980,3"'
holds that welfare is the major problem confronting underclass
Blacks. Mr. Murray argues that government welfare programs, espe-
cially AFDC, is the root of all evil in the Black underclass. Accord-
ing to Mr. Murray, welfare engenders everything from teenage preg-
nancy and its subsequent metamorphosis into female-headed families
(or "family disintegration") to generations of weak men whose in-
centive to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps is blunted by
the comfort of monthly handouts from the government.
There is statistical support for some of Mr. Murray's assertions. It
is true, for example, that the percentage of Black families relative to
the percentage of White families receiving AFDC payments has in-
creased dramatically since the 1960s. 3 60 It is also true that there has
been an equally extraordinary increase in Black female-headed fami-
lies compared to White female-headed families during this same
period.-61
These statistics do not, however, establish a nexus between AFDC
payments and teenage pregnancy or broken families. "In fact, wel-
fare does not seem to be the key factor in forming female-headed
families - since the number of [B]lack single mothers who are not
on AFDC grew just as rapidly during the 1970s as those who
359. C. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AN AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980
(1984).
360. See supra text accompanying note 37.
361. Id. Of course, one of the problems with Black female-headed families is that
a large percentage of them live in poverty. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 39.
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were.,,362
Furthermore, when one talks with Black teenagers - the main
ingredient of Black teenage pregnancy and family disintegration -
a clearer picture begins to emerge. The prospect of receiving a wel-
fare check is not the motivating force behind careless sex or planned
pregnancies. For Black teenage girls, the need to love and to be loved
unconditionally are the primary motivating factors. For Black teen-
age boys, the need to establish one's manhood is the strongest incen-
tive for fathering a baby. These youngsters learn from the streets
that the shrewdness involved in convincing a reluctant girl to become
intimate enough to have a baby is one of the few ways in which a
Black teenager living in poverty can establish his manhood. 63
One cannot help but wonder whether Mr. Murray has ever talked
to Black teenagers. Perhaps he is like the government census coun-
ters who have never stepped foot into a Black ghetto.364 As Senator
Daniel P. Moynihan has said: "How does Mr. Murray know? . . .
The answer is that he does not know. 365
Senator Moynihan has his own theory concerning the sine qua non
of the Black underclass' social problem. Senator Moynihan broached
his theory in 1965 as an Assistant Secretary of Labor. In a contro-
versial report written for President Johnson, Mr. Moynihan con-
cluded that family breakdown was the principal cause of poverty
among Black Americans. 66 He repeated this assertion five years
later as an urban affairs specialist in the Nixon Administration. He
stated, in his infamous "benign neglect" memorandum to the Presi-
dent, that: "Increasingly, the problem of Negro poverty is the prob-
lem of the female-headed family. '36 7 Recently, in a book entitled
Family and Nation,368 Senator Moynihan modified his theory to in-
clude White Americans. He now believes that family disintegration
is so pervasive among Whites as well as Blacks that it is no longer
mainly a racial problem.
The causal link between broken families and poverty has been
contradicted, however, by a more recent study. A 1987 congressional
study, conducted by the Joint Economic Committee, contends that a
362. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 17, 1986, at 21.
363. See infra notes 379-404 and accompanying text.
364. See supra text accompanying note 349.
365. N.Y. Times, April 7, 1985, § I (Main), at 11, col. 2.
366. Id. at 1, col. 3. Portions of the report are reproduced in TIME, May 14, 1984,
at 20.
367. N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1970, § 1 (Main), at 69, col. 2.
368. D. MOYNIHAN. FAMILY AND NATION (1986).
low-wage explosion, which began in 1979, is keeping more than
thirty million Americans below the poverty line. "Between 1979 and
1985 - the most recent year for which Government data are availa-
ble - 44 percent of the net new jobs created paid poverty-level
wages."3 ' Also, "two-parent households accounted for 45 % of the
rise in the number of poor [during this period]. Single-parent fami-
lies made up only 32% of the increase. 37 0
While poverty-wage jobs may have increased during the 1980s
and although poverty can grip two-parent as well as female-headed
families, one point is not refuted by the congressional study. Poverty
and, hence, underclass status fall disproportionately on Blacks, espe-
cially female-headed households. Not only do female-headed families
currently constitute the largest portion of the Black underclass -
approximately forty-one percent as opposed to approximately four-
teen percent for two-parent families 371 - but also in 1985 - the
last year of the congressional study - fifty-two percent of Black fe-
male-headed families live in poverty compared to only twenty-seven
percent of White female-headed families.372 Also, since the 1960s, a
much larger percentage of Black families have received public assis-
tance (for instance 11.6 and 23.6 percent in 1967 and 1983, respec-
tively) than White families (such as 1.5 and 2.7 percent in 1967 and
1983, respectively). s73
A third theory, which has more substance to it than the previous
ones, is advanced by William Wilson in his latest book, entitled The
Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, The Underclass, and Public
Policy.3 4 Professor Wilson asserts that the major problem con-
fronting the Black underclass is joblessness. He believes that unem-
ployment resulting from structural changes in the economy - par-
ticularly the movement away from such "smokestack" industries as
automobiles, rubber, and steel to such service oriented industries as
computers and finances - is the special class problem the Black un-
derclass faces.
Yet, it is not enough to merely point out that Black men were
overrepresented in industries that have declined in recent years. Not
all underclass Blacks are unemployed. Most are stuck in low-skilledjobs, and many of these jobs are going begging. 375 Moreover, Wil-
369. Bluestone & Harrison, A Low-Wage Explosion: The Grim Truth About the
Job 'Miracle', N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1987, § 8 (Bus.), at 3, col. 1.
370. TIME, Jan. 5, 1987, at 49.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 352, 354.
372. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 17, 1986, at 21. See also supra text accom-
panying note 39.
373. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 17, 1986, at 21.
374. W. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDER-
CLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987).
375. Uchitelle, America's Army of Non-Workers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1987, § 3
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son's theory is too narrow to sufficiently explain teenage pregnancy,
Black-on-Black crime, and other major problems within the Black
underclass.
Why are teenage males unwilling to take low-skilled jobs for
which they are qualified? Why are older underclass Blacks so vul-
nerable to being locked into these jobs? Why, in short, are under-
class Black Americans so susceptible to the socioeconomic hardships
about which Murray, Moynihan, and Wilson write? I attempt to an-
swer this question next, while at the same time expressing a different
theory about the dominant class problem of the Black underclass.
b. A Different Theory
Welfare dependency, female-headed families, and unusual vulner-
ability to the low-wage explosion, like crime and malnutrition,
merely give evidence of a deeper problem within the Black under-
class. When one pulls this evidence together, it becomes clear that it
is not any one of these cultural phenomena that constitutes the domi-
nant class problem of underclass Blacks. Rather, it is the force un-
derlying these phenomena - a proclivity toward dysfunction and
self-destruction, a dysfunctional behavioral pattern and value system
that is utterly self-defeating - that fundamentally is the root of
most evil within the Black underclass. The current of dysfunction
and self-defeating acts and attitudes undulating within the Black un-
derclass is more organic and wide-spread than the high rate of wel-
fare dependency, female-headed families, unemployment, and other
grim class conditions. Dysfunction and self-destruction within the
Black underclass help to explain these cultural phenomena and why
the Black underclass is so vulnerable to the low-wage explosion.
In discussing dysfunction and self-destruction within the Black un-
derclass, it is important not to confound issues of responsibility and
blame. While underclass Blacks share in the responsibility for resolv-
ing their class problem, society is mainly to blame for the fact that
the problem even exists. As discussed in greater detail later on,376
today's Blacks inherited tremendous social and economic disadvan-
tage - such as, poor housing, inferior education, and low-paying
jobs - from slavery and, in particular, Jim Crow.
It is also important to understand that the Black underclass' dys-
(Bus.), at 1, col. 2. One McDonald's restaurant in Hartford, Connecticut was so in need
of help that it offered to pay $7.00/ hour as a starting wage.
376. See infra text accompanying notes 405-39.
functional and self-destructive life-style is sustained in large part by
another legacy of prior subordinating systems - racial sensibility.
This is a most insidious cultural disease. Its symptoms include the
inability to manage mixed or negative feelings regarding one's
Blackness - such as, low self-esteem, self-hate, anger, and defiance
- to draw strength, pride, power, determination, or energy from
Black culture, or, in general, to successfully adapt to the modern
world.3 7 7 Racial sensibility helps to explain why White ethnic
groups, Vietnamese refugees and other newer immigrants, and even
Black West Indians, out perform Blacks as a whole.378
A close examination of the behavioral patterns, attitudes, and
value system of Black underclass teenagers provides important in-
sights into the Black underclass' proclivity toward dysfunction and
self-destruction. Together, female and male teenagers generate most
of the negative cultural traits within the Black underclass - teenage
pregnancy, high school dropouts, and a large share of welfare depen-
dency, crime, drugs, malnourished babies, and female-headed house-
holds.37 19 The pattern of dysfunction and self-destruction begins with
teenage pregnancy.
There is little mystery as to why teenage girls in the Black under-
class bear children: they seek to compensate for only partially nur-
turing homelives. True, the lack of proper sex education is a factor
in some teenage pregnancies.38 0 But studies have shown that in most
cases teenage girls get pregnant in spite of prior sex education, for-
mal or informal. The desire to love and to be loved is the main rea-
son so many Black teenage girls get pregnant. This desire comes
through strongly in numerous responses to the question, "Why did
you get pregnant?"
The response of a Black teenager from Atlanta is typical: "I didn't
377. See infra text accompanying notes 391-96 and 426-29.
378. See, e.g., L. THUROW, THE ZERO SUM SOCIETY 184-187 (1980); Kotken, The
Reluctant Entreprenuers. Are American Blacks Still Struck on the Bottom Rung of the
Economic Ladder Because So Few Start Business on Their Own?, INC. MAG., Sept.
1986, at 81; FORTUNE, Nov. 24, 1986, at 148; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 2, 1984,
at 41; JET, July 1, 1985, at 5.
379. See, e.g., Overbea, Youths Hold Key to Black Family Survival, Christian
Sci. Monitor, Apr. 1, 1987 at 6, col. 1; Growing Up Poor, supra note 350; N.Y. Times,
May 19, 1985, § I (Main), at 16, col. 1; TIME, Dec. 9, 1985, at 78-90; TIME, May 14,
1984, at 20. At the release of "The State of Black America - 1986," National Urban
League President John Jacob remarked that the plight of the young Black man is one of
the most pressing problems facing America today. See, e.g., San Diego Union/Tribune,
Feb. 2, 1986, at G-2, col. 4. The role of Black teenagers in Black family breakdown was
highlighted in a controversial television news report that aired on January 25, 1986. See
The Vanishing Family, supra note 344. For an excellent discussion of the program see,
e.g., Raspberry, America's Black Family Crisis, San Diego Union, Jan. 24, 1986, at 8,
col. 4.
380. See, e.g., TIME, Dec. 9, 1985, at 81.
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think my mother noticed me." 381 So too is the statement of another
teenager from Newark: "Children will smile when no one else
will. . . . They will always be there. 38 2 Janet Schultz, a nurse prac-
titioner in Chester, Pennsylvania who has treated scores of pregnant
teenagers, sums up her experience in the following manner:
Children get pregnant - teenagers get pregnant because they want to get
pregnant; they want to have babies. It's not for lack of birth control. Every
child knows where to get birth control. They could even tell us where to get
birth control. It's available; it's not expensive - in fact, a teenage girl who
would like to get the birth control pill does not need . . . permission from
her parent to be treated at a medical facility for gynecologic care in order
to get birth control pills. She's what we call an 'emancipated minor' when it
comes to sexual matters, and she can sign for her own care and therefore
get birth control pills. The girls want to have babies.383
If children bearing children is a self-defeating act, especially when
the child is born into a dead-end, brutally deficient environment, it is
only the front end of a series of other self-destructive acts to come.
Teenage mothers ignite a series of interrelated, integenerational
problems. The first problem, which begins with the pregnancy itself,
is high school dropout. Pregnancy is the single most important rea-
son teenage girls drop out of school.384 Teenage pregnancy can also
have an adverse affect on the unborn baby's health and, conse-
quently, on the social cost of infant care. Pregnant teenagers are "far
less likely than other expectant mothers to receive prenatal care,
thus increasing the risk of bearing low-birth-weight babies requiring
extensive medical care at public expense."3 5 Low-birth-weight ba-
bies experience not only physical but mental developmental
problems, called the "failure to thrive syndrome." '386
The class problems engendered by the teenage mother do not end
here. Having failed to complete high school and lacking her own
means of transportation, access to day-care services, or marketable
skills to obtain a job, the teenage mother is compelled to go on wel-
fare. In New York City, for example, "Seventy percent of. . . [new
teenage mothers] can be expected to end up on public assistance
within 18 months ....
Going on welfare does not solve the problem of malnourished chil-
381. TV GUIDE, June 14-20, 1986, at A-69.
382. The Vanishing Family, supra note 344.
383. Growing Up Poor, supra note 358, at 17.
384. See, e.g., Stein, Children of Poverty: Crisis in New York, N.Y. TIMEs MAG.,
June 8, 1986, at 68.
385. Id.
386. Growing Up Poor, supra note 358, at 5.
387. Stein, supra note 384, at 68.
dren, another class problem to which teenage mothers contribute.
One official explains the problem of malnourished children as fol-
lows: "We have multiple kids who are malnourished and . . . some
of them are malnourished because the families don't have enough
money for food. Sometimes it's because they don't budget money
well, but they don't have a whole lot to budget." 388 Also, underclass
Blacks, like poor people in general, are not nutritional experts or
have access to the best food buys .38 9 Nor do these Blacks or other
poor people have "the kind of sophistication or education that allows
them to work very well with . . [local nutritional agencies]."0
Children sent into the world by Black teenage parents are likely to
become maladjusted members of society. Teenagers are ill-prepared
to teach their children a very important racial survival skill: how to
deal with racial sensibility.3 9' Having to deal with racial sensibility is
a central distinction between underclass Blacks and Whites; this ra-
cial phenonmenon simply does not figure into the latter's life
chances." 2
The importance of teaching Black children how to deal with racial
sensibility - the psychological problems of being Black in a racist
society - is made clear by two leading Black psychiatrists, Dr.
James P. Comer of Yale University and Dr. Alvin Poussaint of
Harvard University, who is also an advisor for television's The Bill
Cosby Show." In their book, Black Child Care,93 Drs. Comer and
Poussaint maintain that while good childrearing principles "are fun-
damentally the same for all,"394 Black parents "will occasionally
need to act in special ways. ' 395 Because our society "so profoundly
threatens [Black] . . . self-esteem," Drs. Comer and Poussaint be-
lieve that Black child parenting requires special efforts chiefly in pro-
viding for the child's psychological well-being. The Black child, who
is "still made to feel inferior to [W]hites," must be "trained to cope
with [W]hite oppression." Parents, inter alia, must "[pass] on to a
growing child both the strengths of the old culture and the rules and
388. Growing Up Poor, supra note 358, at 6.
389. Studies have shown that poverty-strickened areas have above-average food
prices. See, e.g., S. Rose, supra note 59, at 7-8.
390. Growing Up Poor, supra note 358, at 6.
391. See also supra, text accompanying note 378, and infra text accompanying
notes 426-29.
392. See infra text accompanying notes 426-29.
393. J. COMER & A. POUSSAINT, BLACK CHILD CARE, How To BRING Up A
HEALTHY BLACK CHILD IN AMERICA, A GUIDE TO EMOTIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENT (1975) [hereinafter BLACK CHILD CARE].
394. Children universally need food, clothing, shelter, protection from physical and
psychological damage, the ability to trust and feel affection, and to be taught how to
control their aggressive and impulsive energy in order to be able to learn, work, and play
in gradually more mature ways. Id. at 22-23.
395. Id. at 23.
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techniques essential for successful adaptation in the modern world."
These techniques include the art of being "practical as well as cun-
ning", learning "how to win some sort of acceptance from belligerent
[W]hites," and even acquiring the habit of containing one's "aggres-
sion around [W]hites while freely expressing it among [B]lacks."3 96
It is very unlikely that teenage parents, who are forced into a kind
of premature adulthood can master or effectively communicate these
ultra sophisticated rules and techniques to their children. This is es-
pecially true given the complexity of post-1960s racial dynamics.
Even older and wealthier Blacks find this parental burden to be par-
ticularly difficult in today's racial climate.397
As the Black infant suffering from "failure to thrive syndrome"
grows into the malnourished child on its way to becoming the ra-
cially-unschooled teenager, the future looks more bleak than ever.
Educational achievement, given insufficient intellectual, cultural, and
emotional growth accumulating over the years, seems remote. Many
teenagers simply drop out of school to escape the diurnal frustrations
and humiliations that come with educational failure. They seem to
be unaware or unafraid of the fact that a snowball in hell has a
better chance of surviving than a high school dropout has of finding
a good-paying job. Other than a strong sense that money is a com-
modity that one should not do without, there is little guidance or
nurturing from the home. Indeed, homelife has become quite un-
pleasant, with tensions mounting as the family struggles through
each day of poverty and despair. Thrown into a state of premature
adulthood, the teenager looks for ways to survive and to embellish
life in a nonabundant environment. Females often turn to childrear-
ing, and thus become pregnant, as a way of arriving at a productive
life. 398 Males frequently look elsewhere - the streets.
Coping in the streets is a cruel way for teenagers to try to develop
personal growth and fulfillment. They succeed only in becoming chil-
dren of the streets, playing host to a multitude of social and cultural
evils: crime, drugs, vandalism, street hustle, bitterness and resent-
ment against society in general and White society in particular, and,
of course, teenage pregnancy and all its attentant problems. Claude
Brown, whose highly acclaimed autobiography, Manchild in the
396. Id. at 19-21.
397. See, e.g., Morgan, The World Ahead: Black Parents Prepare Their Childrenfor Pride and Prejudice, N.Y. TImEs MAG., Oct. 27, 1985, at 32.
398. See supra text accompanying notes 379-83.
Promised Land,399 made America aware of the problems of a Black
youngster growing up on the streets of Harlem in the 1940s and
1950s, describes the environment and some of the motivations and
coping techniques of today's premature adult male:
Today's manchild is a teen-ager between the ages of 13 and 18, probably a
second-generation ghetto dweller living with his unskilled, laboring mother
and three or four sisters and brothers, maybe one or two cousins, all sharing
a tiny three-, four- or five-room apartment in a dilapidated tenement of low-
income, city-owned housing development, commonly called 'the projects.'
The motivations, dreams and aspirations of today's young men are essen-
tially the same as those of the teen-agers of their parents' generation -
with a few dramatic differences. They are persistently violent. They appear
driven by, or almost obsessed with, a desperate need for pocket money that
they cannot possibly obtain legally.
Like'his progenitor, [today's manchild] seeks the answers to life's "unknow-
able whys" through informal mysticism and mind-altering media collec-
tively called getting 'high.'
Yet, the unimaginably difficult struggle to arrive at a productive manhood
in urban America is more devastatingly monstrous than ever before. All
street kids are at least semi-abandoned, out on those mean streets for the
major portion of the day and night. They are at the mercy of a coldblooded
and ruthless environment; survival is a matter of fortuity, instinct, ingenuity
and unavoidable conditioning. Consequently, the manchild who survives is
usually more cunning, more devious and often more vicious than his middle-
class counterpart. These traits are the essential contents of his survival
kit.
400
Needless to say, the Black underclass is not the only group in our
society exhibiting a proclivity toward dysfunction and self-destruc-
tion. Male teenagers between the ages of fifteen and eighteen, re-
gardless of socio-economic class, have the highest involvement in
crime.4 01 And, of course, the White underclass, with all its attendant
ills of poverty, alienation, broken homes, welfare dependency, and
criminal behavior, is also prone to self-defeating mores.40 2 None of
these groups, however, behave in response to a set of attitudes and a
value system quite like that which is found in the Black ghetto.
The ghetto is a constant reminder to all Blacks of prior subordi-
nating systems. To underclass Blacks, it is also a symbol of society's
indifference and frequent hostility toward poor Blacks. Skirmishes
with the police - angry White men in screaming white cars - per-
vasive economic privation, and the many failed attempts to "make
it" in a perplexing White world - in school, on the job, and so on
- all help to create a deeply ingrained aversion, particularly in
399. C. BROWN, MANCHILD IN THE PROMISED LAND (1965).
400. Brown, Manchild in Harlem, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1984, at 38-40. See also
N.Y. Times, May 19, 1985, § 1 (Main), at 16, col. 1; TIME, Sept. 16, 1985, at 32.
401. TIME, Feb. 23, 1987, at 28.
402. Id. at 29. See also Growing Up Poor, supra note 358.
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Black males, for the attitudes and values of the larger, alien White
world. Life in the ghetto can engender a very real sense that Whites
have purposefully limited opportunities for Blacks, that society has
closed off every avenue of stardom for most Blacks, except "stardom
in crime." John Edgar Wildeman captures many of these complex
attitudes and values in his book, Brothers and Keepers:
403
You remember what we were saying about young [B]lack men in the street-
world life. And trying to understand why the 'square world' becomes com-
pletely unattractive to them. It has to do with the fact that their world is
the GHETTO and in that world all the glamour, all the praise and atten-
tion is given to the slick guy, the gangster especially, the ones that get over
in the 'life.' And it's because we can't help but feel some satisfaction seeing
a brother, a [B]lack man, get over on these people, on their system without
playing by their rules. No matter how much we have incorporated these
rules as our own, we know that they were forced on us by people who did
not have our best interest at heart ...
In the real world, the world left for me, it was unacceptable to be 'good,'
it was square to be smart in school, it was jive to show respect to people
outside the street world, it was cool to be cold to your woman and the peo-
ple that loved you. The things we liked we called 'bad.' 'Man that was a
bad girl.' The world of the angry [B]lack kid . . . was a world in which to
be in was to be out - out of touch with the square world and all of its rules
on what's right and wrong. The thing was to make sure it's contrary to
what society says or is. ...
• . .The world's a stone bitch. Nothing true if that's not true. The man had
you coming and going. He owned everything worth owning and all you'd
ever get was what he didn't want anymore, what he'd chewed and spit out
and left in the gutter for niggers to fight over. Garth had pointed to the
street and said, If we ever make it, it got to come from there, from the
curb.404
These attitudes and values are astonishing yet differentiating.
They help to motivate dysfunction and self-destruction within the
Black underclass. They also distinguish this segment of Black society
from other groups that engage in dysfunctional or self-distructive
behavior.
While there is no denying that these negative attitudes and values
are part of the fabric of the Black underclass, it would be wrong to
conclude from that that the Black underclass is solely to blame for
this sad state of affairs. Prior and current racial subordination have
played significant roles in the creation of these attitudes, values, and
accompanying behaviors - this proclivity toward dysfunction and
self-destruction.
403. J. WIDEMAN, BROTHERS AND KEEPERS (1984).
404. Id. at 57-58, 64.
2. Racial Subordination
a. Slavery and Jim Crow
A sizable segment of Black society did not just decide to join the
ranks of the underclass at the end of the 1960s. Many Blacks had no
choice; they came out of Jim Crow heavily encumbered by poverty
and despair. Given the duration and intensity of slavery and Jim
Crow, 0 5 it would not have been too difficult to anticipate in the late
1960s that the command of these prior subordinating systems, espe-
cially Jim Crow, would have a residual effect on Black Americans
and society en toto beyond the 1960s.
Indeed, in its 1968 report on the causes of America's race riots
during the 1960s, the Kerner Commission cited as some of the lin-
gering effects of slavery and Jim Crow: acute unemployment; high
underemployment; shabby housing; second-rate education; poor mu-
nicipal services; inadequate welfare; and, of course, racism.40 8 Signif-
icantly, the Commission said that "segregation and poverty converge
on the young to destroy opportunity and enforce failure. Crime, drug
addiction, dependency on welfare, and bitterness and resentment
against society in general and [W]hite society in particular are the
result. '40 7
These findings come alive when unemployment, poverty, income,
occupational status, wage scale, housing, and education statistics are
considered. Black society came out of Jim Crow with: an unemploy-
ment rate roughly twice as high as the rates for Whites;408 a poverty
rate for individuals and intact families more than three times the
rate for White individuals and intact families;409 an income level for
males and intact families 58.1 percent and 61.4 percent, respectively,
as high as the rate for their White counterparts; 410 almost triple the
percentage of men and women concentrated in the lowest-paying,
405. See, e.g., J. WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE, AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS
1954-1965 (1987); A. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE & THE AMER-
ICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978); W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK:
AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1969); J. FRANKLIN, FROM
SLAVERY To FREEDOM, A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS (1969); J. LESTER, To BE A
SLAVE (1968); H. APTHEKER, NAT TURNER'S SLAVE REBELLION (1966); K. STAMPP,
THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 (1965); K. STAMPP. THE PECULIAR INSTITU-
TION, SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1956).
406. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISOR-
DERS, SUMMARY OF REPORT 9-16 (1968).
407. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 5
(1968). See also, LIFE, Mar. 8, 1968. For an account of how local governments, through
the unequal distribution of municipal services, helped to create the impoverished condi-
tions under which many Blacks now live, see C. HAAR & D. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE
OF THE TRACKS (1986).
408. POPULATION RPT., supra note 39, at 69, 70.
409. Id. at 29, 49, 50.
410. RAND RPT., supra note 37, at 104.
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least-skilled jobs (primarily private domestic service and farming)
compared to the percentage of White men and women holding such
jobs;""1 a wage scale that permitted its males to earn only 57.5 per-
cent as much as comparably experienced White males and, taking
both experience and education into account, only between sixty and
seventy percent of wages paid to similarly-situated White males;412
an owner-occupied housing percentage that was 1.7 times less than
the rate for Whites and a rental percentage that was 1.7 times more
than the percentage for Whites; "13 a smaller percentage of urban
(1.3 times smaller) and rural (5.1 times smaller) housing containing
all essential plumbing facilities compared to White urban and rural
housing;4 4 more than twice as much overcrowding in urban housing
(whether owner-occupied or rental) and more than three times as
much overcrowding in rural housing (whether owner-occupied or
rental) than for comparable White housing; 41 5 and a smaller per-
centage of high school (more than two times smaller) and college
(almost three times smaller) graduates than the percentage for
White high school and college graduates.4"6
The present-day effects of prior racial subordination cannot be
gainsaid by the fact that some Blacks, even underclass Blacks, have
been able to excel in spite of these dreadful socioeconomic condi-
tions. Simply put, not all Blacks are the same. "Sure, a common
bond of genes, of suffering, of grievances and yearnings does tie to-
gether all [B]lacks in this country. 41 7 But some Blacks are stronger
or luckier than others. "Blacks have always distinguished between
the person who is in the ghetto and the one with the ghetto in him-
self. The former is a striver, the latter a defeatist."41 8 Carl Rowan, a
Black syndicated newspaper columnist, felicitously observes that
"... when a thousand are bound in chains, only a few Houdinis will
emerge. Those who have done so simply turned out to be stronger
than their shackles were. '419
Nor are the current effects of past subordinating systems lessened
by the fact that other ethnic groups, who can also lay claim to a
411. POPULATION RPT., supra note 39, at 74.
412. RAND RPT., supra note 37, at 6, 23-26.
413. POPULATION RPT., supra note 39, at 137.
414. Id. at 139.
415. Id. at 141.
416. Id. at 93.
417. Rowan, The Blacks Among Us, READER'S DIGEST, June, 1985, at 72.
418. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1986, § 4 (Wk. in Rev.), at 24, col. 1.
419. Rowan, supra note 417, at 74-75.
legacy of suffering, have mounted barriers to gain entrance into
mainstream American society. The Black experience in this society
is wholly different from that of other ethnic groups, including the
recent Asian immigrants who have done so well in record time. No
other ethnic group was brought to this 'country against its own
wishes and then enslaved and humiliated so thoroughly by society
and government.420
Too many Americans seem to have forgotten or perhaps have
never read the Kerner Commission's findings on this subject. In ad-
dressing the question, "why have so many Negroes, unlike the Euro-
pean immigrants, been unable to escape from the ghetto and from
poverty," the Commission cited, inter alia, certain racial and cul-
tural factors:
The Disability of Race. The structure of discrimination has stringently nar-
rowed opportunities for the Negro and restricted his prospects. European
immigrants suffered from discrimination, but never so pervasively...
Cultural Factors: Coming from societies with a low standard of living and
at a time when job aspirations were low, the immigrants sensed little depri-
vation in being forced to take the less desirable and poorer-paying jobs.
Their large and cohesive families contributed to total income. Their vision
of the future - one that led to a life outside of the ghetto - provided the
incentive necessary to endure the present.
Although Negro men worked as hard as the immigrants, they were unable
to support their families. The entrepreneurial opportunities had vanished.
As a result of slavery and long periods of unemployment, the Negro family
structure had become matriarchal; the males played a secondary and mar-
ginal family role - one which offered little compensation for their hard and
unrewarding labor. Above all, segregation denied Negroes access to goodjobs and the opportunity to leave the ghetto. For them, the future seemed to
lead only to a dead end.
Today, [W]hites tend to exaggerate how well and quickly they escaped
from poverty. The fact is that immigrants who came from rural back-
grounds, as many Negroes do, are only now, after three generations, finally
beginning to move into the middle class.
By contrast, Negroes began concentrating in the city less than two genera-
tions ago, and under much less favorable conditions....' 2 1
A myriad of other consequences flow from the unique experiences
of the Black American. One is the lack of a legacy of opportunities
from which today's Blacks can benefit. Government-imposed racial
exclusion permitted prior generations of Blacks to amass too few op-
portunities for themselves, leaving even less to bequeath to future
generations of Blacks.422
"Sorriness" is another deleterious consequence of prior racial sub-
ordination. This is an adolescent-arresting disease known in the
Black community, particulary in the South, that helps to explain
some of the dysfunctional behavior of underclass Black males
420. See supra sources cited note 405.
421. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS,
SUMMARY OF REPORT 15-16 (1968).
422. See supra sources cited note 405.
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such as, Black-on-Black violence resulting from the failure of Black
men to ventilate their anger and frustration in a mature manner.42 3
James Baldwin describes this cultural disease in his book, The Evi-
dence of Things Not Seen:424
It is a disease that attacks Black males. It is transmitted by Mama, whose
instinct - and it is not hard to see why - is to protect the Black male
from the devastation that threatens him the moment he declares himself a
man. All of our mothers, and all of our women, live with this small, I
doom-laden bell in the skull, silent, waiting, or resounding, every hour of
every day. Mama lays this burden on Sister, from whom she expects (or
indicates she expects) far more than she expects from Brother; but one of
the results of this all too comprehensible dynamic is that Brother may never
grow up - in which case, the community has become an accomplice to the
Republic.
425
Another cultural disease that, once again, afflicts mainly the Black
underclass is the inability to deal effectively with racial sensibility.
Drs. Comer and Poussaint have discussed the importance of parental
instruction in the art of dealing with racial sensibility.426 Another
scholar has suggested that the failure to deal with this "inheritable"
disease can cause motivational disabilities particularly in young
adult males. These Blacks, for example, may be "less willing to com-
pete aggressively for the opportunities that are open or less willing to
submit to industrial discipline. '427 Moreover, parents who themselves
have not been able to handle racial sensibility may infect the entire
family structure - their mishandling of their own disease may have
an impact on "a child's aspirations and on the guidance availa-
ble."42 This disease, in short, is a major force in the Black under-
class' pattern of dysfunction and self-destruction.429
Given the enormous social disadvantage Black society carried into
post-1960s America, it should surprise no one that a significant por-
tion of this dismal condition remains with us today. What may sur-
423. See, e.g., When Brothers Kill Brothers, TIME, Sept. 16, 1985, at 32-36.
424. J. BALDWIN, THE EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT SEEN (1985).
425. Id. at 19.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 391-96. See also supra text accompany-
ing note 377.
427. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 235, 237-40
(1971).
428. Id. at 240.
429. For a more detailed discussion of racial sensibility, see, e.g., Brooks, Life Af-
ter Tenure: Can Minority Law Professors Avoid the Clyde Ferguson Syndrome?, 20
U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 425-27 (1986). See also supra text accompanying notes 377, 391-96.
For a discussion of other deleterious psychosocial consequences of racism, see NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AND COMMUNITY COMPETENCE
(0. Barbarin, P. Good, 0. Pharr & J. Siskind eds. 1981); A. THOMAS & S. SILLEN,
RACISM AND PSYCHIATRY (1972); J. KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY (1970).
prise some is the role formal equal opportunity plays in sustaining
the residue of prior racial subordination and in creating new forms
of racial subordination.
b. Formal Equal Opportunity
Although the Black underclass, like the Black middle and working
classes, is interested in having real (as opposed to formal) equal ac-
cess to employment, housing, and education, clearly the major civil
rights interest of underclass Blacks lies elsewhere. The Black under-
class' most immediate civil rights interest is in attaining a better
level of existence. As a racial class, the Black underclass is most
interested in the opportunity to achieve a decent standard of living,
which our liberal democratic society promises to all.
Formal equal opportunity subordinates this civil rights interest.
Racial integration in particular, the sibling tenet of racial omis-
sion,430 can be incompatible with the Black underclass' primary civil
rights interest (decent living), and such incompatibility can contrib-
ute to the major socioeconomic problem within this segment of Black
society (dysfunction and self-annihilation).
It might seem absurd to some for anyone to argue that racial inte-
gration subordinates Black Americans. After all, one might ask, isn't
integration the very thing for which Blacks struggled through the
centuries of slavery and Jim Crow?
In truth, Black Americans have always viewed the struggle
against Jim Crow as a demand not for integration but for desegrega-
tion. Desegregation is a much broader concept than integration. De-
segregation is liberty or freedom. It is human dignity engendered by
the removal of degrading, artificial legal restraints on where Blacks
can go and what Blacks can do in our society. Desegregation is the
eradication of government-sponsored racism that excludes genera-
tions of Black Americans from mainstream society.43'
Desegregation frees Blacks to pursue either integration or separa-
tion or some combination of the two. Thus, when Black college stu-
dents decide to sit at an all-Black dining table or to live in an all-
Black dormitory, their actions are consistent with the civil rights
struggle. They are also in line with efforts by other ethnic groups to
create their own institutions for self-support. Contrary to what some
430. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34 for a definition of racial
integration.
431. C. Vann Woodward defines segregation and, by implication, desegregation in
terms of "physical distance, not social distance - physical separation or" people for reasons
of race." He observes that segregation's "opposite is not necessarily 'integration' as the
word is currently used, nor 'equality.' Nor does the absence of segregation necessarily
imply the absence of other types of injustice or the lack of a caste structure of a society."
C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW vii-viii (2d rev. ed. 1966).
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might think, Black separatism is not a form of civil rights heresy.
Racial integration subordinates the civil rights interest of under-
class Blacks by depleting Black communities of vital resources -
resources that are necessary for sustaining a vibrant American mid-
dle-class culture. Racial integration, in other words, has been some-
thing of a boon for those Blacks least handicapped by the emotional
and physical hardships of slavery and Jim Crow. It has given these
Blacks, mainly middle-class and working-class Blacks, the opportu-
nity to move out of previously-segregated communities. But the de-
parture of so many talented community leaders from Black commu-
nities since the waning days of Jim Crow has resulted in a
concomitant loss of valuable community resources. There has not
only been a steady depletion of economic resources - money that
could be recycled in Black communities - but, more importantly,
there has also been a drain of individuals capable of supplying wis-
dom and guidance to young ghetto Blacks.
It is impossible to overstate the importance of middle-class Blacks
to Black communities. Middle-class Blacks were leaders and role
models in segregated communities. In words and, more importantly,
by life style they helped to shape and to direct the attitudes, behav-
ioral pattern, and value system of other Blacks living in the commu-
nity. They interjected crucial "mainstreaming" - American middle-
class - elements into the Black community, not ocassionally but
continuously. As one observer explains:
A generation ago, racist law and custom confined both [the Black striver
and the Black defeatist] to the same neighborhoods. Strivers set the tone -
in commerce, religion, social life, politics. They were role models. They pro-
vided the leavening that made Harlem, instead of the archetypal slum, into
a varied, textured community that was [B]lack America's cultural
capital. 32
Above all, middle-class Blacks were immensely important role
models for the children of poverty. Children become only what they
can imagine themselves to be. And they can imagine only what they
see in their environment. If they can imagine themselves as unem-
ployed recipients of welfare checks or working menials, "then they
will probably subside into that fate, following that peasant logic by
which son follows father into a genetic destiny. 4 3 3 Regardless of
what they see in their parent(s), if Black children see other Black
adults "going out every morning to a job and bringing in a paycheck
432. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1986, § 4 (Wk. in Rev.), at 24, col. 1.
433. Morrow, The Powers of Racial Example, TIME, Apr. 16, 1984, at 84.
to pay for their various needs,"434 if they see other adult Blacks "be-
come doctors and scientists and lawyers and pilots and corporate
presidents - become successes - then young [B]lacks will begin to
comprehend their own possibilities and honor them with work. ' 435
Drs. Comer and Poussaint, in their book Black Child Care,436
make this essential point in a concept that can be called "significant
others." This concept is another way of stressing the importance of
community support in the emotional and psychological development
of Black children - in other words, in teaching Black children how
to deal with the problem of racial sensibility.43 Even Black children
raised in the poorest of homes, who may grow up with strong feel-
ings that their parents are unable to provide for their economic and
social well-being, can learn techiques essential for a Black person's
successful adaptation in today's world. These children can imbibe
the work ethic and an "attitude of [B]lack pride, self-confidence, and
assertiveness" from others in their communities. 38
In short, significant others, who provide an essential escape hatch
for underclass Black children, were in abundant supply in Black
communities during Jim Crow. Housing segregation, to the unin-
tended benefit of scores of Black children, trapped these human re-
sources within Black communities. Black men and women of sub-
stance - lawyers, doctors, dentists, businesspersons, school teachers,
and other skilled workers - were admired and imitated in segre-
gated communities. If not ex cathedra, they spoke and acted with
considerable authority on matters of Black survival and success in a
racist world. They were symbols of Black achievement and offered
young Blacks visible alternatives to a life of semi-illiteracy, crime,
drug addiction, welfare dependency, and abject poverty. Clearly, but
for racial integration, middle-class culture would still be a significant
force in Black communities today - there simply would be nowhere
else for the Black middle class to live. Dr. Comer strikes a similar
note when he observes:
After World War II, . . . [s]uccessful [B]lacks began moving out of the
inner-city, taking their money, leadership and role models, leaving the poor
isolated and alienated. Whites began moving to the suburbs, taking quality
education and jobs with them. These trends left certain parents - [B] lack
and [W]hite - less able to transmit desirable values to the children. 3
434. Growing Up Poor, supra note 350, at 4.
435. Morrow, supra note 433, at 84.
436. See BLACK CHILD CARE, supra note 393.
437. See supra text accompanying notes 377, 391-96 for a discussion of the con-
cept of racial sensibility.
438. See, e.g., BLACK CHILD CARE, supra note 393, at 19-21.
439. Comer, Black Americans' Problems Are the Orphan of History, L.A. Times,
Feb. 14, 1986, pt. II, J, at 10, col. 1.
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3. Summary
If some perverse soul wanted to draw up a recipe for socioeco-
nomic dysfunction and self-destruction, it might be this: Take one
group of Afro-Americans; add a tablespoon of poverty and a cupful
of despair; season with a shovelful of racial subordination; allow to
stew. You have the Black underclass.
Black Americans who live below the poverty line, are typically sin-
gle or live in single-parent homes, and are either unemployed, semi-
skilled or unskilled blue-collar or service workers, or retired. They
exhibit a behavioral pattern, a set of attitudes, and a value system
that offer few springboards from which to launch a successful life.
Underclass Blacks live a life of despair; one that moves toward socio-
economic dysfunction and self-destruction. It is a life far removed
from mainstream society.
The system's role in creating such social and cultural pathology
cannot be gainsaid. Three and one-half centuries of government-im-
posed racial exclusion from mainstream society can only have pre-
dictable present-day consequences. Ending just in the 1960s, govern-
ment racism left Black America with tremendous social and
economic disadvantage. Poor Blacks were left worse off than better
educated Black Americans. While it has taken White immigrants
from low socioeconomic backgrounds three generations to escape
poverty and Asian immigrants from middle class backgrounds even
less time to become middle class Americans, it will undoubtedly take
underclass Blacks, who carry the legacy of America's longest and
most invidious discriminatory tradition, several generations to over-
come their unique disadvantages.
Formal equal opportunity, our fundamental civil rights policy,
contains a racially subordinating feature that, like slavery and Jim
Crow, contributes to the plight of the Black underclass. Racial inte-
gration, one of the twin tenets of formal equal opportunity, subordi-
nates the primary civil rights interest of underclass Blacks (the op-
portunity for decent living) by draining valuable resources from
Black communities. Blacks left behind, especially the children, are
deprived of community leaders and role models. Without these
human resources, there is no one left within the ghetto to continu-
ously expose children to the attitudes and values of mainstream soci-
ety; to regularly help them deal with racial sensibility, sorriness, and
other problems associated with the lingering effects of prior racial
subordination and with adapting to a society that remains largely
racist; and to eventually guide them out of a life of poverty and de-
spair. Formal equal opportunity, in short, gives low priority to the
Black underclass' special needs.
If slavery and Jim Crow have sown the seeds of class paralysis,
formal equal opportunity has certainly fertilized them. Formal equal
opportunity's brand of racial subordination contributes to socioeco-
nomic vulnerability within the Black underclass. By failing to recog-
nize or to give greater deference to the Black underclass' civil rights
interest in a decent level of existence - by providing for the removal
of Black Sherpa guides and other vital community resources - the
proclivity toward dysfunction and self-destruction within the Black
underclass is prolonged and possibly intensified. Again, it is racial
integration, not desegregation, that leads to these results.
PART VI
CONCLUSION
Brown v. Board of Education440 created a revolutionary and
promising civil rights policy - what I call formal equal opportunity.
Formal equal opportunity replaced a civil rights policy - separate
but equal - that subordinated Black Americans in virtually every
sphere of life and caused severe social and economic dislocation
within Black society, the effects of which are likely to continue for
generations to come. In so doing, formal equal opportunity made
Black Americans fully human in the eyes of the law, from which a
myriad of social, economic, political, and psychological benefits have
accrued to Black Americans and to society as a whole.441
Yet it cannot be denied that formal equal opportunity has failed to
equalized the living conditions of Black and White Americans. The
"racial gap" (two-to-one in favor of Whites) has not changed under
formal equal opportunity.442 More specifically, each segment of
Black society experiences socioeconomic problems under formal
equal opportunity that are quite different from those encountered by
their White counterparts. Middle-class Blacks face loneliness, disaf-
fection, stress and hypertension, complex racial discrimination, and
de facto segregation in high-level jobs.443 Working-class Blacks en-
dure housing discrimination and segregation, often accompanied by
violence, a lack of quality education in primary schools, and low en-
rollment in higher education.444 Underclass Blacks are plagued by a
proclivity toward socioeconomic dysfunction and self-destruction.445
My thesis is that formal equal opportunity is more than an inade-
440. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
441. See supra text accompanying notes 16-33.
442. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
443. See supra text accompanying notes 66-122.
444. See supra text accompanying notes 212-34.
445. See supra text accompanying notes 375-404.
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quate remedy for today's version of the American race problem (so-
cioeconomic vulnerability within Black society). Formal equal oppor-
tunity fuels the very conditions it seeks to ameliorate. It does so
because decisionmakers (whether formalists or instumentalists446)
too often apply formal equal opportunity's twin tenets (racial omis-
sion and racial integation4 47) in ways that subordinate (give low pri-
ority to) the civil rights interests of Black Americans. And such ra-
cial subordination contributes to the American race problem because
it denies Black Americans resources that are necessary to alleviate
the conditions that define the American race problem.448 Conse-
quently, formal equal opportunity leaves Black Americans more vul-
nerable than they otherwise need be to racial discrimination and seg-
regation in employment and housing, poor public education, low
college enrollment, a proclivity toward dysfunction and self-destruc-
tion and other socioeconomic conditions that define the American
race problem. Formal equal opportunity thereby accommodates, pro-
longs, and intensifies the American race problem. It may even en-
courage certain conditions of the American race problem, such as
complex racial discrimination.449 In short, under formal equal oppor-
tunity, Black Americans are (still) called upon to shoulder a dispro-
portionate amount of racial discrimination, segregation, and other
societal hardships. This fact of American life simply cannot be
denied.
For this reason, one is left to wonder whether the best days of
formal equal opportunity are behind us. Should the focus of civil
rights scholarship and policymaking be on a search for a successor
civil rights policy? Is there an historical process at work that moves
us through indenture survitude (1619-1638), slavery (1638-1863),
separate but equal (1863-1954), formal equal opportunity (1954-pre-
sent), and finally to a new racial paradigm that delivers genuine
equal opportunity? Or is formal equal opportunity the capstone of
this historical movement, leaving civil rights scholars and policymak-
ers with the difficult task of "patching up" its defects? In short, do
we look within or without the existing racial paradigm for a remedy
to the problem of racial subordination?
I believe these are the questions for the current generation of civil
446. See supra text accompanying notes 40-52.
447. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
448. See supra text accompanying notes 67-122, 212-34, 359-404 and 366-69 for a
summary of these conditions.
449. See supra text accompanying notes 270-79.
rights scholars and policymakers. The recent passage of the Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988450 is a small step in the right
direction. But any attempt to construct a normative response to the
question of where do we go from here should meet at least three
conditions: (1) it must be attentive to class stratification in Black
society; (2) it must be careful to avoid new forms of racial subordi-
nation; and (3) it must be reconcilable with the basic structure and
direction of American society - our liberal democratic state. To il-
lustrate how these conditions might operate, it may be useful to ap-
ply them to the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, which
many believe offers vision to civil rights scholars and policymakers.
Comprised of a heterogenous constellation of legal scholars451 who
have moved far beyond their roots in legal realism,452 CLS believes
that a fundamental restructuring of society is necessary for a more
just society. CLS arrives at this position from the basic premise that
the rule of law cannot bring about significant social change ("social
transformation"). 453 Behind this premise is an analysis ("deconstruc-
tion" or "trashing") of law and the Anglo-American legal tradition
("Western liberalism" or "liberal legalism") that makes the follow-
ing points: legal doctrine is fashioned out of conflicting values (such
as, public versus private, individual versus community, good versus
evil, and freedom versus security) as well as political considera-
tions;454 the language in which rights are stated fails to recognize
differences in wealth and political power;455 and when minorities and
450. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat.
1619, approved Sept. 13, 1988, amending 42 U.S.C. 3601-31 (1982). The amendments,
inter alia: give the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) authority to
investigate charges of housing discrimination, file a complaint on his or her own initia-
tive, seek conciliation, or refer charges to the Attorney General for prosecution in federal
court (Section 810); give the charging party (and the respondent as well) the option to
have the dispute resolved in a hearing before an administrative law judge or in a civil
action (Section 812); give administrative law judges authority to assess civil penalties
between $10,000 and $50,000, depending on the frequency of violation (Section 812(g));
and give the Attorney General authority to seek civil penalties of between $50,000 and
$ 100,000, depending on the frequency of violation, against individuals or groups found to
have engaged in a pattern or practice of housing discrimination (Section 814).
451. See generally Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies,
94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984).
452. See Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social
Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV.
509 (1984). For a discussion of legal realism, see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
453. See, e.g., Gable & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4, 54
(1984).
454. See, e.g., Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 287 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Greer, Antonio Gramsci and
"Legal Hegemony", in id. at 305. Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness
and the fact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1563, 1577 (1984).
455. See, e.g., Sparer, supra note 452, at 516; Schneider, The Dialetic of Rights
and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 594
(1984); Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE POLITICS OF LAW:
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other "marginalized people" rely on rights granted ("loaned") by
the government, they have nothing concrete, only intoxicating rheto-
ric on which to rely, they become blind to the real political choices at
stake, they become dependent on the government for creating social
change, and, worse, they confirm the legitmacy of America's oppres-
sive class structure (rights are "indeterminate," "inalienable," "un-
stable," "coopting," and serve a "hegemonic and legitimating
function") .456
While many of the individual claims advanced by CLS have
merit, but are not particularly new,457 CLS taken as a whole is a
naive and false response to the question of where do we go from
here. It fails to meet all three conditions. Hence, CLS offers no di-
rection for civil rights scholars and policymakers.
With respect to the first condition - the need to be cognizant of
class structure in Black society-CLS is nonresponsive to the partic-
ular problems and interests of each class within Black society. Fur-
ther, CLS seems to assume that class leveling will necessarily resolve
the problem of racism, but then again CLS never really deals with
the issue of race or color, as scores of minority scholars have pointed
out.
458
A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 111, supra note 460, at 111.
456. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 453, at 27; Gabel, supra note 453, at 1577;
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363, 1364, 1370-71, 1375 (1984);
Trubek, Where the Action is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV.
575, 578 (1984). See generally Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 561 (1983); Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983
Wis. L. REV. 379. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981);
Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 RES. IN L. & Soc'Y 25 (1980); Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1979).
457. For example, more than 100 years ago, Holmes underscored the indetermi-
nate and unstable quality of rights. In Lecture I of his 1881 book THE COMMON LAW, a
lecture that dealt with the early forms of liability, Holmes begins with the following
powerful passage:
The object of this book is to present a general view of the Common Law. To
accomplish the task, other tools are needed besides logic. It is something to
show that the consistency of a system requires a particular result, but it is not
all. The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
determining the rules by which men should be govern....
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
458. For a critique of CLS by minority scholars, see, e.g., Crehshaw, Race, Re-form and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of
Race - Does the Fundamental Contradiction have a Corollary? 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
CLS' failure to deal with racism, an important fact of life for
Black Americans, says something about its ability to avoid new
forms of racial subordination which is the second condition. CLS not
only fails to factor in racism in its theory of social oppression but
also fails to do so in its model of the just society (autonomous indi-
viduals living in small communities). The omission of racism gives no
respect to a Black American perspective on life in America. It treats
Black Americans - their problems, their interests, their hopes, their
desires - as invisible. It also generates a false understanding of the
role of rights in social transformation. That is, by taking the Black
experience into account, one is able to see clearly that rights do mat-
ter in the lives of an oppressed people. It matters to a Black Ameri-
can whether he or she has no right to sit at the front of the bus or a
fundamental right to sit wherever he or she desires. To go from one
situation (separate but equal) to the other (formal equal opportu-
nity) is significant social transformation. Also, "rights conscious-
ness" is important to an oppressed people because it gives them sta-
tus and protects against government-sponsored and some forms of
private racism, whether such racism takes place in large or small
communities.459 In short, CLS has its own brand of racial subordina-
tion and that alone destroys its ability to offer sound guidance for
today's civil rights scholars and policymakers.
The final condition - that any theory of remediation must be con-
sistent with our liberal democratic state - is also fatal to CLS. The
CLS movement seems to call for fundamental change in society's
structure.460 This is highly chimerical. There is simply no market in
this country for a radical restructuring of a society that has benefited
far more people than it has oppressed. Not even Black Americans,
who along with Native Americans remain at the bottom of the socio-
economic ladder,48 1 are inclined to jettison the existing social order.
No theory of social change can be realistic if it goes in one direction
while the course of society goes in the opposite direction.
If my thesis concerning formal equal opportunity is substantially
correct,462 then the issue of where do we go from here or, more spe-
cifically, the issue of how do we remedy racial subordination through
REV. 407 (1988); Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does CLS Have What Minorities
Want?, 22 HARV. CL-CR L. REv. 301 (1987); Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical
Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Dalton, The
Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.L.-C.R. L. REv. 437 (1987); Williams, Alchemical Notes:
Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401
(1987); Williams, Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal
Theory for Peoples of Color, 5 L. & INEQUALITY 103 (1987).
459. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV.
460. See supra text accompanying note 452.
461. See, e.g., L. THURLOW, THE ZERO SUM SOCIETY 184-87 (1980).
462. See supra text accompanying notes 445-449.
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formal equal opportunity, may be the central issue with which civil
rights scholars and policymakers must now grapple. Any normative
response to this issue must be cognizant of class stratification within
Black society, racial subordination, and the dictates of our liberal
democratic state. To ignore these conditions is to risk creating a new
civil rights theory or movement that is less viable, livable, or com-
fortable for Black Americans than is the received tradition - warts
and all.

